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ABSTRACT 
Despite the heightened focus on the effects of war on girls, they are still being inappropriately 
grouped under the larger rubric of ‗women‘ or ‗females‘. Since the distinctions in girls‘ and 
women‘s war experiences are not yet well understood (McKay, 2006), this research argues that 
gender analysis is crucial to effective development as it relates to young soldiers. It also 
advocates a distinct analytical focus on girls who exit armed forces as young women (at times as 
a result of having children). One must go beyond the universalistic narrative of ‗women‘s‘ 
experiences of armed conflict and political violence and focus on the experiences of specific 
categories of females. Therefore, the girls‘ war experiences as young and, later, older girls 
require specific attention. This attention will both contribute to a balanced debate on young 
soldiers participating directly in armed conflicts and address the issues and needs which are 
important to the reintegration of girl soldiers exiting fighting forces. The present study is about 
formerly abducted girls in Acholi sub region, northern Uganda. As adolescents and teenagers, 
they were abducted by the Lord‘s Resistance Army and many returned to their communities with 
children fathered by the fighters. This thesis systematically looks at their socio-economic 
reintegration process, experiences and progress over the years. Through a series of 57 in-depth 
and 12 group interviews, this qualitative study explores long-term reintegration from the 
participants‘ perspectives. The study identifies and analyses the central themes in their lives, 
including: physical and mental scars of abduction and life in captivity, stigmatisation, marriage 
complexities, and economic hardships. To date, the growing body of reintegration literature has 
focused on the first one or two years after exiting an armed group, and long-term reintegration 
studies are still limited. Therefore, through these themes, the thesis contributes to the 
conceptualisation of reintegration and understanding of the participants‘ past and current life 
situations.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Child soldiering has not always been perceived as an issue affecting girls; only recently has 
research given attention to the realities of girl soldiering. Evidence has shown that like boys, 
girls comprise a significant proportion of adolescent and teenage soldiers involved with armed 
groups globally (see Machel, 1996; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2004:7–10; 
MacKay &Mazurana, 2004; Paris Principles, 2007; Hobson, 2005). 1 Although there are 
numerically fewer girls than boys among child soldiers, their numbers are still significant, and 
their experiences distinct. Despite this increased attention, the literature is still lacking when it 
comes to their lived experience of war and reintegration (Tonheim, 2010:18; Wessells, 
2007b:3).We have little sense of the magnitude, incidence, and nature of the violence, trauma 
and suffering, or the resilience, of girl soldiers in post-conflict situations. This thesis attempts to 
contribute to understanding the involvement of girls and young women in the Lord‘s Resistance 
Army (LRA) conflict in Northern Uganda and to shed light on their experience of post-war 
reintegration.  
According to the Paris Principles, a child soldier/‗a child Associated with an Armed force or 
Armed group (CAAF/A)‘ is, ‗any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited 
or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, 
boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does 
not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities‘ (2007: 7).  This 
definition includes girls who are recruited forcibly as well as those who join armed groups 
voluntarily. The focus in this thesis is on girl abductees—female adolescents and teenagers that 
are forcibly recruited into armed groups to aid their military work (I further discuss the 
controversy surrounding terminologies used to describe female adolescents that participate in 
armed conflicts in Chapter Three).  
Official English terminologies and classifications do not always correspond to local perceptions. 
I recognise that cultural meanings of childhood and girlhood may diverge from the Paris 
Principles definition. The notion of childhood that informs international policy (see Convention 
on the Right of the Child, 1989) and defines a child as ‗every human being below the age of 18 
                                                             
1Throughout this thesis, ‗armed group‘ is used to mean non-government militia force (rebels), and in the Ugandan 
context, the Lord‘s Resistance Army. 
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years‘ does not overlap entirely with Acholi understandings of childhood and adulthood (a 
discussion on Acholi society is given in Chapter Four). In rural areas of Acholi where the 
Western cultural notion and rite of passage of being a teenager do not exist, an adolescent girl is 
considered to be woman upon experiencing menstruation cycles or simply developing breasts. 
She is also considered to be a woman once she is sexually active or married or given birth (see 
McKay, 2006:90; 2005c:387; Bunting& Merry, 2006). In Acholi contexts, adolescence is 
considered to be between the ages of 10 and 17. The orobo (‗youth‘) are considered to be people 
between the age of 15 and 30. The youth are distinct from adolescents in that they are sexually 
active, a category which also includes females from age 12 and above. In contrast to Western 
societies where persons are normally thought of as children if they are younger than 18 years of 
age, in Acholi custom, girls in the age range of 12-16 are considered ready for marriage and 
bearing children. They become women as soon as they marry or get pregnant, even if this occurs 
at 12 or 13. A pregnant girl, though young in age, will start self-identifying as a woman rather 
than a child. In the following chapters, I have retained the terminology of ‗former girl abductee‘2 
used by the subjects of my inquiry. I prefer to speak of ‗girls‘ or ‗young women‘ who were 
formerly abductedrather than of ‗children‘, because not all of these girls/women were seen, or 
saw themselves as ‗children‘ in the English sense of this term, before, during, or after their 
abduction. 
This study is about the lives and post-war reintegration experiences of former girl abductees in 
northern Uganda, particularly in the Acholi sub-region. These girls and young women were 
abducted by the LRA in their fight against the Ugandan government (the war in northern Uganda 
is discussed in Chapter Two). They later exited the armed group and returned to their families 
and communities. Based on fieldwork undertaken in Acholi in 2012 and 2013, the thesis attempts 
to gain a better understanding of who these young women are and how their return to their 
communities and reintegration has proceeded.It studies their war involvement and shows how 
and to what extent this experience influenced their reintegration and continues to influence their 
status and opportunities in their societies.  
                                                             
2 ‗Former girl abductee‘, an unofficial terminology commonly employed at the time of fieldwork by reception 
centers in Northern Uganda to distinguish between returning veterans who had joined the LRA following forced 
abduction and others who had not been abducted  (for example, those who voluntarily joined the LRA).  
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1.1 The persistence of stigma: reintegration as a lifetime process. 
The thesis mainly contributes to the literature of post-war reintegration experiences. According 
to the United Nation‘s Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards 
(IDDRS), reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain 
sustainable employment and income. It is essentially a social and economic process of 
development with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It 
is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often 
necessitates long-term external assistance (IDDRS, 2006 1.10, a detailed analysis of this concept 
is given in Chapter Three).  
Since the war began in 1986, Acholi has received research attention and many reports have 
appeared about the genesis of the conflict, the experiences of those willingly or unwillingly 
involved in it, and the impacts of humanitarian intervention (see McKay &Mazurana, 2004:54: 
Veale &Stavrou, 2000:29; Allen &Schomerus, 2006:23–27). So this is not the first study about 
girls as direct participants of war in Uganda and their reintegration. However, this research is 
different because it goes beyond the modalities of reintegration or immediate experiences of 
exiting an armed group and follows the trajectories of these young women as they struggled to 
rebuild meaningful lives after leaving the LRA camps. Most detailed research studies on 
northern Uganda focus either on child soldiering or girls associated with the LRA in general, and 
most were done in the first two years following participants‘ exit from armed groups. Although 
they have been included in important surveys (e.g. Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY)), 
empirical research to identify long-term gender-specific issues facing them in their villages is 
still limited. It is important to examine how the return of these young women affected their 
friends and families at home, how they related to other social actors (such as potential partners or 
employers), and how these relationships were perceived and negotiated by the girls themselves.  
The reintegration practice emphasises the importance of family and community reunification: 
‗the family and community generally provides the most effective protection for [formerly 
abducted] children‘ (Paris Principle, 2007:23). The reintegration philosophy calls for every effort 
to immediately return and keep formerly abducted children with their families where it is 
assumed that they will be adequately cared for and protected. Principally, the current 
understanding of reintegration implies stability and continuity of family and community 
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contexts. But, as we shall see from the Acholi case study, this is never the case. Girls go back to 
complex communities, which have been profoundly affected by years of war. Changes in the 
contemporary social and economic organisation of Acholi societyinfluenced the type of activities 
that these women can engage in when they get back. Moreover, and in spite of changes in many 
spheres of life, Acholi is still predominantly a patriarchal culture (Baines&Gauvin, 2014; Porter, 
2012; 2013). Residence and inheritance of important assets like land still follow patrilineal 
criteria. Gender inequalities cut across different social domains. These young women are 
confronted with the gendered expectations of their familial and extra-familial networks, and they 
themselves are changed persons who cannot leavebehind their LRA experiences.  
Research findings demonstrate that reintegration is a lifelong process, which goes beyond 
immediate family and community acceptance (or rejection, as the case may be, see Chapter, 
Three). Although after they left the LRA all of the study participants were accepted by their 
families, they did not perceive this preliminary family acceptance as ‗actual‘ reintegration. Being 
accepted by their families was the starting point for reintegration. To them, reintegration—often 
described in phrases like ‗my coming back home‘, ‗being home again‘ or ‗pleased to be alive‘— 
was seen as a second chance for life, as personal development and an opportunity to rebuild their 
shattered lives. But their experiences with the LRA changed them profoundly and changed the 
way in which they were perceived and treated by their society of origin. In particular, stigma was 
a major obstacle to long-term reintegration.  
To analyse the long-term impacts of war on girl abductees it is necessary to investigate what may 
be termed the ‗paradox of stigma‘. The study participants were among the many unlawfully and 
forcibly recruited adolescents and teenagers, a fact that is acknowledged and accepted in both 
urban and rural contexts of Acholi sub region. This implies tha ton their return, abducted 
individuals in northern Uganda should be accepted, protected, and treated with care and 
compassion by their families and villages. However, formerly abducted persons in Acholi 
continue to be highly stigmatized and marginalised. 
To understand this paradox, one needs to understand the profound value and need attached to 
maintaining social harmony in Acholi culture (see Porter, 2012; 2013; Ofumbi, 2012:116; 
Finnstrom, 2008) and the construct of ‗self‘ (Chapter Four). Because ‗[social harmony] denotes a 
state of normal relations among the living and the dead, linked to an idea of cosmological 
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equilibrium and a social balance of power and moral order‘ (Porter, 2013:15), ‗social harmony is 
the highest goal of the Acholi community‘ (Ofumbi, 2012:116). An individual‘s life should thus 
be lived in line with achieving this harmony/moral order. However, following a disaster, like an 
armed conflict, social harmony becomes ‗difficult to achieve and even harder to maintain‘ 
(Porter, 2013:15). People who negatively contribute to this harmony like the LRA are seen as, 
‗internal strangers‘ (to borrow Behrend‘s [1999] phrase). Due to their association with the LRA, 
formerly abducted persons have transgressed the social harmony and are seen as ‗internal 
strangers‘ and ‗wrong doers‘ who are a ‗threat‘ to the Acholi culture. Because their actions are 
believed to cause serious misfortunes in the community (I discuss this theme further in Chapter 
Four), there is great need to restore and protect the social harmony. Since it cannot be ‗protected 
and ensured by an efficient formal judicial system with moral authority…, in some cases, the 
pursuit of social harmony manifests as mob violence, organized revenge, collective killing, or 
summary execution. In other cases, response focuses on cleansing the parties and/or location 
involved in the crime, or forgiveness related to Christian theological notions‘ (Parker, 2012:86).  
Cleansing and/or forgiveness does not necessarily rule out the need for retribution: ‗punishment 
might well be considered to be deserved, but it is typically a secondary goal…‘ (ibid). Because 
formerly abducted persons were forced to transgress the social harmony, their case is—in 
principle—seen as a pardonable level of disruption to social harmony. They are forgiven and/or 
cleansed and then accepted back in their villages. Although, many of the current research 
participants have had some welcoming and cleansing rituals performed for them, their 
stigmatisation demonstrates how the principle of social harmony in Acholi has been 
compromised and distorted by the effects of war. Although their transgression is seen as a 
pardonable level of disruption to social harmony, findings suggest a notion of forgiving rather 
than forgetting any level of social harmony transgressions.  
Stigmatising and marginalizing formerly abducted people shows that Acholi have not forgotten 
the wrongs the LRA and their abductees did to them and their society. Although they have been 
forgiven, formerly abducted people remain a constant reminder of those ‗wrongs‘. In return, 
Achol people target ‗internal strangers‘ like formerly abducted people to channel their 
frustration, guilt and confusion. With their personalities considered to be ‗polluted‘ and no 
longer seen as ‗normal‘ Acholi people (Chapter Five), they are stigmatized and marginalized 
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within their villages. Early in the research process, it became clear that what the study 
participants had in common was the stigma they receive from their families and villagers as a 
consequence of their abduction and life in captivity. The Paris Principles (2007) observes that 
stigmatisation of formerly abducted girls ‗is one of greatest barriers to 
reintegration(p.32)...stigma facing [them] is fundamentally different in kind—it lasts much 
longer, is critically more difficult to reduce and is more severe‘ (p.36). The evidence from Acholi 
overwhelmingly supports this hypothesis.  
Although cleansing rituals and forgiveness enormously comforted and reassured formerly 
abducted people that they were welcome to reintegrate back into their families and villages, they 
have not protected them from stigma. Even if families have accepted them, because of their 
transgression, their stigma at community level is long lasting.  As I will elaborate later, 
stigmatization negatively impacts formerly abducted girls‘ attempts to associate with other 
people in their immediate settings and makes it difficult for them to get into and/or sustain 
marriages.  
1.2 Not just ‘passive victims’: revealing girls’ agency in the reintegration process 
This study also contributes to debates on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR). Whereas all the three elements of DDR are equally important in restoring peace and 
security, sustainable reconstruction and development, this thesis will primarily focus on the final 
phase of DDR: reintegration. The Integrated DDR Standards identifies reintegration as the most 
complex phase of any DDR programme (UN IDDRS, 2006: Section 6.3). In his study of DDR of 
former combatants in a peace building context, Ozerdem describes reintegration as ‗an open-
ended process during which DDR programme merges with the ongoing post-conflict process‘ 
(2009:21, see also UN, 2010:13).   
Since different elements of a DDR programme are intertwined, that is to say they are part of a 
seamless web in transition from military to civilian life without a clear beginning or end (ibid), it 
is impossible to analyse reintegration in isolation from disarmament and demobilisation (this is 
true particularly for the initial stages of reintegration). Although the study was conducted at a 
time when disarmament and demobilisation in northern Uganda had ended, it looks at how 
disarmament and demobilisation contributed to reintegration. The study investigates how 
reintegration is defined by policy makers, researchers, academics, and practitioners among 
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others. It also identifies their varied expectations of successful reintegration. The thesis then 
analyses the socio-economic reintegration experiences of formerly abducted girls as well as their 
perceptions of what successful reintegration might involve.  
It is essential that any analysis of the plight of former girl soldiers in Africa is sensitive to local 
contexts and their experiences should be understood within a particular conflict and context (see 
Coulter, 2009; Stavrou, 2005; McKay &Mazurana 2004; Verhey, 2004). Acholi sub region was 
selected as a research setting because of the widespread direct participation of local girls in 
armed conflict, involving stays of varying length with the armed group. Estimates placed 70 to 
80% of the LRA as adolescent and youth combatants (UNICEF, 2006). Most of these were from 
Acholi area (see Pham, et al 2007:14).It has been estimated that adolescent girls made up 
approximately 30% of the armed group (UNICEF, 2006).  Of those who returned, many had 
given birth to children in captivity (McKay &Mazurana, 2004:9, 88, Annan et al., 2006; 2008). 
At the time of this research, villages and hamlets in this region were confronted daily with the 
problem of reintegration of children and their mothers. Thus, the conflict in Northern Uganda 
can be considered as offering the opportunity for studying the impacts of abduction, child abuse 
and early parenting on girls. Widespread involuntary recruitment in Acholi has created a ‗pool‘ 
of formerly abducted girls, potential research subjects with important information on 
rehabilitation and reintegration processes and experiences to relate. 
The thesis shows that although abducted girls in war situations are highly vulnerable, they are 
not passive victims.Young females, particularly those who return with children fathered by the 
rebels (so-called child mothers), are often described as the most vulnerable upon return home. 
Following her extensive research on women, girls and armed conflicts, Susan McKay found that, 
girls, ‗…are among the most vulnerable in post-war contexts‘ (2004:1). She further emphasized 
that the situation is worse for child mothers: ‗the presence of ―war babies‖ can worsen their 
[mothers] situations, because these girl mothers and their children are often subject to 
resentment, due to the children‘s unknown paternity, or because their fathers are known to be 
rebels‘ (ibid). All important policy documents on child soldiering recognise child/girl mothers as 
a particularly vulnerable group, needing explicit attention within the contexts of their 
communities (for example, see the 2007 Paris Principles; Machel‘s 10-year strategic review; 
UNICEF 2009 and IDDRS 2006). It is argued that some young soldiers should be prioritized for 
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reintegration because of their experiences, including those who have been severely abused and 
girls who have become mothers in fighting forces (Jareg, 2005). I agree with this analysis and re-
stress that this category of girl soldiers and their children have distinct vulnerabilities and needs. 
Returning to their communities with children fathered by the rebels/enemies puts such mothers 
in complex economic, social and cultural situations. However, as findings in Acholi show, this 
varies with individuals, their families and wider society: for example, when families are 
supportive, as in most cases in Acholi where maternal families take on the responsibility for 
children born out of wedlock,3 the mother is able to remarry and start a new life, go back to 
school/training, or engage in small business activities. Without such family support, the child is 
an obstacle for the mother‘s re-marriage and beginning of a new life. While returning with a 
child fathered by a rebel fighter may make life difficult for the mother, in most cases, girl 
abductees (with children or not) are highly vulnerable and share common social and economic 
challenges. 
African girls and young women who directly participate in armed conflicts in particular have 
been ‗too visible as super-victims‘ (Park 2006:316; Nordstrom 1997:3): ‗too often girls are 
considered only as silent victims of (sexual) assault—devoid of agency, moral conscience, 
economic potential or political awareness….‘(Nordstrom 1997:36; see also, Denov, 2007; Utas, 
2005; Coulter, 2008).While this image of girls and young women as passive victims ‗drives 
policy making at the global level, donor funding at the country level, and program design on the 
ground‘ (Annan et al (2009:1), it also contributes to their (and boys‘) invisibility and 
marginalization in post war societies:  
when child soldiers are constructed as completely lacking in agency during conflict, the 
need for accountability mechanisms to actively engage with them post conflict 
correspondingly diminishes and, what is more, perceptions regarding their ability to play 
a vigorous or independent role in post conflict reconstruction dim, relegating them to the 
perimeter of the transformative project (Drumble, 2009:9).  
Researchers like Utas (2005), Vigh (2006), Honwana (2006), and Denov (2007), among others, 
have challenged the passive victim image. Their work sheds light on the variegated experiences 
                                                             
3 The Acholi people highly regard their children and grandchildren. It is believed that when a child is not taken care 
of, the spirit of the dead son/daughter will haunt the family. This applies to grandchildren as well and for the case of 
children born out of wedlock, the burden falls on the maternal families. 
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of female child soldiers and shows how they carefully and consciouslynavigatewar situations. 
Such studies draw attention to their capacity for reflexivity, agency, resistance and 
resilience.They show that while experiences of forceful recruitment, indoctrination, sexual abuse, 
and life in captivity point to victimhood, the fact that girls and young women manage to make 
the best out of their circumstances should be seen as ‗tactical agency‘ (Honwana, 2006:96).These 
works emphasise theneed to seegirls and young women‘s lives in war and post war situations as 
constantly adjusting in response to the social and economic opportunities and constraints that 
emerge unexpectedly and ambiguously within war zones: 
The agency of these women is not a matter of ―have, nor have not,‖ but rather represents 
a range of realizable possibilities that are informed by specific social contexts as well as 
larger economic and political contingencies. A more robust analysis of women‘s lives in 
the war zone requires seeing women as something other than mere victimsdevoid of 
agency, or alternatively as ―fully free actors,‖ but rather as tactical agents engaged in the 
difficult task of social navigation (Utas, 2005:426). 
 
The thesis contributes to theabove literature and argues that whileabducted girls find themselves 
in complex and inhumane circumstances; they consciously make choices that ensure their 
security and survival. Analysing their abduction and life in captivity experiences in Chapter Five, 
we shall see that right from the day of their involuntary military recruitment, study participants 
were actively engaged in the LRA world they suddenly found themselves thrown into.They 
consciously and effectively devised ways to make the best of their adverse situation.Although 
there was not much room to resist physical and sexual violence in the LRA contexts (see also 
McKay &Mazurana 2004; Calson&Mazurana, 2008),most girls openly opposed rape and early 
forced marriages. According to Connell, the agency of abused women is primarily visible in ‗the 
exercise of any measure of resistance and self-determination used by an abused woman to regain 
control in her life and in her attempt to stop the abuse she experiences,‘ (1997:118). Perhaps the 
most decisive moral choice abducted girls in the LRA made was to venture into escaping, despite 
all the threats of being killed if unsuccessful. Those who compromised and adapted 
pragmatically to their new circumstances, however harsh, also exercised self-determination as 
they effectively executed their allocated tasks to ensure a good relationship with their abductors. 
Back home, they continue making choices and actively engaging with the world. As I shall 
demonstrate later, by their own efforts, former girl abductees cope with adversity and exercise 
some levels of calculated agency as they attempt to make life bearable. One important way they 
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demonstrate that they are not just passive victims but active agents, is through their attempts to 
engage in livelihoods (means of securing the necessities of life). However, their options for 
strategic action are not infinite. Their agency is influenced by their status in society and, in turn, 
their status and opportunities are shaped by gender ideologies and the sexual division of labour.  
Because livelihood opportunities for young women are different from opportunities for 
boys/men, the positionality of formerly abducted young women affects their opportunities in 
their villages. Moreover, the opportunities of former abductees are not only limited by prevailing 
patriarchal values, but also—as has been mentioned above—by an added ‗stigma effect‘ that 
marginalises them further not only as women, but also as women whose identities have been 
spoiled by war.  
Crop growing is the main livelihood that formerly abducted girls can engage in.  However, 
because of their gender, their participation in peasant farming is limited. Individual males have 
claims on patrilineal clan resources like land. Because women access and use land only through 
husbands and fathers, marriage ‗is life‘ for young women in rural Acholi. Marriages remain 
patrilineal and patrilocal. Women in legitimate marriages are in a more secure position to access 
their husbands‘ clan land. However, because of their stigmatised status, formerly abducted girls 
are at a disadvantage. They are unable to secure and/maintain formal marriages to ensure their 
access to, and usage of this important resource.  
Stigmatisation also limits their ability to explore their community networking trust, cohesion and 
inclusion where they would obtain information and other resources, and find social support. As a 
result, many of them are unable to participate in crop production or/and engage in more highly 
respected and profitable supplementary livelihood strategies. However, to meet their basic needs, 
they venture into other less stable sources of income including, hawking, odd jobs, distilling and 
brewing among others. Because they are aware that ability to earn an income is a valuable way 
of alleviating their predicament, they are hardworking, shrewd and willing to work in groups or 
as individuals.  
The research found that their reintegration is not a task for their families, communities and 
NGOs. These young women are aware that although other stakeholders of reintegration are 
necessary, to achieve a successful reintegration, these girl veterans must primarily help 
themselves. They must continuously renegotiate their identities and opportunities in multiple 
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circumstances—at home, but also in many extra-familial institutions. They have significant 
insights into their circumstances and how to improve them. Most of them see themselves as 
having a sense of future and a voice that needs to be heard. This is not to imply that this category 
of young women in Uganda is without challenges to their daily lives, but like other youth in the 
region, they desire to be recognised for their particular capacities, resilience and vulnerabilities 
as well.  
Generally, their lives do not demonstrate passiveness but experiences of resolve, courage, 
resilience and agency. As victims, survivors, and occasionally perpetrators of violence, they 
show strength, independence, and determination to survive (see also Utas, 2005; Coulter, 2009). 
The findings demonstrate how female youth who returned to ‗bad surroundings‘ (to borrow 
Finnstrom‘s [2008] phrase) of Acholi, are re-building their lives, negotiating and making choices 
in their immediate and community settings to facilitate their reintegration. The findings highlight 
a need to ask formerly abducted girls to tell their own experiences, ‗rather than assuming the 
right to speak for them‘ (Nordstrom, 1997: 36). They also portray urgency for increasing girls‘ 
agency in war situations and not toning it down: ‗girls must gain a sense of agency and control 
over their lives, if they and their children are to survive and thrive‘ (McKay, 2004:27, see also 
Paris Principles, 2007:31). The thesis discusses the study participants as active agents who relied 
on different tactics in their attempts to cope and survive life in captivity. The thesis will 
demonstrate how they continue to survive by exploiting the opportunities provided by the 
conditions produced by the post-conflict Acholi. To give them a voice, as a logical focus of the 
research, I allowed their particular circumstances and experiences to emerge from their stories 
and inform the study of what was important for their wellbeing. It remains my goal to 
specifically portray their lived experiences through their own eyes and in their own words.  
1.3 Positionality 
A research idea seldom comes into view as a surprise to the researcher, but rather as the result of 
considerations and reflections about the research interest and positionality. In terms of selecting 
an area of interest for an investigation and how the research was to be conducted, my experience 
was no different. I came to learn about abductions of children in northern Uganda in 2004. Like 
many youth in the south of Uganda, I had not paid much attention to the complex emergency in 
the north. Although the persistent fighting and suffering of people in this region appeared in the 
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daily media, I remained ignorant of the plight that children, teenagers and youth faced. However 
this changed in 2004 when I came across a publication detailing the abduction of 139 girls from 
St. Mary‘s boarding secondary school in Aboke, Apac District, northern Uganda (see 
Temmerman, 2001). I had joined Makerere University for a Bachelors course in Economics. This 
kidnapping that came to be commonly known as ‗Aboke abductions‘ or ‗Aboke girls‘ drew 
attention of Ugandans in the south (and beyond) to the insurgency and suffering of children in 
the north. Although 109 of the abducted girls had been rescued by their head teacher, the fate of 
the remaining 30 raised questions and concerns in the Ugandan public. I began paying attention 
to this complex emergency and I learned that cases similar to Aboke abductions were wide 
spread and many girls and boys had been forced to stop school and join the LRA in their fight 
against the Ugandan army. I understood that many of them were dying in captivity and those 
who escaped faced a bleak future in their communities. In 2008/9, as I undertook MSc in 
Disaster Management, I learned more about the child soldiering phenomenon in Africa. I learned 
that militias particularly target adolescents and teenagers to advance their agendas. This 
awareness motivated me to seek more knowledge and understanding of the situation of abducted 
children, particularly the reintegration process and experiences of returning girls.  
Before I went to the field, as a researcher, I viewed myself as the one who determined the 
research agenda and decided how to organize research design, data collection, its refining and 
interpretation. However, during field work, although I was still the central figure, I recognized 
the research was a joint product of the participants, myself, and our relationship. This realization 
further pushed me to reflect and clearly identify my positionality/positionalities in this research 
process. It is argued that positionality—‗your place in space‘ (Sayed, 2008)—allows a researcher 
to clearly state the perspectives/lens through which she or he interprets a social world. Maher and 
Tetreault (2001:22) explain that, ‗knowledge is valid when it takes into account the knower‘s 
specific position in any context, a position always defined by gender, race, class and other 
socially significant dimensions‘. Apart from these aspects of identity, positionality may also be 
defined by personal experience including employment, academic background and training, and 
previous projects worked on, among others. Thus the researcher‘s perspective, which holds a key 
role in the research process, is influenced by these aspects of identity and personal experiences 
(Denzin& Lincoln, 2003). It is significant for a qualitative researcher to continuously reflect on 
his or her positionality throughout the research process. Reflexivity creates an awareness of the 
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researcher‘s prejudices, such as ‗… preconceptions, motivations and ways of seeing [which] 
shape the qualitative research process‘ (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008:333; see also Robson, 2002:22). 
Deutsch (2004:888–889) writes that: 
… the researcher‘s own awareness of her or his own subjective experience in relation to 
that of her or his participants‘ is key to acknowledging the limits of objectivity. It 
recognizes the bi-directional nature of research. I am subject, object, and researcher. My 
participants are subjects, objects, and actors. To assert otherwise is to be disingenuous 
about the process of research, especially qualitative research. 
Being sensitive to contextual ethical issues, it was important for this author to identify the main 
identities and backgrounds that influenced the research process. International students returning 
to their home countries to conduct fieldwork may face a problematic distinction of ‗field‘ versus 
‗home‘ (see Katz, 1994; Hyndman, 2001, Oriole, 2012). However, this did not apply to this 
author, because going to do fieldwork in Northern Uganda was by no means returning ‗home‘.  
I was born and raised in rural Western Uganda (Ankole sub-region) and then moved to and 
studied in the capital, Kampala (Central Region, Buganda sub-region). In a general sense, when I 
think about my positionality, it includes aspects of a young woman growing up in rural Uganda, 
followed by internal migration to the capital city, leading to attendance at six schools (both in 
rural and urban areas) and pursuing higher education in Kampala and England. I had never been 
to Northern Uganda prior to the field study. Similarly, most participants had never been to 
Central or Western Uganda. The field sites were typical villages and semi-urban towns, quite 
different from the capital city where I dwell when in Uganda. After only a few days in the field, I 
could tell the social and economic differences between myself and the fellow Ugandan young 
women I was researching. For example, the class difference was clear. They came from poor 
peasant families. I was from the capital, from the urban elite who are highly respected by rural 
people everywhere in Uganda. I was aware that at times such respect (and distinction) is met 
with some level of resistance and resentment. I also became aware of my education and 
economic privileges: the fact that I could speak, read and write English, I wore shoes, changed 
my clothes daily, had plaited hair, had a watch, camera and notebook, and moved by car, among 
others, all placed the participants and me indifferent positions. 
Before I went to Acholi, as a Ugandan woman, I perceived myself to be an ‗insider‘. ‗Insider‘ 
research is where ‗social interviews [are] conducted between researchers and participants who 
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share a similar cultural, linguistic, ethnic, national and religious heritage‘ (Deianira& Scott, 
2006:45). During this kind of research, differences between the researcher and participants ‗are 
brought into focus as a result of shared cultural knowledge‘ (ibid; see also see also Setlhabi, 
2014; Mullings, 1999:340). During the research design stage, being Ugandan, I believed was 
something that would help me during field work. However, sharing a nationality with the study 
participants did not afford me any degree of social proximity with them. Actually, I do not think 
being Ugandan helped me that much in the interview process because the interviewees were 
willing to talk to anybody (Ugandan or not) about their experiences. Regardless of historical and 
political processes locating me with them, the participants can be ‗other‘ or ‗different‘ through 
ethnicity and class privilege. In this sense I am different from the research participants: a part 
from our social and economic differences, I have no personal abduction, military or early 
motherhood background. Significantly, we do not share cultural, linguistic and religious heritage. 
Having grown up and studied in the Central and Western Regions, I can speak most of the Bantu 
languages, which are different from the Luo dialects spoken in Acholi and Lango regions (see 
Artkinson, 1994). Throughout the interview process, I relied on research assistants to help with 
translation. 
Realizing the acute differences between the study participants and me, I felt and acted as an 
‗outsider‘ researcher. However, in terms of insider-outsider and the politics of representation, 
doing research in my home country still brought in a few dynamics. For example, some people 
saw me as one of their own (Ugandan) conducting important research (getting interested in their 
life situations), while others placed me in certain categories of urban elite with authority and 
influence—‗othering‘ me. Being perceived, ethnically, as a Munyankole (person from the 
Ankole sub-region), I was likely to be associated with president Museveni‘s regime, possibly 
with strong links to the government that is dominated by Western Ugandans. Because viewing 
me completely as part of the ‗other‘ would have encouraged many participants to negotiate our 
relationship on a continual and/or beneficial basis, I distanced myself from such a position.  My 
attachment to a British university also reduced possible suspicions such as the risk of me being 
seen by some as a representative of an organization or government ministry collecting personal 
and other information. In circumstances where the ‗insider–outsider‘ divide was blurred, I found 
pursuing rapport based on mutual respect more useful. As field work progressed, I learnt to 
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embrace any possible scenarios that presented me with ‗insider‘, ‗outsider‘ or both 
positionalities. 
Although ‗insider‘ status can make the researcher accepted within the group, evidence shows that 
it can also affect the research process (see Bousetta, 1997). In my case, viewing myself as more 
of an ‗outsider‘ researcher afforded me a greater degree of objectivity. Standing as an ‗outsider‘, 
I remained conscious of the differences and hierarchies in the field. I also understood that I was 
observed and studied by those who ‗othered‘ me. Having identified the differences between the 
participants and me, to ensure the research did not do any harm, I considered the possible 
similarities as well.  
1.3.1 Gender, Age and Background 
Pratt et al. (2007) argue that the differences between the researcher and the participants (cultural, 
social and economic) can be used ‗productively‘ in the research process. They further note that, 
‗indeed, recognizing this productivity is one means of working with—rather than attempting to 
overcome—difference‘. Jacobs (2000:403) notes that, as well as considering differences, it is 
also helpful to think ‗past difference‘ and identify positions of ‗betweenness‘ (Nast, 1994:57; see 
also Harvey, 1996:360). In the current study, apart from my nationality, to bridge the cultural, 
social and economic gaps, I relied on other commonalities, particularly my gender, age and 
background. 
First, I relied on my gender to develop rapport with the participants. Research has shown that 
constructions of gender and sexuality influence and shape research encounters (see, for example, 
Valentine, 2002; Vanderbeck, 2005). It has been suggested that when both researcher and 
researched are women, the commonalities of experience help them to be able to share their ideas 
and experience (Finch, 1984; Oakley, 1981). Finch (1984:71) writes that ‗women are almost 
always enthusiastic about talking to a woman researcher, even if they have some initial anxieties 
about the purpose of the research or their own ‗performance‘ in the interview situation‘. This 
reduces the exploitable power balance between researcher and subject (Graham, 1984). From a 
feminist perspective, Oakley (1981) argues that researchers should seek to equalize the 
relationship with women they interview as part of their commitment to sisterhood.  
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Secondly, to increase my chances of developing rapport with the women, I exploited my age 
factor. Although the majority of the participants were younger than me, the fact that I was in my 
late twenties at the time of field work and willing to live in some of the remotest parts of the 
country was a clear benefit to me. Before going into the field, I had anticipated that the youngest 
participant would be between 22 and 24 years; but I met some women of 19 and 20. However, 
considering the average age of 26 (range 18–43), I can describe many of them as my age-mates. 
To avoid any form of tension as the result of age differences while approaching the participants, 
research assistants in the same age bracket were also recruited. In the long run, I believe being a 
young female interested in the lives of my fellow young women was a huge advantage to build 
rapport. With my age minimizing the ‗authority image‘ that may come with older female 
researchers, the young women found it easier to talk to me about themselves, even enquiring 
about my social life. This does not mean that I did not get on well with older participants. Age 
did not limit me when it came to talking to them either; for example, the oldest participant (43) 
talked to me generously and openly.  
Finally, my background of growing up in the rural areas of the Central and Western parts of the 
country connected me to the participants. Although the Acholi culture and lifestyle are different 
from that of these regions, having spent my childhood years in villages I could easily relate to the 
rural lifestyle in the field. Due to the identified social and economic differences, I was aware of 
the possible resentment and tension between the participants and me. However, I was confident 
that having spent my first 13 years studying and living in a village, I could bring myself to work 
with the participants without offending them in any way. Although the participants did not know 
about this background, observing them—their houses, compounds, gardens, children—I felt a 
connection stemming from our village life background. Also, the young women I met in Acholi 
villages were not distinct from the young women (particularly child mothers) I had come across 
in my village or other areas in Central and Western Uganda: neglected, marginalized and poor; 
but very hopeful and actively involved in their lives. However, due to their military background 
and lived experiences, the participants are obviously different from any other young women in 
the country. I thus depended on this background and experience to forge a relationship with the 
participants and, from my perspective, such points of identification to some extent bridged our 
class and educational differences. This connection probably enabled me to be a better and more 
informed listener. I came to appreciate this background, which made me comfortable and 
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allowed me to enjoy my time in the field. Before I commenced my fieldwork, I had not 
anticipated how useful this background would be, but when I reflect back, it actually made much 
of the fieldwork easier to execute and somehow natural.  Although I put in great effort to blend 
in as much as I could while working with the participants in villages and towns, it would be 
naive of me to assume that the relationships formed with them or other people I came across in 
northern Uganda were ever fully equal or that, after six months, I had become one of them. 
1. 4 Research Methods 
The study required the establishment of direct contact with former girl abductees through 
fieldwork (Aug 2012–Feb 2013).4In the second year of the research, efforts were made to contact 
a number of reintegration agencies in northern Uganda. Kitgum Concerned Women‘s 
Association (KICWA) took me on as an intern for the six months I was to be in the field.5 This is 
where I was stationed for most of the time while in northern Uganda. In the course of fieldwork, 
other centres were visited as well, including Gulu Support the Children Organization (GUSCO), 
World Vision Rehabilitation Centre, Kitgum Women Peace Initiative (KIWEPI) and Christian 
Counselling Fellowship (CCF). I decided to work with such agencies because I was interested in 
the local context of the war, how the reception centres addressed the needs of former girl 
abductees when they first returned home, and how the organisations were still aiding them to 
achieve a successful reintegration. KICWA welcomed and took interest in my study because they 
also sought to find out how the former girl soldiers the centre had reunited with their families 
                                                             
4 Field work was divided into two stages: preparation and pilot study (4 months) and actual fieldwork (3 months). 
The first month was spent in Kampala meeting and consulting with researchers at Makerere Institute of Social 
Research (MISR) who had worked on the conflict in northern Uganda. The author was also affiliated with MISR, 
through which field research clearance in Uganda was acquired. Ethical clearance was first obtained at the 
University of Birmingham, then from Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST), and finally 
from Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) in the respective districts worked in.   
 
5 KICWA is a Community Based Organisation that started off in August 1998. As a very small organization, its 
starting motivation was to help formerly abducted children, particularly those who could not allocate their families 
upon return. Founded by a few concerned women, in 1999, the KICWA Reception Centre was officially opened as a 
Rehabilitation Centre for formerly abducted children. KICWA mainly operates in the Acholi districts of Kitgum and 
Lamwo with plans of extending to Pader and Agago. With UNICEF as their main donor, one of its major activities 
is to promote the rights and reintegration of war affected children through psychosocial support, advocacy and 
reconciliation and building their productive capacity for a sustainable development. Like most Community Based 
Organisations, KICWA (located in Kitgum town) has a privileged position in society. It is trusted by formerly 
abducted individuals (and other people). Its works are positively received and the organisation is looked at as 
serving the most vulnerable youth including formerly abducted girls.   
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had fared over the years. KICWA‘s acceptance to work with me was an initial important step 
towards a successful fieldwork phase and the organisation worked as the main gatekeeper.6 
During the first two weeks in Kitgum before the pilot study commenced, I accompanied KICWA 
field teams to villages in Kitgum and Lamwo districts. By interacting with the staff and people in 
the villages, I developed a picture and ideas of how to work with the participants and other 
people in the community. Sleeping in villages for days boosted my build confidence in the field. 
It also prepared me to fit in with the local people and culture. I relied on this confidence and 
experience to select the sub-counties to focus on for the interviews. Also, during this time, the 
research instruments were designed and translated from English to Acholi. Two research 
assistants were recruited in Kitgum (male, 29 and female, 26) and were employed to help with 
the entire fieldwork and translation. As university graduates, they were selected on the basis of 
previous data collection experience. Although they were residents of Kitgum town, they did not 
know the interviewees personally, even those in Kitgum town itself. They were part of the pilot 
exercise that provided input for rephrasing, refining and rearranging the interview schedule. A 
transcriber to help with the data collected in the local language was recruited later on in the 
process. I managed the whole field process and the collected data.  
Data was collected through structured and semi structured individual and group interviews. 
Interviews were carried out in four districts: Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo and Pader. Interviews were 
conducted in towns (Gulu, Kitgum, Pader) and in more remote sub counties of Kitgum district 
(LabongAmida and Omiya anyima) and Lamwo district (Lokung sub county) (see Appendix B). 
1.4.1 In-depth Interviews 
The study had 170 participants with whom this author held conversations about questions of war 
impacts, development, reintegration and the future. Of these, a total of 57 women were engaged 
                                                             
6While working with KICWA, it was made clear to the staff and project manager that I was conducting the field 
study purposely for my academic qualification and not for the government or any organisation. I did not offer or 
promise to repay their support financially or otherwise, but only to share the final study findings with the 
management. Throughout the field study, KICWA did not influence the field activities or findings in any 
way.Throughout the data collection process, KICWA helped me meet some of the field logistics including, 
transport, office, printing services etc. For interviews in villages, KICWA gave me a vehicle and driver. I provided 
fuel and the driver‘s allowances. Considering that the research team spent a whole week conducting interviews in 
the villages, hiring a vehicle would have been very costly. Transport in other cases, around Kitgum town, I walked 
or used boda-bodas (commercial motorcycles).  
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in in-depth interviews (Appendix C). The main selection criteria for individual interviews were: 
a) age at time of abduction-below 18 years, b) length of abduction-longer than 1 year, and c) 
returning with child/ren. Of the 57 participants, 40 were purposefully selected because they were 
abducted as children and returned with children fathered by the LRA fighters.  The seven of the 
remaining 17 women were abducted as adults and/or were already mothers. The thesis has drawn 
heavily on these individual interviews in providing evidence for the arguments, with quotations 
used as illustrative of the wider set of stories. The table below summarizes some key 
demographic information for the 57 participants whose lived experiences are discussed in this 
thesis. 
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Table 1.1: Demographic Information for the participants 
Demographic indicators Total Percentage  
Gender  57 females 100% 
 
Age at abduction  
(6–30) years 
2–9: 6 
10–17: 45 
18 and above: 6 
Average: 13.6 years 
11% 
79% 
10% 
Length of abduction (years) 
3 months –12 years 
Less than a year: 3 
1–5:   19 
6–10:  25 
11–15: 2 
Don‘t Know: 8 
Average: 4.9 years 
5% 
33% 
44% 
4% 
14% 
Returned with Child(ren)? 
Ranging from 0–5 
No: 17 
Yes:40 
A child on average  
30% 
70% 
Age at time of interviews 
(18–43) years 
18–23:   19 
24–29: 24   
30 and above: 13 
Don‘t Know: 1 
Average: 26.3 years 
33% 
42% 
23% 
2% 
Length of Reintegration 
6 months–12 years 
Less than a year: 1 
1–5:  6 
6–10: 42 
11–15: 2 
Don‘t Know: 7 
Average: 6.5 years 
2% 
10% 
73% 
3% 
12% 
 
Before I went out for fieldwork, I planned to meet and recruit formerly abducted girls through 
local organisations like KICWA. This was not the case, however. I did not rely on KICWA‘s 
archives to recruit the participants. I did not want to target only the women who were 
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demobilised through this centre, given that other agencies had been involved in demobilisation 
programmes as well, and some former abductees had organised their own demobilisation 
themselves without agency assistance. Considering that formerly abducted people are known and 
easily identifiable in their villages, the research team relied on a snowball technique to recruit 
most participants for in-depth interviews. Locating at least three formerly abducted women in a 
village was enough to start snowball recruitment. Through the snowballing technique, I observed 
how formerly abducted girls maintained a sort of network among themselves. Many of them 
knew fellow former abductees including those who had returned with a child or not, had been in 
abduction for months or years, and those pretending to have been abducted. Only a few of the 
women asked how the team had known they were former abductees and when told it was through 
a fellow former abducted girl(s), there were positive reactions. 
Identifying and accessing potential interviewees in villages was a much easier process compared 
to towns. Unlike in the villages, people in towns did not stay in one place for long, they often 
moved without leaving any useful information. Also, some women in towns kept their abduction 
experiences private. Unlike in villages, women in towns did not seem to know their fellow 
formerly abducted persons and there was no sort of ‗network‘ among former abductees in towns. 
Most of the interviewees in Kitgum town were identified through two local women‘s leaders. In 
Gulu town, four participants were identified through a World Vision rehabilitation centre and a 
further two through their fellow former child abductee. In both locations, negotiat ion to 
participate in the study remained between the participant and the research team and not the 
organisation or local leaders.  
Both in towns and villages, it was evident that the women wanted to tell their stories. I observed 
that they took being interviewed as a great opportunity to be heard, especially in the more remote 
villages where they would be telling their stories for the first time. For example, during the week 
taking interviews in Kitgum district, Omiya-anyima sub county, two young women had learned 
through their fellow former girl abductee about the study. For almost two hours, they walked 
with their babies on their backs to meet the team in Omiya-anyima trading centre. After 
explaining the purpose of the study to them, they agreed to participate. Also, while seeking their 
consent to participate (first day of meeting them), some young mothers insisted on being 
interviewed, saying they would not find another time in the week. However, it was later learnt 
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that some of them had thought we would not return to interview them. It cannot be ignored that 
the women expected to exchange their stories for help (money or supplies); however, they were 
never deterred when told that participation was voluntary and no compensation was to be 
expected.  
Although most homesteads welcomed us and expressed eagerness to have formerly abducted 
girls in their families participate in the study, the research team observed a few dilemmas as we 
recruited the women. One case stood out: On the first day of our visit, we talked to 20 year 
Josephine in private. Although family (husband, mother and father in-law) were also briefed 
about the purpose of our visit and the research in general, they remained curious and concerned 
about what she would share in the interview. When we returned the next day, during the 
interview, Josephine told us that, ‗...because you [interview team] came here yesterday, today 
morning, they [husband and in-laws] quarrelled saying that if you people are thinking of taking 
me back to school, then I should know that no one will do my garden work...‘7 We had arranged 
to engage the husband and in-laws in a family discussion but Josephine requested the family 
interviews scheduled that afternoon be cancelled. This case precisely portrayed the tension 
between some young women and their immediate families. Josephine‘s family seemed happy 
about their daughter in-law participating in the study, but they were actually not pleased with our 
visit. They still had questions, particularly on how Josephine was to benefit from the interview. 
Their reaction did not target the study but Josephine and, as expressed in the interview, this 
caused her some emotional distress. This case suggested that if we had gone through the 
husbands or parents to seek permission for the women to participate in the study, it is possible 
we would have encountered more difficulties or missed out on some potential interviewees. 
Seeking their consent in private put the women in control of the decision to participate and the 
information they shared.  
1.4.2 Focus Group Discussions and Purposely Selected Persons 
The views of other people in Acholi carry influence. A person is not defined as an independent 
individual but in terms of social relations and the groups she/he functions within (Chapter Four). 
To supplement information collected from in-depth interviews, I conducted twelve Focus Group 
Discussions (FGDs) with community members and young women (abducted and never 
                                                             
7 Interview, CM20 
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abducted). Data was also collected from eight key informants—people considered to be 
knowledgeable regarding formerly abducted girls and reintegration including staff at the 
reception centres, local government officers and village women leaders. These were considered 
key informants, observers or reflective members of the Acholi who were knowledgeable about 
the topic and culture.  They had worked and/or lived with formerly abducted persons and were in 
positions to say why some individuals were making progress with their reintegration and others 
not. Conducting FGDs and interviewing key informants helped in developing an understanding 
of how people in Acholi make sense of, and attribute meaning to, war and its aftermath and how 
this is reflected in the attitudes towards formerly abducted girls.  
During the research design phase, both family and village members were combined for a group 
discussion. However, during the pilot study, this did not work. Family members were unwilling 
to talk about their child, sibling, spouse, etc. in the presence of in-laws, strangers, friends and 
neighbours. The village members refused to open up about the former female child abductees in 
their villages. Every participant kept referring to a former child abductee (s) he or she had seen 
or heard of in communities elsewhere. With experience, I changed the arrangements such that 
family members were interviewed separately in family groups rather than as part of wider 
community FGDs. The interview questions did not change for the two group discussions (family 
and village members), with the focus remaining in each case on the former girl abductees‘ social 
and economic reintegration. Inquiring about these issues, the author was interested in 
understanding how formerly abducted girls were perceived by others, when they first returned to 
their communities; and after a number of years back home. 
The other set of FGD was for the two categories of young mothers: those who were recruited 
into the LRA and those who were never abducted but had become mothers while still less than 
18 years old, for example while living in camps, or following a forced marriage or unwanted 
pregnancy, etc. Child mothers with no abduction experiences acted as a control group in this 
research. Although social and economic situations of both groups closely resemble one another, 
the control group was used to produce comparisons in the findings. Also, the motive for 
recruiting this category of young mothers was to reduce the stigmatisation/jealousies that could 
have resulted from recruiting exclusively formerly abducted persons in a village. The 
participants for these FGDs were mobilised through former girl abductees who had previously 
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been interviewed. At the end of each in-depth interview, the participant was asked if she could 
participate in a group discussion for young mothers in a selected village. She was also requested 
to identify other young mothers who were willing participate. In addition to being interviewed as 
key informants, village women leaders also helped to mobilise participants for FGDs and to find 
convenient interview sites. This came with its own challenges. For example, during a pilot study, 
the two women leaders asked the research team if they could attend the discussion. Naively and 
out of respect for the older women, I accepted. However, this became a problem as the 
discussion kicked off and the young mothers were reluctant to talk. At first, the interview team 
could not understand what the problem was but decided to politely have the two women leaders 
leave the discussion for a little while. Surprisingly, the young mothers started talking freely, 
laughing as they responded to the interview questions. This was the first time I observed the 
tension and differences between ‗women‘ or ‗females‘ in this region in reference to their ages or 
status etc. In the FGDs with young mothers that followed, no village leader or older women 
joined the interviews. 
Also, using women leaders and former child abductees to mobilise participants for the FGDs in 
some communities discouraged participation by men. Even when the purpose of the discussions 
was explained, some men still viewed the study as only addressing women‘s issues. However, 
the men who attended the FGDs were a great source of information on the subject. For example, 
they discussed the topic in a more general manner in terms of ‗problems facing formerly 
abducted people‘ or ‗returnees‘ behaviour‘ or ‗their networks‘, and not only issues affecting 
formerly abducted girls. In addition to the literature on child soldiering and reintegration, such 
men‘s views were useful and provided a broader perspective of the collected data. My interaction 
with the community members was generally good and they welcomed the research because they 
thought the problems facing this category of youth should be identified and addressed.  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured in nine chapters. Chapter Two presents the background and context to 
the research. It provides a brief analysis of the Ugandan history and post-independence political 
violence that gave way to the war in northern Uganda that went on for almost two decades. The 
former female abductees in this study were affected by the war through the Lord‘s Resistance 
Army‘s abductions and returned to a wrecked society following years of fighting and forced 
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mass displacement. Particular attention is given to the three impacts of this war: participation of 
underage children, forced displacement and the increasing poverty rates. Providing a background 
for this research, these impacts are discussed in relation to the main concerns of the study (child 
soldiering in captivity and reintegration).  
Chapters Three and Four look at the theoretical frameworks for this research. This is achieved 
through reviewing the contemporary literature on conceptual and theoretical perspectives on post 
war-reintegration. Both Chapters focus on showing how reintegration as a process and 
experience is understood and perceived, particularly in African contexts (meaning, approaches, 
initiatives and determinants/measures). Chapter Three starts off with the definitions of important 
concepts including ‗girl soldier‘ and ‗child mother‘. DDR‘s standards and definitions are 
explored, particularly as outlined by the United Nations. A brief overview of DDR framework in 
northern Uganda is also provided in this Chapter. Chapter Three concludes with a definition and 
an analysis of ‗reintegration‘, as a concept and process. Chapter Four examines further the 
question of Reintegration: Going back to what and where? It discusses the socio-economic 
context of Acholi society and shows how it has been changed by the effects of war. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of two measures/determinants of long-term reintegration, including 
acceptance and stigma.  
Chapter Five and the following three chapters discuss and analyse the empirical research 
findings. Chapter Five details the findings on the first research objective: what were the war 
experiences of former female child abductees while in captivity? The women in this study were 
among the thousands of children and adults abducted in Acholi by the rebel group and the 
chapter looks at abduction and transformation process from being a mere child, a girl, to a rebel, 
soldier, wife and mother. Hence, the actual experiences of abduction, journey to Sudan, 
initiation, military training and deployment are discussed. The chapter then looks at life in 
captivity, including marriage and motherhood under stressful conditions of an armed group. 
Finally, the chapter discusses the manner in which they left the armed group. The chapter is 
composed of experiences depicting personal suffering, resilience, agency and resistance, 
courage, resolve, and triumph, among other characteristics portrayed by girl soldiers. These 
personal experiences are important because they offer grounding for understanding their long 
term impacts on the lives of girls and women as they seek to reintegrate into their communities.   
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Chapter Six looks at stigmatisation, another central theme in the lives of the study participants. 
Although there are a number of challenges of social reintegration, the findings show that stigma 
promotion is a major hindrance to long-term social reintegration. Even though stigma from the 
women‘s perspective may be partial or distorted, the chapter argues that their perceptions of it 
should not be minimised or overlooked. The chapter commences with the definition of stigma, 
carefully breaking down what is meant by stigma in Acholi contexts. The chapter analyses how 
the women‘s social identity is conceptualised and stigmatised. This is followed by a discussion 
on the types and outlooks of stigma, how their stigma is sympathised with, and finally, how it 
hinders their reintegration. 
In the following two chapters, two measures of socio-economic reintegration are discussed. 
Marriage (Chapter Seven) is identified as a major determinant of social reintegration. Through a 
comparative approach, the study analyses the marriage experiences of formerly abducted girls 
and their non-abducted peers. Chapter Eight, on the other hand, focuses on the theme of ability to 
earn money as a determinant of economic reintegration. Similar to Chapter Seven, this 
experience is discussed in comparison to never-abducted youth. Through this chapter, the study 
demonstrates that abduction and life in captivity reduce young women‘s livelihood resources, 
particularly human and social resources. Also, the effects of war further reduce the natural and 
physical resources that should support them upon return to their communities. With no or limited 
livelihood strategies in post-conflict situations, they are unable to achieve a sustainable 
livelihood, which basically defines their successful reintegration. 
Lastly, the study is concluded in Chapter Nine. This chapter summarises and retraces the central 
themes explored and draws conclusions. The author reflects further on her experience of doing 
research on formerly abducted girls and highlights areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE WAR IN NORTHERN UGANDA 
This chapter situates the study within the context of socio-historical processes that have shaped 
the current circumstances in Uganda. Providing a socio-historical review supports an 
understanding of the complex linkages, challenges and trajectories that contributed to the armed 
conflict in northern Uganda.  The historical background and root causes of this war, and how it 
evolved over the years, have been extensively studied (see Gersony, 1997; Doom &Vlassenroot, 
1999; Allen, 2005; Branch, 2007; among others). The purpose of this chapter is not to add to the 
already explored genesis and historical background of the war, but briefly to show that this civil 
war was born out of felt grievances rooted in long-term inequalities. Because the war could not 
be resolved with measures that addressed the roots of discontent, the fighting went on for almost 
two decades (1986-2005). The chapter then discusses how the war has affected and created 
problematic circumstances for adolescents and youth through abduction and displacement. 
Although a number of opposition movements emerged following President Museveni‘s seizure 
of power on 26th January 1986, the concern in this thesis is the Lord‘s Resistance Army 
insurgency, the most persistent as well as the most destructive rebellion in the region.  
The chapter commences with an introduction to this East African country, highlighting important 
socio-economic characteristics. Keeping the focus on the armed conflict in northern Uganda, the 
chapter discusses the rise of spirit movements in Acholi and highlights two 
dimensions/explanations that have dominated the literature on the war: did the Lord‘s Resistance 
Army have a rational motive for fighting? And, were they simply a religious/spiritual movement 
terrorising their own people? The study uses some of the first-hand information provided by the 
participants in constructing an understanding of the LRA and its strategies.The chapter then 
looks at three impacts of the war, including abduction of the under-aged; forced displacement; 
and, finally, the declining economic situation of Northern Uganda, where reintegration of the 
formerly abducted adolescents is taking place. 
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2.1 Uganda: Socio-Economic Context 
The Republic of Uganda is a land locked Eastern African country which sits astride the Equator. 
Uganda is bordered to the east by Kenya; to the south by Tanzania; the southwest by Rwanda, 
the west by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and the north by South Sudan (Figure 
2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1Map of Uganda showing its Geography8 
                                                             
8https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Uganda_Regions_map.png 
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Located on the East African Plateau, lying mostly between latitudes four degrees north, two 
degrees South and longitudes twenty nine degrees and thirty five degrees east, the country covers 
an area of approximately 236,040 square kilometres. Some 36,330 square kilometers are covered 
by water, with the Nile River traversing the country from south-east to north-west.  Out of the 
four regions (Northern, Eastern, Central and Western), Northern Uganda is  the largest 
administrative region in the country, covering 35% of the total land surface, followed by the 
Central (25%), Western (23%) and Eastern (16%) regions (Ministry of Gender, Labour and 
Social Development, 2003). For administrative purposes, the regions are divided into sub 
regions: northern Uganda (Acholiland, Lango, Karamoja, Teso and West Nile); Eastern (Bugisu, 
Busoga); Central (Buganda); Western (Ankole, Bunyoro and Kigezi). 
With an annual growth rate of 4.7 percent, agriculture remains the most important economic 
sector in Uganda(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014).Coffee is the chief export crop and foreign 
exchange earner. About 80% of the Ugandan work force is employed in agriculture, with most 
people in rural areas practicing peasant farming. This makes land the most important natural 
resource in the country.  
According to the 2014 National Population and Housing Census, Uganda‘s population was 35 
million in that year, up from 10 million in 1969, with some 11 million of this increased total 
being recorded during the 2002 – 2014 intercensal period. The national total, which is made up 
of roughly equal numbers of females (18 million) and males (17 million), is distributed between 
the country‘s main regions as follows (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014): Central (10 million); 
Eastern (9 million); West (8 million);  and North, with the lowest population total (7 million).  
During the period 2002-2014, the population growth rate was 3.03 percent, a slight decline from 
the rate of 3.20% observed between 1991 and 2002. If Uganda‘s population maintains the growth 
rate of 3.03%, the total population is projected to increase to 47 million in the year 2025 (Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics, 2014:16). The high rate of population growth is mainly due to the high 
fertility levels (over six children per woman) that have been observed for the past four decades, 
combined with a faster decline in mortality levels, reflected by a decline in infant and childhood 
mortality rates as revealed by the Uganda Demographic and Health Surveys (UDHS) of 2006 
and 2011.  
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It is estimated that over 78 per cent of Uganda‘s 35 million people are below the age of 30, with 
adolescents and young adults (aged 10–24 years) making up about 25 per cent of this cohort 
(Uganda Population Report, 2013:52). Uganda thus has one of the youngest populations in the 
world. At the same time, and according to World Bank Data (2015)9, the proportion of Ugandan 
living below the poverty line declined from 57 per cent in 1992/3 to 24 per cent in 2009, and 
further to 20 per cent in 2012/13.Despite making this enormous reduction in poverty 
countrywide, poverty remains deep-rooted in many parts of the country, particularly the rural 
areas, which are home to most Ugandans. The proportion of people unable to meet their basic 
consumption needs remains high. 
Uganda is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, with more than 40 different 
indigenous ethnic groups. The major ethnic groups are divided into two broad linguistic groups 
including, the Bantu-speaking majority, living primarily in the Central, Southern and Western 
parts of the country; and the non-Bantu speakers, who occupy the Eastern, Northern and North-
western part of the country (see Behrend 1999; Gakwandi 1999). Although, there is broad ethnic 
and cultural diversity in Uganda with many African languages spoken, English (language of the 
colonial administration) is the official language. It is used in government, courts of law, 
commerce and as the primary medium of educational instruction.  Also English is used by major 
newspapers and in some radio broadcasts. 
Before Uganda gained independence on 9th October 1962, it was under the control and influence 
of the British. At the Berlin conferences of 1884 and 1885, Africa was diced and distributed to 
European nations. Following these conferences, Germany and Britain controlled the eastern part 
of Africa (Harlow & Carter 1999; Gakwandi 1999; Schwab 2001:15). However, in 1890, an 
Anglo-German agreement was signed declaring Uganda to be solely under British influence and 
in 1894, Uganda became a British Protectorate10 (see Ingham, 1958). 
                                                             
9http://data.worldbank.org/country/uganda 
 
10 The United States of America, Federal Research Library of Congress (2007:7) describes the term ‗protectorate‘ as 
‗political entity (a sovereign state or less developed native polity, such as a chieftainship or feudal princely state) 
that formally agrees by treaty to enter into an unequal relationship with another, stronger state, called the protector, 
which engages to protect it (diplomatically or, if needed, militarily) against third parties, in exchange for which the 
protectorate usually accepts specified obligations, which may vary greatly, depending on the real nature of their 
relationship.‘  
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At the Berlin conferences, it seemed the primary interest of the Europeans dicing up and 
demarcating Africa was to secure trade routes via rivers or mountains and other natural 
resources. The interests and concerns of the natives were not given much thought. ‗These 
demarcations reflected the balance of power between European and imperialist countries, not the 
historical processes within the continent‘ (Mamdani, 1983:9). People from different backgrounds 
and traditions (ethnically unconnected), ‗at different levels of social development and without 
close historical contacts‘ (ibid) were brought together to live side by side in a territory. Meredith 
(2005:1) describes these arrangements as follows: 
Using inaccurate maps, large areas were described as terra incognito. When marking out 
boundaries of new territories, European negotiators frequently resorted to drawing 
straight lines on the map, taking little or no account of the myriad of traditional 
monarchies, chiefdoms and other African societies that existed on the ground…. In all, 
new boundaries cut through some 190-culture groups. In other cases, Europe‗s new 
colonial territories enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups, with no 
common history, culture, language or religion.  
In Uganda, for instance, the language and culture gulf between the Bantu-speakers of the south 
and the Nilotic-speakers of the north was/is wide and this difference has contributed to the 
country‘s subsequent disintegrations. Colonial rule scholars have shown that British colonial 
governance was about identity formation, reshaping self-consciousness of the colonizedand how 
they thought of themselves. Through this identity formation and reshaping process, populations 
were broken down into different ethnicities that were further tribalized for administration 
purposes.  
This state of affairs provided a most favourable starting point for the colonial tactics of 
divide-and-rule which were applied in an all-round manner. To pit one region against 
another, one nationality against another, one religion against another, and one race 
against another to ensure the unity of the rulers and the divisions of the ruled—that was 
the conscious purpose of colonial policy (Mamdani, 1983:9; see also Schwab 2001).  
Like other African countries, the colonial period had manifold impacts on Uganda and these 
historical developments are of particular importance in understanding the armed conflicts that 
engulfed Uganda during the post-colonial era. The colonial period in Uganda was a time of 
ethnic and regional division and polarisation (see Karugire, 1980; Mamdani, 1983; Meredith, 
2005). Although before the British penetration, the centralised kingdoms in the south had more 
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developed economies than the segmentary societies (see Ingham, 1958; Mamdani, 1976: 17), the 
colonial policies exacerbated the existing patterns of uneven development (see Mittelman, 
1975:53; Mamdani, 1976: 17). Colonial administration concentrated development efforts in 
Southern region (Bantu speakers). People in the south, particularly the Baganda (people of 
Buganda) as sub-imperialists became more powerful than other ethnic groups: economically and 
became more influential politically. The area benefited most from the spread of education, health 
services and infrastructural development among others. The British introduced cash-crop 
farming in the region (see Ingham, 1958:86). However, for other ethnic groups, particularly in 
the north (Nilotics), colonial rule was a period of economic, social and physical stagnation. 
During the three decades of colonial government‘s labour policy (1900-1930s), the north ‗was 
gradually developed into a labour reservoir for the cash-crop economy of the south, itself a raw 
material reservoir for the manufacturing economy of metropolitan England‘ (Mamdani, 1976: 
53). The region was further reduced to pastoralism and military recruitment (see Barber, 1968). 
This led to a socio-economic gap between the ethnic groups and regions: ‗the impoverishment of 
the north was thus a condition for the relative prosperity of the south. There was no dual 
economy here—one traditional, the other modern, one static, the other dynamic‘ (Mamdani, 
1976: 52).With the colonial policy dividing the country between two regions—producing and 
nonproducing—with the north being labour exporting and nonproducing (ibid: 149), the 
inequality gap (reflected both in income and in the distribution of social services) widened. The 
divide subsequently set the stage for post-independence violence, counter violence and revenge 
(Behrend, 1999; Schwab, 2001). From a long-term perspective, divide-and-rule of the colonial 
government contributed to the genesis of the armed conflict in northern Uganda. The civil war 
between the government of Uganda and the rebel groups, including the Lord‘s Resistance Army 
was born out of felt grievances and power vacuum in the north, particularly in Acholi sub region. 
It is to this theme of post-independence political violence in Uganda that we must now turn.  
2.2 Post-Independence Political Violence 
Since independence on 9th October 1962, Uganda has faced political turmoil (see Kasozi, 1994; 
Gersony, 1997; Branch; 2007). The first government was a coalition of the Uganda People‘s 
Congress Party, with Milton Obote as its chairman, and the Buganda Kingdom Party 
(KabakaYekka, ‗king only‘ in the Luganda language) chaired by the Kabaka Edward Mutesa (see 
appendix A: Uganda Timeline since 1962). Under the coalition terms, Obote was Prime Minister 
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and Mutesa a ceremonial Head of State. In 1966, Obote went against the constitutional terms and 
replaced the Kabaka as president (see Kasozi, 1994). The late Obote was a northerner, from 
Langoland. Although the army and government contained people from all ethnic backgrounds, 
the majority were Langi and Acholi, and Ugandans identified Obote‘s regime with these two 
ethnic groups. In 1979, Obote was overthrown and replaced by one of his army officers, Idi 
Amin, also a northerner from West Nile region. His regime (1971–1979) was characterised by 
torture and killings that mostly targeted the Acholi and Langi (see Mazrui, 1975). In 1980, with 
the help of the Tanzanian army, Obote and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) 
overthrew Amin. An election was held and Obote became Ugandan president for the second time 
(1980–1985). During his second term (commonly referred to as Obote II), the political situation 
worsened in Uganda and Ugandans saw the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) 
launch a guerrilla war in central Uganda. Museveni and NRA fighters, mainly from Western 
Uganda and Rwanda, waged war on the Ugandan Army (UNLA) for five years (see Ngoga, 
1998). The fighting was restricted to a specific central Ugandan area, Luwero (this war is often 
referred to as ‗Luwero triangle war‘ (see Luwero district on the map below, Figure 2.2). As the 
NRA waged war on the UNLA, there was infighting within the army and among government 
officials (between Acholi and Langi). Following these factional conflicts, one of the Acholi army 
generals, Tito OkelloLutwa, ousted Obote. There were peace talks between him and Museveni in 
Nairobi but on 26 January 1986, NRA went against these peace agreements and toppled Okello 
and the UNLA. With Museveni and NRA taking over power the succession of presidents and 
governments from northern Uganda (Obote I, Amin, Obote II and Okello) ended. However, this 
did not end the turmoil but simply shifted position, from central Uganda and the Luwero triangle 
to northern Uganda, particularly Acholiland, as discussed later. 
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Note: The arrow shows the shift of war theatre from central to northern Uganda 
Figure2.2 Map of Uganda showing Conflict affected areas, August 2007 
© UNOCHA, 2007 
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2.3 Rise of the Holy Spirit Movements 
UNLA‘s loss of power to Museveni and the NRA created three immediate problems in Northern 
Uganda, particularly in Alcholiland: a power vacuum; concern over the returning or rather 
fleeing UNLA soldiers; and the NRA counter-insurgency (in the 1995 constitution, NRA became 
the Uganda People‘s Defence Force (hereafter, UPDF)). After years of fighting and working in 
central Uganda, many of the former government soldiers returned to their villages in Acholi or 
went into hiding in Sudan (see Branch, 2007, 2010:25). The former soldiers found it difficult to 
adjust to the rural life and posed a threat to the Acholi patriarchal order (Behrend, 1998). 
Following the loss of Acholi-Langi political leadership to UPDF, the Acholi looked to the elders 
to restore and keep order. The leaders sought to heal and reconcile the former soldiers and the 
civilians. Like the abducted children and adults exiting armed groups recently, they were 
expected to go through the Acholi cultural reintegration rituals to be cleansed of the potentially 
deadly vengeful spirit of the dead, Cen (see Chapter 4).  
In Acholi, social and cultural problems are still viewed through a spiritual lens; for example, 
calamities afflicting communities are viewed as a punishment from the spirits for people‘s 
wrongs. The former soldiers were seen and treated as ‗internal strangers‘ who had become 
impure by killing in the Luwero triangle war, hence bringing Cen to the communities (see 
Behrend, 1999:43). To amend this, such people had to be cleansed and accepted back into their 
communities. However, these former combatants did not pay attention to such community 
reintegration initiatives. They instead joined rebellions to fight the government and participated 
in looting operations, creating more tension and violence in Acholiland. According to Behrend 
(1999:43), the failed reintegration of earlier waves of self-demobilised soldiers threatened the 
internal security of the Acholi order and needed to be fixed (see also Branch, 2010:25). This 
internal crisis was worsened by Museveni‘s army occupying and setting up battalions in some 
major Acholi towns like Gulu and Kitgum. Without realising the internal crisis within Acholi at 
the time, the government approached the Acholi people as an enemy who could strike in revenge 
over loss of national power. Assuming that former soldiers were intentionally refusing to 
surrender weapons and local people were not collaborating with the new government, the army 
responded with extreme violence, creating more chaos and grievances (see Branch, 2007, 
2010:25).  
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One of these groups was the Holy Spirit Movement (see Gersony, 1997; Behrend, 1998, 1999; 
Allen, 2005; Allen &Vlassenroot, 2010:9). The Holy Spirit Movement (henceforth HSM) was 
led by an Acholi woman from Kitgum, Alice Auma, commonly known by the spirit medium 
name, ‗Lakwena‘ (meaning messenger). When ‗Lakwena‘ (a Christian, male spirit) recognised 
the increasing tension and disorder in Acholi, through Auma, he sought to engage in spiritual 
cleansing to address whatever had gone wrong. Like the Acholi elders, Auma proposed to offer a 
solution to Acholi‘s problem by cleansing the former combatants and other people of all 
impurities. She also offered to drive the government soldiers out of Acholiland through war. 
Emerging in late 1986, HSM registered unexpected success over government forces before they 
were defeated in 1988, on their way to Kampala. Auma escaped and lived in an IDP camp in 
Kenya until she died in 2007.  
Following the fall of HSM, in late 1988, Uganda saw the rise of another opposition campaign led 
by Joseph Kony, an Acholi himself from Gulu district (Allen, 2005:16). Previously, he had led a 
smaller spirit movement, similar to HSM; but unlike Auma, who incorporated other ethnic 
groups in her movement, Kony‘s initial operations were limited to his home area in Gulu (ibid.). 
It is claimed that he had wanted to merge forces with Auma, but her spirit ‗Lakwena‘ rejected 
him, causing clashes between their two movements (Behrend, 1999a:29). Kony then worked in 
the shadow of Auma until she was defeated in 1988 (Gersony 1997:37). The Lord‘s Resistance 
Army (hereafter referred to by its initials, LRA) is said to have started with many of the 
opposition groups whose movements had failed, including the HSM and other UNLA remnants 
that had refused to surrender to the government. By the 1990s, Kony‘s movement dominated all 
the opposition groups in the region. Branch (2007:179–80) describes the period when the group 
appeared on the scene: ‗at a point when the support enjoyed by other rebel organisations among 
the Acholi peasantry had diminished, a casualty of the rebels‘ military failures and the 
government‘s brutal counter-insurgency.‘ Although Kony came with a mission of cleansing 
Acholi of any impurities and, like Auma, he saw war as a form of healing (‗Acholi society had to 
be purified by violence‘, Allen, 2006:40), his strategy was slightly different from that of Auma. 
In addition to fighting the government soldiers who had occupied Acholi, he positioned himself 
to eliminate all Acholis who had been corrupted by the government. Collaborating with the 
government meant that these people were impure and needed to be uprooted out of Acholi (see 
Branch, 2010:25). He went on to promote this struggle for almost twenty years. 
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2.3.1 The Lord‘s Resistance Army Insurgency 
Although at the time, there were many anti-Museveni groups (NDDR-RC, 2006; Global 
Security, 2000, 201111); the most persistent and destructive was the LRA in Northern Uganda. 
While the armed conflict between the government and the LRA went on for so long, affecting 
most parts of northern and north-eastern Uganda and Southern Sudan, the primary victims have 
been the Acholi and their region (see map, Figure 2.1).  
Rational Agenda, Secrecy and More Violence 
Even though the armed conflict in northern Uganda went on for two decades, accounts 
frequently emphasise that the reasons for the LRA rebellion were not entirely clear, beyond the 
calls for overthrowing president Museveni, re-conquering Uganda and restoring Acholiland to a 
position of prominence and power (see Gersony 1997; Behrend, 1998, 1999; Amnesty 
International, 1997; International Crisis Group, 2004:5; 2010). These accounts instead asserted 
that the crisis in northern Uganda was more humanitarian than political, economic or social. 
From the early analyses of the conflict, based on LRA‘s military strategies and tactics, it was 
emphasised that they did not have a good reason for fighting. Gersony (1997:59) writes that, 
‗...the LRA has no political program or ideology; at least none that the local population has heard 
or can understand....‘ In describing the LRA, the international stories also portrayed the group as 
having no political agenda for their rebellion: ‗the rebels have no clear political agenda but have 
said they want the country governed in accordance with the Christian Ten Commandments‘ 
(BBC, 2003). The media portrayed the movement ‗as a barbaric and insane cult‘ (Allen, 2006: 
25). If LRA was accorded any explanation beyond these connotations, this was limited to a 
proxy war between Uganda and Sudan (see Prunier, 2004), that is, Khartoum was using the LRA 
as a mercenary army to fight the Sudan People‘s Liberation Army (SPLA). 
Away from the political analyses, the religious and spiritual dimension (see Baines, 2007; Acker, 
2004; Behrend, 1999; Eichstaedt, 2009) dominated most of the analyses on the war. There was a 
persistent impression that the LRA were fighting to overthrow the regime and impose a 
fundamentalist Christianity in Uganda based on the Ten Commandments (see Gersony, 1997; 
Doom &Vlassenroot, 1999, 2006; Nambalirwa, 2010; Eichstaedt, 2009, Jeroenet al., 2007). 
However, in their manifestos, the LRA/M explicitly denied being motivated by fundamentalist 
                                                             
11http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=37 
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Christian ideology (see Finnström, 2008:124). Even though Kony often proclaimed that the LRA 
wanted to establish a theocratic state and be ruled according to the biblical Ten Commandments, 
his army (obviously under his command) acted contrary to this, breaking  most of the 
commandments (Temmerman, 2001:154; Nambalirwa, 2010:183), attacking churches and 
threatening to kill all priests in the region (HURIPEC, 2003:6). In addition, for an Islamic 
Khartoum government to support the LRA for so long in order to fight the SPLA rebellion in the 
south shows Khartoum must have known the LRA was not pursuing a fundamentalist Christian 
ideology as perceived by the rest of the world. Without these realisations during the earlier years 
of the rebellion, the fundamentalist interpretation of the LRA still drove analyses, media and 
public debates for most of their fighting in Uganda, framing the group as the product of 
‗religious fanaticism‘ (Acker, 2004:348)—religious lunatics, terrorising their own people.  
However, in the latter years of the conflict, a number of accounts emerged challenging this ‗myth 
of madness‘ (see Dolan, 2005, 2009; Bevan, 2007; Branch, 2007; Finnström, 2008; Allen 
&Vlassenroot, 2010, among others). These accounts began surfacing in particular when the LRA 
started spreading their fighting to other countries including Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Central African Republic. These analyses sought to both acknowledge and explain the existence 
of a coherent LRA political agenda. They provided detailed analysis of LRA political 
manifestos. For example it is reported that in 1997, the Lord‘s Resistance Movement (LRM), 
LRA‘s political wing (reported to be comprised of Acholis in Diaspora) released a number of 
manifestos. (For an excellent discussion of all the LRA manifestos, see Finnström, 2008: Chapter 
3.) Finnström writes that the first, one page manifesto:  
…expresses support for human rights, stresses the need to develop national-wide 
socioeconomic balance, and promotes restoration of national-wide peace and security and 
ending corruption ... free and fair forthcoming [1996] elections, the establishment of good 
relations with neighbouring countries, improvements in the judicial systems ... military 
organisation be separated from the judiciary and executive ... reform of parliament so that 
it can become capable of tackling critical political and economic issues of the country 
(Finnström, 2008: 122). 
In late 1999, the LRM/A released further, more detailed manifestos and Finnström further cites 
an 18 page manifesto expanding on the manifesto summarised above and addressing more 
political and economic issues, such as the UPDF‘s military actions in neighbouring countries; 
challenging the government for multiparty elections; and, while recognising the structural 
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adjustment programmes, calling for greater emphasis on the most poor, particularly in northern 
and eastern Uganda (Finnström, 2008:122).  
While these new analyses were helpful in offering explanations as to why and how the LRA was 
fighting, it was still difficult to identify their rational agenda difficult. The ‗misconceptions and 
myths‘ surrounding the LRA leadership and its use of ‗a mixture of Christian, Islamic, and 
animist beliefs to validate its actions‘ (Chatlani, 2007:281) masked the leadership‘s motives for 
fighting. For example, after all the years of fighting in Uganda, Sudan, Central African Republic 
and DR Congo, Kony (and all the top leadership) remain a ‗mystery‘:  
… little is known about the rebel leader, Joseph Kony, the man behind the atrocities, and 
it is clear that this is exactly how he likes it. He has created an aura of fear and mysticism 
around himself which is an image difficult to dispel (Refugee Law Project, 2004:13). 
Throughout the years, he surrounded himself with secrecy, a withdrawn character, and the world 
was left to guess who Kony and the LRA were and what they were fighting for. The LRA was 
viewed as if it was an army of one individual, ‗Kony‘. During the second 1994 peace talks, when 
the government delegates complained that Kony‘s absence showed a lack of commitment, his 
representative informed them that the LRA was more than just Kony: ‗…you should note that if 
we (the officers) were not there or the young soldiers were not there, or if the officers who have 
come were not there, Kony would not be in the bush‘ (cited in Dolan, 2005:121). Although the 
LRA was obviously bigger than the individual ‗Kony‘, apart from what returning individuals 
narrated, little was still known of how the LRA operated—their structures and what motivated 
their cruelty. Despite all the information on the LRA before they were pushed out of Uganda in 
2005/6 and for about 2-3 years thereafter, the realities of the inner workings of the group remain 
rather mysterious to the external world (see Cakaj, 2010). For a man who had dropped out of 
school after six years of primary education, trained as an ajwaka(traditional healer) (Allen, 
2005:16), his strategies for controlling such an army, turning the abducted individuals into his 
loyalists, and waging a war on the well-equipped UPDF for such a long time remained a 
mystery. His elusiveness and inability to access the media to promote his political agenda in 
Acholi and beyond left the important question of why the LRA was fighting not fully answered.  
Although some examinations, like that of Doom &Vlassenroot (1999) and Gersony (1997) 
acknowledge that the LRA‘s violence sometimes came across as oriented towards realising 
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certain political and military purposes, the strategies outlined above compromised their 
rationality further (Finnström, 2008:161–162; Acker, 2004:336). However, according to 
Blattman and Annan (2008:3), a closer look at the LRA group yielded a more nuanced view; the 
LRA appeared to be a political and rational organization, however evil and cruel their actions—
the group‘s political messages had been relatively consistent and coherent, although poorly 
articulated. According to the former girl abductees‘ accounts in this study, however terrible their 
violence and military operation strategies, the LRA structure appears to have been complex, with 
a much more strategic outlook than was often assumed. 
In relation to whether the LRA was/is a religious group, the accounts given by the study 
participants do not suggest that the LRA is a religiously fanatic group. But, as discussed in 
Chapter Five their leaders observed some of the Acholi traditions that are applied in close 
relation to Christianity (see p‘Bitek, 1971). Basically, religion, spirituality and traditional beliefs 
served as a code of conduct in the daily life of the abductees and LRA members, but not as the 
foundation of their fighting. The leadership simply relied on these to ensure discipline, 
adherence, and respect to military order: ‗the man who believes [in God] is a good fighter‘ 
(former LRA commander, quoted in Cakaj, 2010:5). Thus, religion and spiritual order served to 
ensure ‗internal cohesion, through motivating, legitimizing and intimidating the individual 
fighters‘ (Titeca 2010:62). Apart from relying on military organisation and roles to run the LRA, 
in order to maintain cohesion in the organisation, Kony exploited his spirits‘ multi-layered 
visions, including ideas of maintaining control, liberation and destruction to advance the 
rebellion (see RLP, 2004:13). Also, the use of a religious language was a tool for maintaining 
loyalty, motivation and confidence among the followers (Branch, 2007:174). Religion, infused 
with Kony‘s personal spirituality, became a viable strategy to run a disciplined army and justify 
its actions. Kony used the language and framework of religion; spirituality, traditional beliefs 
and ruthlessness to reinforce his terrifying and mysterious personality (see Gersony, 1997:36; 
Eichstaedt, 2009:16; Behrend, 1999:179). 
To conclude this subsection, considering that Kony was not highly educated and practised 
healing for most of his adult life until he came to warfare, it is possible he did not start with a 
clear understanding of political processes or a framework to channel his dissatisfaction with 
Ugandan politics. It is also likely he did not know much about the importance of positive 
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publicity to an effective rebellion. Among other factors, these could have limited the LRA‘s 
ability to get their message and agenda across to the country and the world. However, ‗failure of 
the LRM/A to have access to the mass media to express its political agenda in intellectual form 
does not mean the lack of it‘ (Finnström, 2008:127). Further, considering the general political, 
economic, social and cultural situation of northern Uganda at the time, this could have motivated 
anyone to start a war against the government. Thus, ‗…we need to pay attention to the power 
relations and structural circumstances that promote such persons‘ positions‘ (ibid.) rather than 
seeking to understand whether the fighting individuals have a rational agenda or not. In relation 
to the analysis of the conflict in northern Uganda, the over emphasis on the religious and 
spiritual aspects of LRA marginalised other crucial and valid political, economic, social and 
cultural concerns (Finnström, 2008:115). Considering that these dimensions were/are 
interconnected, it was/is important to ‗interrogate the social totality of the conflict, paying 
respectful attention not only to economic factors but to social and religious dimensions as well‘ 
(Dunaa, 2010:56). The LRA‘s usage of a religious language to frame their vicious violence and 
military strategies should be seen as one aspect coexisting with other dimensions (Branch 
2007:174). The current study argues that whether the armed group had a political motive or not 
should not become the pivotal point for reintegrating the formerly abducted adolescents and 
youth that were caught up in this war or responding to the post conflict situations of northern 
Uganda. 
The LRA‘s Adolescent Abduction Practices 
The LRA rebellion is well-known for their widespread child abduction practices in Uganda and 
beyond.12Kony initially stated that his group was carrying out abductions to protect children 
from an evil society so that they could be secure and live in the alternative world that he intended 
to create with his fighting (Behrend, 1999:179–182). However, in the long run this strategy 
impacted the group‘s image negatively. They were portrayed as an irresponsible rebellion that 
lacked accountability for their actions. Such strategies further alienated them and made LRA 
                                                             
12 For present purposes, child abduction is defined as ‗the unlawful removal, seizure, capture, apprehension, taking 
or enforced disappearance of a child either temporarily or permanently for the purpose of any form of exploitation of 
the child—this includes but is not limited to recruitment in armed forces or groups, participation in hostilities, sexual 
exploitation or abuse, forced labour, hostage-taking, or indoctrination. If a child is recruited by force by an armed 
force or group, this is considered as two separate violations—being abduction and recruitment‘ (Watch List, 2011 
(May):16).  
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appear a less than viable partner in peace negotiations (Schomerus, 2007:16). They were viewed 
as a rebellion that was utterly unaware of their international, national and traditional 
responsibility to protect the underage (Allen, 2006:114). When observers, commentators and 
peace activists concluded that the LRA had no viable agenda for their fighting, they turned their 
attention to the recruitment of ‗poor‘ Ugandan children. This also shifted the focus from the 
bigger picture of the war effects, like how the fighting and displacement were impacting the 
people and children in the general population (Dolan, 2002). 
A figure produced by UNICEF in 2006, estimating that the LRA was 80 per cent comprised of 
abducted children, some as young as eight, circulated in the literature, portraying LRA as ‗an 
army of children‘. However, the current findings support the existing evidence that age mattered 
during the abduction process. Commonly, abductions in northern Uganda were more focused on 
adolescents rather than children under the age of ten or adults. Children under the age of ten were 
frequently released before the abductors headed for South Sudan (see also Blattman& Annan, 
2010:132; Schomerus, 2007:16). Although  women in this study were abducted at different 
stages of their lives, the majority (79%) were in the age range of 10–17 years, with a further 11% 
less than 10 years of age and another 10% adults (18 and above). They were abducted in the 
period 1998–2003 when the armed conflict was most brutal in the region (see Branch, 2007; 
Allen, 2005). This data suggests that during abduction, the LRA ‗recruiters‘ took the females‘ 
age at abduction into consideration. They purposely targeted pre-adolescent and adolescent girls 
aged 10 to 16 while avoiding the anyira-matino (Acholi for ‗little girls‘) below the age of 10 and 
adult females (over 18s). This evidence supports the observation that, as with boys, adolescent 
girls are often targeted by armed groups in Africa (see West, 2000:193; Veale, 2003).  
But why target the adolescents? Evidence from other armed conflicts in Africa shows that pre-
adolescents and adolescents are easier to control, indoctrinate and manipulate than young adults. 
Less likely to question the authority, they easily adapt to the harsh conditions of the jungle and 
become loyalists (see Honwana, 2006; Singer, 2005). In Uganda, the abducted adolescents were 
taken to remote areas of the north and Sudan, where they were trained and brainwashed, and 
when they returned to Uganda for the first time, many of them did not think of escaping (or they 
were terrified of the same). Defecting usually happened after serving for a while. When they 
were older, if an opportunity to escape presented itself, many opted for it. In addition, pre-
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adolescent and adolescent girls were targeted because they had not yet been sexually active, and 
therefore did not suffer from any sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) including the potentially 
fatal Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Due to HIV/AIDs and displacements, the LRA was 
also aware of a demographic shift in northern Uganda (Blattman& Annan, 2012:146) and 
exploited it knowledgeably. With adults dead or weakened, they targeted the adolescents. Lastly, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, the LRA also targeted girls for their functional value in the camps, for 
fighting, domestic work and farming.  
In northern Uganda, studies and international media depicted the abduction of children as 
happening at night, hence the ‗night commuters‘—children leaving villages for towns every 
evening in fear of being abducted at night, and then returning to their homes at dawn (see Lunde, 
2006; Radhakrishna, 2006; BBC pictures13). However, the findings in this study support the 
evidence of other scholars like Dolan (2009:79; Veale &Stavrou, 2003; Blattman& Jeannie, 
2008) that abductions were large scale and random, so much so that abduction appeared to have 
been a chance event. Abduction took place at any location, day and time, and not necessarily or 
only at night. Recruitment took place when the adolescents were involved in their daily 
activities, in their homes, bush (collecting firewood or house building materials), water wells, 
gardens and village pathways. Even those in boarding schools were not safe (see Temmerman, 
2001). This made it difficult for the families and communities to protect the children from being 
recruited into the LRA. In Acholi sub-region, it is almost impossible to find a family that was not 
affected by these abductions, which were concentrated in Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader, although 
neighbouring sub regions like Lango, Teso, West Nile, and South Sudan were also affected (see 
Annan et al., 2006, 2008; Dolan, 2002; Allen, 2005). 
Significant inconsistency exists among estimates of the number of children abducted in northern 
Uganda (McKay &Mazurana, 2004:77): ‗the scale of abduction is a matter of speculation‘ due to 
insufficient monitoring (Allen, 2005: iii). A survey carried out by UNICEF Uganda covering the 
period of 1999–2001 shows that of 28,902 people who were abducted from Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, 
Apac and Lira, about 10,000 were children (UNICEF, 2001; see also Dolan, 2005:91). 
Abduction seemed to increase soon after the failure of peace talks in 1994 and LRA‘s recourse to 
Khartoum for support and to provide a base for their fighting. Since the support was given for the 
                                                             
13http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/picture_gallery/05/africa_night_commuters/html/2.stm 
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purpose of fighting the SPLA, the LRA needed to equip its troops to fight the two armies (UPDF 
and SPLA) and other militias. Like the atrocities towards the civilians, the increased abductions 
were also connected to the government‘s attempt to involve the Acholi civilians in the ‗Home 
Brigades‘ to fight the LRA (see Branch, 2007). Abductions thus increased during the 
government counter insurgencies, with more than 10,000 children said to have been abducted in 
the period 2002–2004 (Annan et al., 2006, 2008; Pham et al., 2007; Blattman& Annan, 2008; 
Berntsen, 2010: note 3; Dolan, 2005:91). There are no accurate records of abductions after 2004. 
However, the Berkeley-Tulane Initiative (2007) and Brubacher (2010:272) highlight that the 
abductions decreased in the period after 2005, with just over 200 reported for the first six months 
of 2006. By June 2007, many reception centres were not receiving returning individuals. 
In an attempt to sum up the abductions, Pham et al. (2007:14) estimate that between 1986 and 
2006 approximately 54,000 to 75,000 people, including 25,000 to 38,000 children, were 
abducted, with the majority 89 per cent of them from Acholi region. These estimates were based 
on the number of children passing through reception centres. However, abductions seem to have 
been underreported (Annan et al., 2008:31). The estimate by Pham et al. does not account for the 
possibly many children and youths who did not pass through these centres. Annan et al. carried 
out a survey in northern Uganda (Survey of War-Affected Youth—SWAY) that was based on a 
random survey sample of 1,016 households that included youths abducted from ages 14–30. This 
estimates that at least 66,000 youths between the ages of 14 and 30 seem to have been abducted 
(Annan et al., 2008:31). Although this estimate leaves out the children below 14 who were 
among those purposely targeted by the LRA abductors, the survey captures the abducted 
adolescents and young adults who self-demobilised, died or are still missing—something the 
other estimates do not do. The survey estimates that 20 per cent of male and 5 per cent female 
abductees were dead and never to return (ibid: 33). These are the major studies that offer 
abduction estimations in northern Uganda. However, they both leave out the many children born 
in captivity to the abducted girls (for more about this category of children in northern Uganda, 
see Eunice Apio‘s work).  
Although there are no definite figures for abductions by the LRA in northern Uganda, it is 
apparent that most abductees were from Acholi region. It is difficult to determine which 
estimates are right, but these high figures depict how severe abduction practices were in northern 
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Uganda. The figures also show that many of the young adults today have been affected by the 
abductions and, as discussed in Chapter 8, there is a need to explore how the abduction 
experience continues to impact daily lives and livelihoods.  
2.5 Forced Displacement 
This section looks at forced displacement as one of the policies the government employed in its 
attempts to end the war. It is important to look at the mass displacement in northern Uganda to 
identify how it impacts ‗reintegration‘ as a process and experience. In 1996, the government 
came up with a strategy to protect the populace from LRA attacks and abductions by forcibly 
displacing them from their villages into government created camps (see Branch, 2007). By 2005, 
there were more than 200 internally displaced people‘s camps—commonly referred to as 
‗protected villages/camps‘ (HRW, 2003:4; Human Rights Focus-HURIFO, 2002:11). The 
government purposely drove people—particularly in Acholi—out of their homes into the camps, 
in most cases in the trading centres or near UPDF battalions. This was done through 
intimidation, bombing and burning down of homes (Acholi Religious Leaders‘ Peace Initiative 
(ARLPI), 2001:8–10; HURIFO, 2002:10; Atkinson, 2009:8). The villagers were given a short 
notice of seven days to ‗peacefully‘ move to the camps. Thereafter, followed artillery and mortar 
shelling of the villages, followed by foot soldiers marching villagers to the camps. Anyone found 
outside the camps would be considered a rebel and possibly killed (HURIFO, 2002:8; Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2006:35). 
This government strategy was said to have been for security purposes and allegedly to cut the 
rebels‘ food supply and decrease forced recruitment of children and youth (Behrend, 1998:117; 
Carlson &Mazurana, 2008:12). The then Senior Presidential Adviser, Major Kakooza Mutale, 
was quoted as saying: ‗the depopulation of the villages removes the soft targets and logistics for 
the survival of the rebels. They would lack food, information, and youth to abduct and people to 
kill. Desperation would drive them to attack the Army in the camps. That will be their end‘ (cited 
in HURIFO, 2002:16). The President also had a similar response, indicating that the measure 
would leave the villages ‗open for UPDF confrontation with marauding remnants of the rebels 
now terrorizing innocent people‘ (ibid). As a military strategy, forced displacement seemed to 
make sense, since clearing out the villages would give UPDF an opportunity to fight the rebels 
when they lacked resources (food and recruits). 
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However, as time went on, a mass displacement strategy affected the people more than saving 
them from the wrath of the LRA. From 1996 to 2000, about 400,000 civilians, mostly in Gulu, 
Kitgum and Pader, were living in camps. These people in the ‗protected villages‘ were later to 
become internally displaced persons (IDPs).14Although they were still in their country and in 
Acholiland, displacement left them vulnerable, exposed and their livelihoods disrupted, 
undermined and destroyed. Considering that many people left northern Uganda for Kampala, 
other districts or abroad, it is possible that most of the people in Acholi at the time were the poor 
and those living in rural settings. Since a majority (77%) of households in northern Uganda 
depend on subsistence agriculture (Ministry of Finance, 2003:9; see also Girling, 1960; 
Atkinson, 1994), confined in the camps, people could not cultivate their land, rear domestic 
animals or engage in any agro-business, as had been the case before the war. They instead 
depended on foodstuffs distributed by relief agencies (Dolan, 2005).  
Apart from displacement breaking down livelihoods and lifestyles, the camps further rendered 
the people vulnerable to rebel attacks and abductions (Branch, 2007:181). The LRA did not have 
to roam vast areas of northern Uganda to abduct and loot; they simply attacked the camps to 
accomplish their mission (Finnström, 2008:131–165; HURIFO, 2002:10; HURIPEC, 2003:81). 
Although they were in ‗protected villages‘, people were left with little or no protection from the 
LRA (Atkinson, 2009:8). It is reported that once the camps were formed, the UPDF began 
withdrawing soldiers from the north, leaving people to be protected by the ‗home-guard‘ 
brigades and a few soldiers (Refugee Law Project, 2004:29–30).15 This made it easier for the 
LRA to terrorise the civilians (International Crisis Group, 2007:1; Branch, 2007). People were 
affected from two sides, the government and the rebels. The government forced them into 
‗protected villages‘ while the LRA threatened and abducted them, and burned their huts in order 
to push them back to the villages (Acker, 2004:350; Finnström, 2008:131–165). Living in the 
                                                             
14UNOCHA (1998: section 2) defines Internally Displaced Persons as the ‗persons or groups of persons who have 
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in 
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural 
or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border‘. 
15 The government-backed home guards (formerly known as the ‗Arrow Brigade‘) weregroups of civilian youth who 
were armed with bows and arrows to fight the LRA. This was one of the government‘s earlier initiatives to fight the 
rebels, through encouraging the local population to join forces and fight off the LRA.  
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camps was considered collaborating with the government army and administrators and called for 
punishment.  
Following intense attacks in 2002–2004 that extended to other sub-regions of northern Uganda 
like Lango and Teso, many more people were displaced. Although people in Lango and Teso 
were not forced to move into the camps as was the case in Acholi, they still fled their villages to 
the camps for their own safety. By mid-2005, approximately 1.8 million northern Ugandans were 
internally displaced (Relief Web, 2005; Dolan, 2005:9). While there were displacements in other 
sub-regions, 90 per cent of the IDPs were found in Acholi (Berntsen, 2010: note 3; Dolan, 
2005:9; Allen, 2006:72). 
Apart from lacking protection from the LRA, camp situations made their suffering more severe. 
Characterised by the worrying conditions, forced displacement came to be understood as ‗forced 
dependency, forced vulnerability, forced humiliation, forced congestion within camps, and 
forced isolation from outside‘ (Atkinson, 2009:8). Because of the large numbers of people 
confined in camps, life there was marred by conditions of poor sanitation, violence, starvation, 
disease and poverty, among others (GUSCO, 2010:5; HURIFO, 2002). A study carried out in 
2005 by the World Health Organization and the Ugandan Ministry of Health estimated that 
conditions in the camps in Acholi were resulting in 1,000+ excess deaths a week. Causes of 
death included malnutrition, malaria/fever, respiratory and diarrhoeal diseases, murder, and 
suicide. Furthermore, because of lack of basic supplies (food and water, shelter and housing), 
trauma and emotional distress were higher in the camps. There were also high rates of sexual 
violence against women and girls, especially rape. Females were raped by the fighters including 
government soldiers who were meant to be protecting them (MSF-Holland, 2004 (October and 
November); Hunter, 2007; WHO, 2005). A report by Morten and Hatloy (2005), who 
interviewed 2,300 households in 67 camps, found that: one-third of all children above 10 years 
old had lost a parent and 9 per cent of children in the camps were orphans; illiteracy was very 
high, particularly among women (84%); most people had very few possessions; 85 per cent of all 
households received food aid; youth idleness and unemployment were widespread; and crime 
rates were extremely high. These were the life conditions that the women under study and other 
formerly abducted individuals returned to when they exited the LRA. Most of them were 
reunited with their families in these camps to start on their reintegration. 
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2.6 Post-conflict Northern Uganda 
It has been ten years (2005–2015) since the LRA left Uganda and, following the 2006 peace 
process,16 there has since been optimism among northern Ugandans. Since 2006, there have been 
no LRA attacks, and with this relative peace, people began returning to their villages or resettling 
in new environments near their villages and areas of cultivation (satellite camps). There, they 
started a challenging recovery process. By the end of 2007, the overall number of IDPs living in 
camps had reduced from a high of 1.8 million to 1.3 million (OCHA, 2008). At the end of 2008, 
420,000 people remained in IDP camps and by 2010, more than 90 per cent of the 1.8 million 
people had left the IDP camps, with 112,000 people including 28,000 children still in camps 
(IRIN, 2008; OCHA, 2008; UNHCR 2010:1). On 6th January 2012, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that the UN‘s main and the world‘s biggest 
refugee agency had concluded all its relief work with IDPs in the region. Also, the many other 
relief agencies that flooded the region when the conflict was at its peak (2000–2004) have now 
left the region, and the remaining NGOs are supporting economic activities for formerly 
displaced people rather than providing emergency relief. By the time of the field work in 2013, 
all people had returned to their villages. The study came across only one satellite camp, in 
Lokung, Lamwo district, Deblyoch village, bordering South Sudan. Some people were still in the 
satellite camp because of land wrangles back in their villages and others had nowhere else to go. 
Once described as ‗the world‘s worst forgotten humanitarian crisis‘ (Dolan, 2009:23), northern 
Uganda is now a different region altogether.  
A collective effort to shift the region completely from humanitarian assistance to more regular 
development assistance through national institutions is in progress (IRIN, 2013). The 
government and the development partners are rebuilding the region through initiatives like the 
Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP, see Chapter Three). PRDP 
has indicated that most welfare indices in the north are poor, largely because of the conflict and 
the consequential weak state institutions (Government of Uganda, 2007). It was implemented 
                                                             
16 Following the collapse of the Betty Bigombe peace talks in 1994/5 (see Branch, 2007; Dolan, 2005), new peace 
talks were initiated. On July 14, 2006, the world saw the government of Uganda and LRA come to the negotiating 
table. These peace talks became known as the ‗Juba peace talks‘ that resulted in several agreements: Cessation of 
hostilities; Comprehensive solutions to the conflict; Accountability and reconciliation; permanent Ceasefire 
agreement; Demobilisation, disarmament and Reintegration. Most of these agreements were signed, creating hope 
for peace in northern Uganda at last. However, Joseph Kony failed to sign the final peace agreement, hence further 
increasing the unpredictability of attaining sustainable peace. For more on the Juba peace talks process, see 
Schomerus (2007); International Crisis Group, 2007; Atkinson, 2009, 2010:205). 
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and fully commenced in the Fiscal Year 2009/10 and it is currently in its second phase. PRDP 
and other initiatives like Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF 1&2)—supported by the 
World Bank—aim to revitalise the economy, targeting the most vulnerable households and 
persons in the region. The improved security in the region enables business and investments to 
run as expected, but the region remains extremely poor. 
The war in northern Uganda not only left the region paralysed, with people subjected to 
horrifying suffering (widespread killings, abductions, displacement, torture, and sexual abuse, 
among other afflictions), it also affected the region‘s economic development by destroying the 
infrastructure, markets, livelihoods and through increased migration. Compared to other regions 
in Uganda, poverty trends analysis shows that northern Uganda has the highest rates of poverty 
at 64 per cent in rural and 40 per cent in urban areas (Republic of Uganda, 2008).17 Due to the 
prolonged war, poverty levels increased rapidly in northern Uganda. In 2003, the Ugandan 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in the Office of the Prime Minister 
published a report indicating that income poverty declined rapidly nationally between 1992 and 
2000, from 56% to 35%. However, poverty levels had not fallen at the same pace regionally, but 
rather remained high in northern Uganda. The proportion of people in the region unable to meet 
their basic consumption needs declined marginally from 72% in 1992/93 to 66% in 1999/2000, 
although urban dwellers experienced a much faster poverty decline from 55% to 31% within the 
same period. However, between 1997 and 2000, poverty rose again from 60 to 66% implying 2 
out of 3 persons in the region were poor. According to the Poverty Status Report, 2003, ‗one 
third of the chronically poor (30.1%) and a disproportionate percentage moving into poverty are 
‗from northern Uganda‘ (Ugandan Ministry of Finance, 2003:102). This represents 7% of the 
total population of Uganda (34.5 million) (New Vision, 2011, 2013). This showed that almost a 
half (44.3%) of the poorest 20 per cent of the Ugandan population lived in northern Uganda 
(Ugandan Ministry of Finance, 2003: 9). 
                                                             
17The 1990 World Development Report defines poverty as the ‗inability to attain a minimal standard of living‘, 
measured in terms of basic consumption needs or income required to satisfy them. The World Bank uses $1.25 a day 
as the measure to assess poverty levels. The poverty line is based on the expenditure necessary to buy a minimum 
standard of basic necessities.  
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Poverty remains highest in Acholi region. For instance, for 2005/2006; poverty rates for Gulu 
stood at 67%, Kitgum 78% and Pader 76% (Ahikire et al., 2012). These figures seem consistent 
during and after the war, whereby northern Uganda did not register much increase in household 
welfare, but rather the poverty head count index went down tremendously in the period 1992-
1999 compared to the national poverty head count index, which declined in the same period 
(Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2003). At the same time, a 2006 study conducted by the Civil 
Society for Peace in Northern Uganda found that 70% of northern Ugandans had no monetary 
income and 90% lived in ‗absolute poverty‘ (Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2007:16). 
According to the 2007 progress report on Uganda‘s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
there was an obvious economic imbalance between the north and the rest of the country with the 
north maintaining the highest incidence of poverty at 61% (UN 2007:12). In the Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics‘ 2009/2010 report, 46.2% of the inhabitants in northern Uganda lived below the 
poverty line. This is almost double the figure for the country as a whole. The Poverty Status 
Report 2012 showed that some 40 per cent of people in Acholi were absolutely poor compared to 
4 percent in Kampala (IRIN, 2013). Compared to the rest of the country, the region also fares 
badly in other measurements of well-being. For example, the infant mortality rate is about 20% 
higher than the nationwide average. The poor human development outcomes are mainly 
attributed to the armed conflict and loss of assets like cattle (MFPED, 2005).  
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have encountered some of the impacts of the conflict in northern Uganda 
including abduction, mass displacement and widespread poverty. As will be discussed in the 
following chapters, these issues define the socio-economic situation formerly abducted 
individuals find themselves in today, struggling to reintegrate, provide for themselves and their 
families. Following the destruction of livelihood strategies for households, there are no real 
economic structures for formerly abducted and other vulnerable youth to rely on. The fluid 
economic situation presents a negative impact on the reintegration process, experience and life in 
general. This is exacerbated by the unwelcome treatment formerly abducted individuals receive 
from their families and communities. As will be shown in the following chapters, all these issues 
are related to the concept of long term reintegration. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
‘GIRL SOLDIERS’ AND POST–CONFLICT REINTEGRATION 
3.1 Girl Soldiers and Child Mothers 
There is controversy surrounding the terminology used to describe female adolescents that 
participate in armed conflicts. They are often identified as ‗girl soldiers‘ or ‗girls associated with 
fighting forces.‘ One concern is that identifying girls as ‗soldiers‘ conceals both the involuntary 
basis of their participation and the non-combat roles they fulfil. On the other hand is the concern 
that identifying the girls as only ‗associated with fighting forces‘ denies them agency in their 
roles, actions and experiences (Tonheim, 2010:13). Similar to the label ‗girls associated with 
fighting forces‘, the description of ‗forcibly involved girls‘ was introduced in Angola (see 
Wessells, 2007b:7; Stavrou, 2005). Angolan girls preferred the ‗forcibly involved girls‘ 
description to ‗girl soldiers‘, as the former underlined that their participation was not voluntary. 
Girls associated with the LRA are commonly referred to as ‗formerly abducted girls‘, ‗female 
returnees‘ or ‗former girl soldiers‘. Like their Angolan counterparts, the participants felt that 
identifying them as ‗former soldiers‘ was prejudicial, stigmatising and suggested that they 
willingly offered their services to the LRA. Although they protest the ‗former abductee‘, 
‗formerly abducted‘ or ‗the woman who was in the bush‘ identities that the community and 
NGOs have baptised them with, they feel that with time, they will get over their consequences 
and replace these identities with their preferred classification of young woman, mother or wife.  
The literature on girl soldiers, particularly when they have been sexually violated, employs 
various concepts such as, ‗forced wives‘ and ‗bush wives‘ (see Coulter, 2006, 2008; Carlson 
&Mazurana, 2008; McKay, 2004; Annan et al., August 2009). For girls who give birth during 
their time with fighting forces, the commonly used terms are ‗girl mothers‘ (McKay &Mazurana, 
2004:53; Paris Principles, 2007) and ‗forced mothers‘ (Annan et al., August 2009; Tonheim, 
2010). It is important to note that neither of these terms can be used as a universally accurate 
description due to the contextual variations relating to their experiences including duration, roles 
within the armed groups and abuse. The term ‗girl mother‘ as used in the Paris Principles does 
not make any reference to the girl‘s association with armed groups, and ‗forced mother‘ indicates 
that all pregnancies within the armed groups are involuntary and unwished for (Tonheim, 
2010:15). However different, these descriptions are all related to ‗forced marriage‘ and early 
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pregnancy practices in armed groups. ‗Forced marriage‘ is, since the ‗Special Court‘ in Sierra 
Leone‘s ruling on the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), a legally defined international crime and, hence, a meaningful term (see Park, 
2006). ‗Girl mother‘, ‗forced mother‘, ‗child mother‘, when used to describe the situation 
concerning girls within the fighting forces, are all related to ‗forced marriage‘ or ‗forced wife‘. 
The word ‗mother‘, however, obviously implies the birth of a child to a mother while in an 
armed group, which again also falls under ‗forced marriage‘. 
Although most of the former female abductees in northern Uganda who gave birth are currently 
older than 18 years, reintegration agencies and community based organisations (CBOs) still refer 
to this category of young women as ‗child mothers‘. The persistence of the ‗child mother‘ 
description can be partly attributed to the way abduction was interpreted by reintegrating 
agencies and the Acholi people in general. It was viewed that abduction denied an individual a 
smooth childhood development. He or she was perceived as a child, in reference to their age at 
abduction, until the individual returned home. This means that upon abduction, a child‘s age was 
‗frozen‘ and even when she or he returned home aged over 18 or as a mother, that individual was 
still considered and treated as a ‗child‘. This was basically done for legal purposes and reasons of 
the individual‘s responsibility and accountability. This, however, makes the usage of ‗child 
mother‘ confusing because, generally, the description is used to refer to any female who gives 
birth to their first child before the age of 18. While the early motherhood aspect of former girl 
abductees‘ abduction experiences cannot and should not be overlooked, presenting them as ‗girls 
who gave birth in the bush‘ (child mothers), even when they are adults, limits the understanding 
of the multiplicity of their war experiences. 
However confusing its usage is, the present research adopts the term ‗child mother‘ to refer to 
any former female child abductee that exited the LRA with a child. When the label of ‗child 
mothers‘ is used, it also describes young women who became mothers when they were still 
children themselves (below 18), for example in the camps or by rape in the village. The ‗younger 
mother/woman‘ description refers to the female youth between 15 and 30 years of age who are 
mothers, including former abductees and their non-abducted counterparts that participated in the 
study.  
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3.2 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
When an armed conflict comes to an end in a country or region, economic and social conditions 
are usually not supportive for all former soldiers returning to their communities, and they may 
find it challenging to settle on their own. Assistance and programmes that address their struggles 
and difficulties as well as broader post conflict recovery are essential. For this reason, the United 
Nations‘ DDR programme is considered as one of the important phases in rebuilding war 
affected societies (Veal &Stavrou, 2003:19). The most influential international standards guiding 
the DDR processes and frameworks are the 2006 UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and 
the Stockholm Initiative (2006). According toIDDRS (2006 1.10), Disarmament is the 
collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light 
and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Combatants are 
stripped of their weapons through a trade-in system, which offers them money or participation in 
vocational training in exchange for their weapons. Disarmament also includes the development 
of responsible arms management programmes. Demobilisationon the other hand is the formal 
and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The 
first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in 
temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment 
sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation which is 
called reinsertion (commonly, too, transitional safety net), encompasses the provision of a 
support package to the demobilised.  This is assistance offered to ex-combatants during 
demobilisation but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of 
transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can 
include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term 
education, training, employment and tools, and can last up to a year (‗reintegration‘ is defined 
and explained later in this chapter).  
The success or failure of these processes and programmes directly affects the long term stability 
and peace building prospects (Knight &Ozerdem, 2004:1; Fusato, 2003). Ensuring effective 
DDR is therefore key to sustaining long-term peace and security, as well as paving the way for 
individual and community development. Many post conflict African countries have acquired 
expertise in DDR exercises both within and outside a UN framework. There are two kinds of 
DDR: formal programmes, implemented by the UN (Development Programme-UNDP; 
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Department of Peace Keeping Operations-UNDPKO), the World Bank, international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as member nations of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD (McKay &Mazurana, 2004:98; IDDRS, 2006). 
There is also informal DDR, carried out by the state and humanitarian organisations, but still 
executed in the framework of formal DDR. This is the kind that took place in northern Uganda 
after 2000 where the state, national NGOs and donor agencies seeking to address the conflicts 
handled the DDR process.As discussed in the following sub sections, the figure below presents 
an overview of links among the policy, technical/planning and operation/implementation levels 
of DDR in northern Uganda. 
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Fig 3. 3 Organisation chart for DDR intervention in Uganda 
Source: author 
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3.3 The Nature of Government of Uganda Intervention in DDR 
DDR in northern Uganda was implemented under the Amnesty Act. In 2000, the government of 
Uganda passed the Amnesty Act ‗...in respect to any Ugandan who has at any time since the day 
of the 26th of January 1986 engaged in or is engaging in any war or rebellion against the republic 
of Uganda‘ (Amnesty Act 2000, paragraph 2 (3)).18 The Act, which was set to expire in mid-
2008, granted amnesty, broadly understood as pardoning, forgiving, and exempting from 
prosecution by the state, with no distinctions on the levels of responsibility or ranks of the 
applicants, be they commanders, foot-soldiers, camp helpers or any of the abducted persons 
(Amnesty Act, section 3(2)). However, on 24 May 2006 the Act was further revised by a 
legislative statute intended to ‗deny amnesty to leaders of rebellion and to provide for the grant 
of amnesty to persons abducted, those coerced into rebellion and those who apply for amnesty in 
reasonable time, in good faith and who have demonstrated repentance‘ (see Allen, 2007). 
To implement the Amnesty, in 2000, the Act of Parliament established a 
Commission.19According to the Amnesty Act 2000, section 8, the Amnesty Commission is a 
government organisation comprised of: ‗Chairperson who shall be a judge of the High Court or a 
person qualified to be a judge of the High Court; and six other members who shall be persons of 
high moral integrity‘ (Amnesty Act 2000, para. 9). The commission‘s statutory functions are to: 
a)  monitor programmes of demobilization;  reintegration; and  resettlement of reporters20 
b) co-ordinate a programme of sensitization of the general public on the amnesty law;  
c) consider and promote appropriate reconciliation mechanisms in the affected areas; 
d) promote dialogue and reconciliation within the spirit of this Act; (e) to perform any other 
function that is associated or connected with the execution of the functions stipulated in 
this Act (Amnesty Act 2000, para. 9). 
                                                             
18 A copy is available at 
www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/documents/2000_Jan_The_Amnesty_Act.doc 
 
19 The Commission has its headquarters in Kampala with about five regional offices (three in the north: Arua, 
Kitgum and Gulu district). 
 
20 In recognition of the fact that most of those seeking amnesty could have been involuntarily recruited by armed 
groups (as was the case with the LRA), the Act refers to amnesty beneficiaries as ‗reporters‘, as opposed to ‗ex-
combatants‘.  
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Within the commission, a Demobilisation and Resettlement Team (DRT) was also established 
(to be appointed by the president, with the approval of the parliamentary Sectoral Committee on 
Defence and Internal Security (Amnesty Act 2000, para. 11)).DRT is responsible for: 
‗decommissioning of arms; demobilization; resettlement; and reintegration of reporters‘ 
(Amnesty Act 2000, para. 13). 
To finance the implementation of its mandate, the Amnesty Commission relies on different 
sources. International organisations and donor states have supported the amnesty process in 
Uganda over the years,including the European Union, USAID, Britain, Ireland, DANIDA and 
the Netherlands among others (see Mallinder, 2008). They have provided funds and expertise to 
the amnesty commission by setting up DDR schemes. For example, the commission got direct 
financial and technical assistance from Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Programme (MDRP 21 and the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program 
(TDRP)22.To cover its administrative costs, the commission has also received limited funds 
through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
On 23rdMay 2012, on grounds that war in northern Uganda had ended, amnesty provisions (part 
II of the Act) were withdrawn by the Government (Mugisa, 2012; IRIN News, 2012). This effect 
dissolved the Amnesty Commission‘s work in relation to receiving and reintegrating returning 
ex-rebels and formerly abductees. In the following subsections, the chapter analyses the impact 
of the amnesty DDR particularly in relation to formerly abducted individuals in northern 
Uganda.  
                                                             
21  Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) was initiated by World Bank, UNDP, 
member nations of  the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and others to support 
countries‘ DDR activities and transition to broader recovery and development programs. MDRP was the largest 
programme of its kind to be implemented in the world and was designed to support an estimated 400 000 ex-soldiers 
in seven countries of the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Central Africa, including Angola, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. 
MDRP worked with national partners to finance and implement demobilisation and reintegration activities. Created 
in 2002, MDRP closed in 2009 See MDRP on  http://tdrp.net/mdrp/index.php 
22The Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) followed in the footsteps of the MDRP. 
TDRP is a six-year program (2009-2015) financed by a multi-donor trust fund including African Development 
Bank, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Sweden among others. The TDRP continues to 
provide technical assistance to the Amnesty Commission to finalize evaluations and assessment of DDR activities in 
Uganda. See TDRP  onhttp://www.tdrp.net/ and Finn et al. (2012) for a Uganda Demobilization and Reintegration 
Project Beneficiary Assessment report 
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Disarmament 
Disarmament of returning children and youth was handled by the Ugandan army (Uganda 
People‘s Defence Force, UPDF). Upon exiting the LRA, under military procedures, the LRA 
child abductees were to be referred to a nearby barracks of the UPDF‘s Child Protection Unit 
(CPU) for up to 48 hours (Allen &Schomerus, 2006). In practice, children were frequently held 
for longer periods: for example, some of our participants were kept for periods ranging from two 
days to three months. During this time, they were housed, fed, clothed and their statements were 
taken; thereafter, they were transferred to interim care centres for further rehabilitation assistance 
(see also McKay &Mazurana, 2004:79). Since some of the returning abductees had been 
militarily trained, carried guns and fought on the front lines, UPDF used this period to debrief 
them on their military experience, and those who exited with guns were advised on how to 
surrender them. Regardless of the time spent at the CPU and age differences, abductees were 
treated well, with fairness and dignity, by the Ugandan forces (see also Anann et al., 2008:36; 
McKay &Mazurana, 2004:81). However, there were also reports indicating that while in the 
barracks, some girls (and boys) were threatened and assaulted by UPDF soldiers (see HRW, 
March 2003, July 2003).  
While residing at the CPU, many returning individuals registered with the amnesty commission. 
The commission‘s primary task in relation to the war in northern Uganda was to register ex-
rebels and former abductees, issue them with amnesty certificates, resettle and then help them to 
reintegrate into society. Children above the age of 12 and adults who spent more than four 
months in the LRA were eligible to apply for the amnesty certificate. Under the terms of the 
Amnesty Act, they were to report to ‗the nearest Army or Police Unit, a Chief, a member of the 
Executive Committee of a local government Unit, a magistrate or a religious leader within the 
locality‘ and ‗renounce and abandon involvement of the war or armed rebellion‘ (Amnesty Act, 
2000, para. 4(1)(a)). Each applicant was issued with a certificate of amnesty, exonerated of all 
crimes. The Commission‘s database indicates that, as of the 22nd August 2008, 22,520 former 
rebels had been granted amnesty since 2000 (Bean, 2008). By 2009, a total of 55% of amnesty 
beneficiaries were LRA returnees (Mallinder, 2009:31). Considering that LRA‘s recruitments 
were higher in comparison to other armed groups in the period 2000-2005/6 (see Bean, 2008), 
this figure is low. The Survey of War Affected Youth in northern Uganda found that ‗two-thirds 
of [LRA] formerly-abducted youth [did] not appl[y] for formal amnesty‘ (Annan, et al, 2008:44). 
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In our research sample, 39% of the women did not register with amnesty commission. According 
to Annan and others, ‗low application rates may indicate that receipt of a Certificate [was] not 
seen as worthwhile, [was] too difficult, or [was] to be avoided due to stigmatization…that the 
amnesty process [was] poorly understood‘ (Annan, et al, 2007:5). In their study in northern 
Uganda, Allen and Schomerus found that, ‗there [was] much confusion amongst FAPs [formerly 
abducted persons] about what amnesty actually mean[t]: for some it mean[t] receiving a 
[resettlement] package, others believe[d] that they ha[d] been granted amnesty if they ha[d] gone 
through a reconciliation ceremony‘ (2006:38). While it remains unclear why individuals exiting 
the LRA did not apply for amnesty, it seems that efforts to communicate the amnesty to the 
potential beneficiaries targeted those who were still in the LRA camps (see International Crisis 
Group, 2007a: 7; Pham, 2005: 49; Allen, 2006:75) and not those already back in towns and 
villages. Allen and Schomerus further found that, ‗others ha[d] lost faith in the amnesty, because 
they had been consistently turned away from the Amnesty Commission‘s offices. The probability 
of receiving an amnesty package of assistance items [was] regarded as so low, that many just 
d[id] not bother claiming it—not realizing that not applying for amnesty could have legal 
consequences‘ (2006:38). Among the reasons given for applying amnesty, ‗being granted 
amnesty from the Amnesty Commission to obtain legal immunity from prosecution was barely 
ever mentioned as an explanation about what amnesty means‘ (ibid). 
Demobilisation 
In implementing its mandate, the amnesty commission worked in partnership with interim care 
centres (commonly known as reception centres in Northern Uganda). The Demobilization and 
Resettlement Team (DRT) over saw the activities of most centres. It set out policies and 
guidelines for their operations. DRT 
[did] not directly [manage] reception centers, except where there [were] no specialized 
agencies capable of assuming the task. In this case, the Demobilization and Resettlement 
Team [took] direct responsibility for reception, generally by using the facilities and 
resources of existing institutions within the district and the community (Community 
Development Office, community counseling facilities, civil society groups, the UPDF, 
religious, traditional and cultural leaders (DDR Resource Center, as quoted in Mallinder, 
2009:29) 
Reception centres ensured the defecting individuals were rehabilitated and reunited with their 
families. Possessing an amnesty certificate and return or family reunification through these 
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centres was considered as formal reintegration in northern Uganda. According to interviews and 
the literature, most of the returning children and young adults found their way to their families 
and villages with the help of these centres. It is therefore important to explore the contribution of 
these centres to the actual reintegration of returnees. Reception centres act as briefing points, re-
introducing returning individuals to ‗normal‘ society by preparing them for possible reintegration 
challenges and opportunities (see McKay &Mazuruna, 2004; Mazuruna& Carlson, 2004). 
Formerly abducted people were thus provided with space and opportunity for healing and 
reflecting, and interacting with other returnees and staff—something that boosted their 
confidence in their new environment. In practice, rehabilitation via the centres involved three 
major components: physical, health and psychological (see HRW, March and July 2003; Allen 
&Schomerus, 2006; McKay &Mazurana, 2004:83; Mazurana&Carlson 2004). 
Upon arrival at the centres, individuals went through an assessment of their general condition 
and urgent physical needs, including accommodation, feeding, and clothing, that helped them 
reorient themselves to a new, ‗normal‘ environment. They also had access to health care, as  
McKay &Mazuruna‘s (2004:83) research among returning girl soldiers found: ‗the centres [had] 
nurses who provide routine nursing and health care for the children and youth and make contacts 
with hospitals for testing and additional medical care. The centres also employ[ed] counsellors 
and social workers who work[ed] with the children using a variety of approaches‘. Project 
managers for KICWA and World Vision rehabilitation centre indicated during the present study 
that all persons at the centre were taken to a local medical centre and those with special health 
needs like broken limbs were referred to Lacor hospital, Gulu town (the biggest referral hospital 
in Acholi region). Indeed, a whole year after their eventual departure for home, returnees that 
went through KICWA still benefited from access to medical service at the centre. In addition to 
health provision, individuals were assessed for psychological illness. If symptoms of depression, 
trauma or post-traumatic stress disorder were found, they received treatment for illness while 
they were still at the centre.  
As their physical and mental conditions improved, individuals were provided with other support 
like counselling. KICWA and World Vision provided counselling on individual or group basis, 
with those with emotional and social problems for example, benefiting from psychological 
support (see also Akello et al. 2006; Mazurana& Carlson, 2004). Group counselling happened 
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when former abductees gathered to talk with social workers about their challenges, progress and 
worries among other issues. It is important to note that professional counselling is almost non-
existent in Acholiland. As the following quote exemplifies, available counselling dealt 
commonly with how to live with others in societal settings, how to react to stigma and how not 
to lose hope in the possibility of a more promising future: 
The social workers counselled/trained us on how to live if we got back to our villages… 
They counselled us to leave the ‗bush mentality‘ of wanting to hurt or fight any one that 
disturbs us. They told us to live the life people back home were practising. If someone 
stigmatised or started a quarrel with us, we were not to respond physically but report 
them to the LC [local council leader].23 
Counseling was complemented by healing ideas, through Christian prayers, cleansing 
ceremonies, recreational activities like singing, dancing, acting, painting and watching movies 
that were also helpful for bonding and networking (see also McKay &Mazuruna, 2004:83).  
According to individual needs, length of time (in months) spent at the centres varied with 3.4 
months as the average. For example at KICWA, under normal circumstances, an individual was 
expected to stay at the centre for at least two months. However, many of the participants who 
went through this centre stayed for longer than that, including those  who were pregnant or had 
returned with children, or had been in abduction for a long time and whose families could not be 
traced easily.  Although the women in this study were not asked to evaluate (or comment) on 
whether the services and support they received were adequate or not, it is clear that some 
interventions made a positive contribution towards reintegration. Many women described their 
lives and experiences at the centres as ‗good‘ and ‗helpful‘ (see also McKay &Mazuruna, 
2004:83; Mazuruna& Carlson 2004). Research indicates that there is a difference between 
returnees who go through rehabilitation centres and those who do not: for example, a study of 
567children (412 male and 155 females) in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts found that formerly 
abducted children who did not pass through the centres had more trouble reintegrating. They 
were less confident, more anxious, depressed and angry compared to those who went through the 
centres (MacMullin&Loughry, 2002). 
                                                             
23Interview, CM5, 13/12/2012 
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Reinsertion 
In January 2005, the amnesty commission received $4.2 million from MDRP to formally launch 
its DDR programme on 13 May 2005 (Mallinder, 2009).The money (to cover a period of two 
years) was intended to ‗assist approximately 15,300 reporters [from different armed groups] in 
their reintegration into civilian life, within the context of Uganda‘s Amnesty Act of 2000; and 
Strengthen the capacity of the Amnesty Commission‘ (Finnegan & Flew, 2008:7). Since then, 
Amnesty Certificate holders in northern Uganda have received an unconditional cash payment 
(as part of reinsertion/resettlement package) from the Amnesty Commission (Allen &Schomerus, 
2006:37). Each of reinsertion package included ‗both cash—sh350, 000 ($205)—and physical 
items such as a mattress, blanket, cup, pots and pans, jerry can, ten kilograms of seeds, farming 
tools‘ (International Crisis Group, 2005:8).In our research sample, 61% of the women reported to 
have received this unconditional cash payment ranging from 10,000 to 300,000 Ugandan 
shillings (US$ 4-120), with the majority (53%) receiving between 210,000 and 300,000 ($84-
120). They received the assistance while they were still rehabilitating at the reception centres. 
This should not however imply that everyone who applied for amnesty received the reinsertion 
package. Although the commission received international financial support, its work was often 
hampered by financial constraints, for example, by end of 2005, ‗the backlog of reporters who 
had not received reinsertion assistance…had climbed to nearly 11,200‘ (Cecily, 2008:135, see 
also Allen &Schomerus, 2006:38; Annan et al 2008:44).  
In addition to the above assistance, and as part of transitional support, the centres also facilitated 
vocational skills training programmes for returnees. Like the skill programme designers and 
providers, returnees believed this training would provide expended livelihood options during 
long term reintegration. The women considered participating in skills training as the most 
important factor for successful long term economic reintegration (see also Mazurana& Carlson, 
2004). In our research sample, 44 % of women received training in hair dressing, tailoring, 
baking, catering and farming skills among others. Although most women received such training 
during their stay at the centres, others accessed training after they had already returned to their 
villages or moved to IDP camps. Upon successful completion of the course, they were expected 
to rely on their newly-acquired skills to earn a living. The concern in this thesis is the impact of 
reinsertion support including the newly-acquired skills. Chapter Eight of this thesis seeks to 
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analyse particularly the impact of tailoring, one such skill and a livelihood activity, on long term 
reintegration. 
Reintegration Assistance through PRDP 
The MDRP programme in Uganda closed on 30 June 2007. The completion of the MDRP 
seemed to have left the commission completely unable to issue unconditional cash. However, in 
September 2007, the Ugandan government launched a three year plan (2007-2010): Peace, 
Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda, PRDP (see Government of Uganda, 
2007).  The government formulated this ‗comprehensive development framework…as a strategy 
to eradicate poverty and improve the welfare of the populace in Northern Uganda‘ (Government 
of Uganda, 2007: iii).The overall goal of the plan/framework was ‗to consolidate peace and, 
security and lay foundation for recovery and development‘ (ibid: iv). This was to be achieved 
through four core strategic objectives including: consolidation of state authority, rebuilding and 
empowering communities, revitalization of the economy and peace building and reconciliation. 
The PRDP‘s stakeholders included the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) (constitutionally 
mandated to oversee the implementations of the plan), Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development (to manage and budget the plan‘s financial contributions), sixty four 
northern Uganda districts and municipalities (to plan and administer the plan‘s implementations). 
NGOs and Development Partners were also to play a role in planning as well as implementation 
of activities (see Government of Uganda, 2007). 
Objective four (peace building and reconciliation) had reinforcing demobilisation and socio-
economic reintegration as one of its sub-objectives: ‗the objective of this programme is to 
coordinate and facilitate of socio-economic reintegration of reporters in a timely manner‘ 
(Government of Uganda, 2007: 101). Budgeted over 18,099,500,000Ugandan Shillings 
(US$10,055,278, (ibid: 102)), objective four stated that with  
the strategy for demobilization and re-integration will focus on provision of resettlement 
packages to the ex-combatants, facilitating reunification with their families and the 
community and providing opportunities to access existing service providers. Mass 
information dissemination and facilitation of contact with reporters will be promoted.  
 
Other strategies include:  
 
 Issuance of a Demobilisation Certificate and kits (of about $250 USD in value);  
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 Provision of bursaries for formal education for an estimated 20% of the reporters;  
 Skills training/apprenticeships for 50% of the ex-combatants. In some cases, the 
assistance may be a one off while in other cases, it may be for a specified period 
depending on the specific needs of individual ex-combatants. For example, a 
onetime support will be given for income generating activities, education may be 
for an average 2-4 years and skills building may be for 3-6 months; and  
 Provision of support to income generating activities for 30% of the ex-
combatants.  
 
Activities will include:  
 Clearing backlogs;  
 Defining the assistance framework;  
 Establishment of technical standards for programme interventions;  
 Establishment of delivery mechanisms and identification of service providers 
through issuance of a request for proposals from existing organizations;  
  Establishment of a system to facilitate the linkage between reporters and 
reintegration assistance; Plan for handling the potential new caseload 
(Government of Uganda, 2007: 101).  
 
 
To fund PRDP, the government requested for support from the World Bank. A special Multi-
Donor Trust Fund was established in January 2008. Countries including Britain, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden among others committed funds to the Trust (Mallinder, 
2009:30). On 19 August 2008 the funds ‗to socially and economically reintegrate former rebel 
combatants into communities to which they return, within the context of the Government of 
Uganda Amnesty Act of 2000‘ (World Bank, 2008, para, 6) were allocated to the Amnesty 
Commission, to help both ‗new and back-logged case-load of reporters‘ (ibid). 
When PRDP1 came to a close in 2010, PRDP2 (July 2012-June 2015) was launched in 
November 2011 (see Government of Uganda, 2011).  PRDP2 pledged that ‗it [would] maintain a 
.strong programming focus on ex-combatants to ensure effective community level reintegration 
and resettlement‘ (Government of Uganda, 2011:33). But, ‗the proportion of funding allocated to 
this area ha[d] been, and [would] be, lower than other strategic objectives, because many of the 
activities [were] not as resource heavy. This [did] not mean that this [was] not a priority area: the 
overall success of the PRDP and PRDP 2 [was] dependent on the peace building and 
reconciliation activities‘ (ibid).  
On paper at least, Uganda has had a relatively strong and compressive set of development 
initiatives which contained specific components on DDR but, ‗despite the focus placed on 
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reintegration under the PRDP to date, there appears to be a lack of substantive information about 
the success of reintegration activities, and their impact on ex-combatants and the communities 
they have returned to‘, PRDP2 acknowledged (Government of Uganda, 2011:32).  PRDP2 went 
on to note that  
…the MTR [Mid-Term Review of the PRDP] found that very few (26%) of the surveyed 
sub-counties had activities which focused on the socio-economic reintegration of ex-
combatants. Where activities were in evidence, they tended to focus on enhancing access 
for ex-combatants to government programmes such as NAADS [National Agricultural 
Advisory Services] and NUSAF [Northern Uganda Social Action Fund] rather than 
specifically designed programmes (ibid: 33).24 
Although in their design, development initiatives targeted formerly abducted people, such 
findings show that government ‗programming for youth formerly-abducted by the LRA [has 
been] insufficient to meet their needs‘ (Annan et al 2008:44). 
One major problem that has faced PRDP in its attempts to address post conflict recovery, 
reconstruction and development was/is lack of political will. Its public image was and continues 
to be tainted by allegations of corruption (Bertasi, 2013:43). Officials in the Office of the Prime 
Minister (OPM) and service providers have been accused of fund embezzlement: ‗billions of 
shillings meant to help Ugandans affected by two decades of war rebuild their lives ended up 
building mansions for corrupt OPM officials in Kampala and buying luxury vehicles‘ (Daily 
Monitor, 2012, see also Bertasi, 2013:43). Embezzlement and mismanagement of funds led to 
offering sub-standard work or no work at all. Also, under pressure from Ugandans and the 
international community, the government of Uganda has been more concerned about 
‗normalising‘ the situation in northern Uganda (i.e. making sure the LRA did not return to the 
region and that IDP camps inmates could return home), than ensuring formerly abducted 
individuals were settling in well  on their return home and achieving successful reintegration. 
Reintegration has been left to individuals, communities and community based organisations.  
                                                             
24 Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) is a World Bank-funded development project divided into two 
phases. The first, worth $133m, approved on 23rd July 2002 and closed on 31stMarch 2009 (see World Bank, 2002). 
The second phase, worth $100m, was approved on 28th May 2009 (implementation started on 25 November) and 
will close on 29th February 2016 (see World Bank, 2015a). NUSAFdoes not target individuals or groups but 
communities: the project ‗aims to empower communities in Northern Uganda by enhancing their capacity to 
systematically identify, prioritize, and plan for their needs and implement sustainable development initiatives that 
improve socio-economic services and opportunities‘ says the Bank‘s Website  (World Bank, 2015).  
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The amnesty process was seen as the main vehicle for promoting dialogue and reconciliation. 
However, it was not responsive enough to the needs of formerly abducted individuals, their 
children born in the LRA camps. As demonstrated in the following chapters, such individuals 
continue to face stigmatisation and marginalisation in their villages, hindering their long-term 
reintegration. While stigma is the main obstacle to achieving successful social reintegration, lack 
of capacity to meet their basic needs exacerbates their situation. The reintegration experience of 
formerly abducted individuals shows the government of Uganda failing in both its duty of care 
and pledge to help them as set out in the Juba Peace Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation (see Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, 2008)  as well as the 
Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (see DDR document, 2008).This 
is particularly important given that in-community government development initiatives like 
NUSAF do not specifically target such individuals and their needs, but address vulnerable people 
in a general sense. Findings from the current research show that, lacking systematic external 
support, returning individuals have had and continue to rely on themselves and their immediate 
families to meet their pressing and long-term reintegration needs. For many, it is a difficult 
experience. Although the fighting in northern Uganda has stopped, and formerly displaced 
people have returned to their villages in large numbers, we still need to know how minority 
groups like formerly abducted people are coping with post conflict challenges and how they can 
be further assisted to achieve a successful long-term reintegration. 
3.4 The Concept of Reintegration 
Reintegration is a term that Muggah (2009:19) describes as still under-conceptualised and poorly 
understood by the various actors involved in making and executing the process (see also Nillson, 
2005:1). Reintegration is identified as the most complex phase of the DDR process by which 
former soldiers have to find a civilian status, re-establish roots in the society, and gain 
sustainable employment and income (IDDRS, 2006:Section 6.3; see also Kingma, 2000:46; 
Ozerdem, 2009:21). This is fundamentally a social and economic process of development 
principally taking place in local communities (IDDRS, 2006: Section 6.3). Analysing 
reintegration in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, Kingma (2001:407) writes that reintegration 
is not one general process, but consists of ‗thousands of micro-stories, with individual and group 
efforts and with setbacks and success.‘ He emphasises that ‗the long-term objectives of the 
reintegration process are to enhance economic and human development and to foster and sustain 
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political stability, security and peace‘ (Kingma, 2001:407, 2000:46). Because it is part of the 
general development of a post-conflict country or region, it necessitates long-term external 
assistance (IDDRS, 2006: Section 6.3; UN 2000:15).  
As the first phase of reintegration, reinsertion (also seen as the final part of the demobilisation 
phase) is defined as the short term arrival period of an ex-soldier into his or her former home. As 
mentioned earlier, during the reinsertion period, the ex-soldiers receive support mainly with 
basic household goods, food supplements, housing materials, and money, among others. 
Regarding the actual reintegration, which takes a long term approach to assisting the community 
and former soldiers in their transition to civilian life, this is often done through job placement 
services, skills training, credit schemes, scholarships, rehabilitation programmes etc. 
(IAWG.DDR, 2006:1.10:2; Specker, 2008:2). However, in cases where reintegration support is 
available and utilised, it usually lasts a year or less (Specker, 2008). Arguably, a year is not long 
enough for reintegration support in post-conflict situations where resources and economic 
opportunities are scarce for everyone. Although reinsertion support is expected to contribute to 
reintegration (and links demobilisation to reintegration), practice shows that reinsertion is also 
used as a reason for not giving any further assistance for actual reintegration. For example, in 
Uganda, since the reinsertion and rehabilitation assistance was not sustained by longer-term 
reintegration and development initiatives, the actual reintegration was left up to the individuals, 
their families and communities. The fact that the dividing line between reinsertion and 
reintegration has not been clearly defined (Specker, 2008) makes the contribution of reinsertion 
assistance thereto extremely difficult to measure.  
To conceptualise reintegration further, being an open-ended process (IDDRS, 2006: Section 6.3), 
there is a need to clarify its duration, because it is not clear what is the preferred or expected 
outcome, or after how long this should be achieved. In northern Uganda, there is no systematic 
follow-up of what has happened to former child abductees who were reinserted back into their 
communities. Save for the Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY), there is a gap in the 
literature about the long term socio-economic reintegration outcomes and experiences. The 
.assumption that the former abductees have gone on to reintegrate ‗well‘ in the communities 
could explain why policies, programmes and research targeting their long term reintegration are 
non-existent. Instead, there are only government supported initiatives coupled with NGO 
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programmes directed at vulnerable persons in general. This gap in the literature and lack of 
attention is not unique to the Ugandan post-conflict situation, where the child soldiers received 
tremendous attention immediately after exiting the armed group, but their long term progress and 
experience remain less explored.  
Reintegration: Going back to what and where? 
The ‗reintegration‘ process of former young soldiers is commonly described as involving family 
re-unification or returning to their communities of origin (IDDRS 2006:1.20; Jareg, 2005), with 
Ager (2006) explaining the importance and functions of the family to the war-affected young 
soldiers. Due to this assumption, former child soldiers are expected to rely on the families with 
whom they are reunited for moral and livelihood support. However, evidence shows that not all 
family reunifications yield the expected sustainable reintegration (see Wessells, 2007a; Barth, 
2002). Often, individuals are reunited with families where they had problems before their 
recruitment. Studies like those of Wessells (2007a, 2007b), Barth, (2002) and Nilsson (2005), 
among others, show that, for various reasons, reintegration is not desired by all individuals. This 
applies to young soldiers who sometimes do not wish to go back to their old lives and instead 
desire to start over in areas away from their original communities. In Uganda, three months after 
the rescue of 300 such youths in 2004–2005, none was found residing in the community into 
which they were supposed to have been reintegrated (Akello et al., 2006:229). In the current 
sample, 70 per cent of the participants were not living in their communities of origin, for reasons 
including stigmatisation, marriage and economic activities. This experience is not unique to 
Uganda. In Angola, after the war, ex-girl soldiers increasingly preferred to live apart from their 
families or to develop non-traditional family forms of relations. Of 40 former girl soldiers, 53 per 
cent lived in female-headed households––almost double the national average of 27 per cent 
(Stavrou, 2005; Wessells, 2007a). Similarly, as part of the re-unification programme in one 
district of Sierra Leone, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) reported that it had reunited 
196 girls and young women with their families, but that after a few months, as many as 157 had 
left their families, and either returned to a ‗bush husband‘, or gone to live with friends in urban 
areas (Coulter, 2010: note 3). Such cases of not remaining in the reintegration area show an 
inherent problem with the concept of ‗reintegration‘ as it denotes resettling in one‘s community 
of origin (Michael, 2006; Kingma, 1997a).  In the case of re-settlement in a new community, the 
content of current reintegration programmes might need to be reconsidered (Tonheim, 2010).  
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Similarly, using the concept of ‗reintegration‘ as a general term is misleading for some 
categories of child soldiers, including those recruited at a very young age and children born and 
raised in the armed forces. These categories spend most of their early childhood development 
with the armed groups and have nothing to re-integrate into. They have no experience or memory 
of pre-abduction/war patterns of life and, as they join the communities, they are basically 
beginning a new life. In this case, with no prior role in their communities to return to, talking 
about reintegration seems misleading because it is not an option for such individuals. This is also 
applicable to individuals returning to lost relatives and families, changed societies, again this is 
not reintegrating but beginning a new life, even if it is within the community of origin. In all 
these scenarios, the concept of ‗reintegration‘ is misplaced, which is why some studies use, for 
example, the term ‗integration‘ instead of ‗reintegration‘ for such categories of former soldiers 
(see Knight &Ozerdem, 2004; Apio, 2008). However, this is different for returning former 
soldiers who locate their families and are supported, and have pre-recruitment memories and 
roles, because in such situations there is a structure to be re-integrated into (Nilsson, 2005:22).  
Usually, as noted above, reintegration process of young former soldiers is commonly described 
as involving family reunification and returning to community of origin. Findings in this study 
support two arguments that: 1) reintegration process and experience vary largely among 
individuals, even from the same group and culture; 2) reintegration is a dynamic process 
whereby as community members receive and react to returning individuals (either negatively or 
positively), returnees are also equally actively involved in this process of creating a respectful 
relationship with the people in their communities. This is a complex and dynamic negotiation 
that eventually leads to either successful or failed reintegration. To understand how this process 
unfolds, why some individuals, and not others, are able to register successful reintegration, we 
need to examine further the question of ‗going back to what and where‘?  
An analysis of community based socio-economic reintegration in the contexts of Acholi 
communities is the subject of discussion in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SUCCESSFUL REINTEGRATION: ADEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND 
EXPERIENCE 
Various studies have conveyed views of former young soldiers; particularly the reasons for their 
recruitment and their experiences within the armed groups, as well as their experiences after 
escaping or demobilisation (see Uvin, 2007; Chrobok&Akutu, 2008; Keairns, 2002; Boyden & 
de Berry, 2004). However, in the existing literature, there are no in-depth explanations to help us 
understand what aids long term reintegration or when it tends to be successful. The questions 
regarding the criteria or standards defining and measuring successful reintegration for ex-soldiers 
are still unasked and unanswered. As already noted, preferred outcomes of this process have not 
been effectively explored (Nilsson, 2005:13; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Greenen, 2007). 
Humphreys &Weinsten (2007:532) write that ‗despite the confidence of policy makers in the 
impact of DDR programmes, there have been few systematic efforts to evaluate the determinants 
of successful reintegration by ex-combatants after conflict‘. In the literature, we instead have 
statements and assumptions, based on actual experience from the attempts to reintegrate ex-
soldiers, of what is believed to hinder them from engaging in further violence (Nilsson, 
2005:13). In northern Uganda, the nature and determinants of successful reintegration remain 
poorly understood (Annan et al., August 2009). 
Social reintegration is considered a particularly complex and challenging process (IDDRS, 2006: 
section 4.30, 4) because, unlike the Disarmament and Demobilisation phases, it does not result in 
easily quantifiable results, such as the amount of weapons collected or the number of soldiers 
demobilised (Jareg, 2005:3; Chrobok, 2005:27). Bearing in mind that in-depth research 
addressing the local (and individual) perspective on the content and the preferred outcome of the 
social (and economic) reintegration process is still largely missing (Tonheim, 2009:54; 2010:24), 
long term reintegration continues to be based on assumptions. Veale and Shanahan (2010:116) 
argue that ‗if we see reintegration as a rational process, we also need to cast light on community 
perspectives‘. Participants in Sendabo‘s study in Liberia revealed what successful reintegration 
entails and the community‘s expectations of former child soldiers in the long term:  
When you see someone coming from fighting you have certain prejudices…when former 
child soldiers come back from the warfront and roam around, the community does not 
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accept them easily. People in the community have to see that these ex combatants are 
making some changes. Therefore reintegration is considered to have happened or 
successful ‗when the former child soldiers start to settle in the community, get married 
and start farming, gradually they become accepted‘. Only when they engage in activities 
of their community, members of the community admit them readily for faster 
reintegration. Only then the community feels much more comfortable with the former 
child soldiers return to their families and are accepted, the change of attitude from war to 
normal life starts. The more the children are accepted and become part of the society, the 
more they will be rehabilitated and reintegrated (Sendabo, 2004:66, emphasis added).  
As already noted, reintegration does not take place in a vacuum but in an existing society 
framework, and successful reintegration calls for a cautious balancing and adjustments by the 
most important stakeholders to achieve equilibrium. Gradually, attitudes and perceptions of 
individuals, groups and society shift to accommodate and live with each other. This two-way 
street process and the relationships take time and hard work for all stakeholders. In order to 
understand the reintegration process and experiences of former girl abductees in any society, it is 
necessary to gain an understanding of the normal family and village structures of this society. As 
we have already seen in Chapter three, the current understanding of the term ‗reintegration‘ 
implies stability and continuity of context. However, this is never the case. In the following 
subsection, before we explore social and economic reintegration, the thesis examines the socio-
economic order and structure of Acholi, the society that the participants belonged to.  
4.1 Acholiland 
Acholiland (also known as Acholi sub-region)25is one of the seven sub-regions of Uganda. In the 
1990s, Acholiland was made up of three districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader. Four more 
districts have since been created out of the three initial districts as part of government 
decentralisation programme/policy: Lamwo, Agago, Amuru and Nwoya. The seven districts are 
further sub-divided into manageable sub-counties. Acholiland borders the Republic of South 
Sudan to the north, Karamoja to the east, Lango in the south and West Nile sub-region in the 
west (see Map 4.1). 
 
 
 
                                                             
25 For a detailed political history and origin of Acholi people and culture, see Atkinson (1994).   
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Fig 4, 1: Map of Uganda showing Acholiland26 
From colonial times, compared to other sub-regions of the country, population in Acholi has 
always been small (see Girling, 1960:15). According to the 1991 Uganda census, the population 
of the Acholi sub-region was 746,796 people (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 1991). By 2002 the 
population had increased to 1,124,983, constituting 4.8% of the Ugandan population of 24.4 
million. Based on the 2002 population Census, it was estimated that Acholiland‘s population in 
2011 would be 1,572,900, representing a 110% increase in 20 years (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics, 2002).  
4.1.1 Socio-Economic Structure 
The patriarchal setting in Acholi sub-region is based on extended families.27Acholi villagers are 
organized in households: a typical dog gang(household) consists of husband, wife(s), and 
                                                             
26https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Atlas_of_Uganda 
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unmarried children, grandparents (parents to the husband), unmarried siblings, offspring of 
deceased siblings, among other relatives (the Ugandan Census defines a household as ‗a group of 
persons who normally live and eat together‘ (2014:16, italics original)). Members of such a 
household share a compound with their houses (circular huts with a high peak, finished in  mud) 
facing each other while acknowledging the authority of the household head, who in most cases is 
a father/husband. Under normal circumstances, as head of the family, the father or husband has 
absolute control over decision making in the household. He protects, guides, and carries the 
responsibility of up keeping the family. On the other hand, the wife also is a great contributor to 
the maintenance of the family, particularly in child bearing and rearing, as well as in providing 
domestic and farming services. Youth will only be considered adults after getting married and 
giving birth. Until then, they are not in position to take on responsibilities within their clans and 
villages (we return to this in Chapter Seven). Even in adulthood, a person‘s lineage and kaka 
(clan) is held legally responsible for his or her actions throughout their life.  
Family in Acholi is the primary institution for socialization and for passing on cultural norms 
and values. It is also the foundation upon which the Acholi clan system relies for its smooth 
functioning. A kaka (clan) can be defined as a small unit of social organization made up of many 
families who trace their origin to a common ancestor (all Acholi share the same heritage and 
culture) (see Girling, 1960; Artkinson, 1994). Clan elders by definition are the most senior 
people in this family circle (kaka). They have the responsibility to transfer and preserve culture, 
tradition and knowledge to younger generations. Because they are the regulators of the clans and 
represent them at the village level, these leaders have always been highly respected in the family 
and villages (see Girling, 1960; Artkinson 1994).These are the familial and ethnical customs and 
institutions upon which the integrity and cultural development of Acholi people depend, and 
their children are brought up to recognise and respect this custom and hierarchy.  
A group of households in an area make up a caro (village/hamlet).28During the colonial period, 
families of a similar kaka occupied a caro (Girling, 1960:7; 21), but this social order and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
27 The study is referring to the family as it is organised in rural areas (where most participants resided), not as 
nuclear family found in urban centres but the extended family.   
 
28 For present purposes, the terms village (caro) and community (lwak) are used synonymously.  
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organisation later began altering, with clan families dispersed throughout Acholiland and 
beyond. In search of fertile soils, water, green pastures and employment, families and individuals 
moved from village to village or outside of Acholi sub-region. When war broke out, people 
relocated to IDP camps, left villages for towns and other districts or moved abroad. Some 
displaced people have not returned to their villages of origin following the end of fighting (they 
are either settling in new villages or still in former camps that have turned into village trading 
centres). Importantly, due to increasing competition for, and dispute over land among clans and 
villages (see Hetz& Myers, 2006; Phuong &Vinck, 2010:28; Vaughan & Stewart, 2011:4; IRIN, 
2011), people are forced to stay away from their clan land/village and resort to attempts to access 
land elsewhere. In current village settings, we now have people of different lineages and clans 
under the administration of a local government leader (Local Council One (Chairman LC1)).  
The war and displacement of people has changed Acholi: ‗there is no community in terms of 
what was…In essence the conflict has broken down the very fabric of Acholi society‘ (Veale and 
Stavrou, 2002:28 as cited in McKay &Mazurana, 2004:38). Compared to other Ugandan ethnic 
groups, the culture of Acholi was distinct, with stronger marriage and kinship systems. Things 
were always done within a clan setting (see Girling, 1960). Family and clan leaders relied on 
community-building practices to govern homesteads and villages. One of these practices worth 
mentioning here is wangoo (translated as ‗evening fireplace discussion/compound fire‘). Among 
other social events, homestead and clan elders used the forum provided by the wangoo institution 
to elaborate to children and youth issues deemed vital including cultural demands/expectations 
and behaviour of different categories of people: 
Before the war, and in spite of the advent of modernisation and western ways of life, 
Acholi‘s culture was very strong. The socio-cultural institutions regulated everyday life, 
with men, women and children aware of what was required of them. Children were taught 
at the wangoo and knew their roles as looking after the compound, supporting their 
fathers in home management, farming and for the girls helping their mothers in the 
kitchen and weeding. What Acholi culture instilled in children is respect, discipline and 
obedience (a clan elder, as quoted in Ochen, 2014:234). 
Also, through wangoo, cultural values, customs and policies were passed from elders to the 
future generations. It was also a place of entertainment and folk tales that every person in a 
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homestead looked forward to at the end of each day. To quote the Acholi novelist and 
anthropologist, Okotp‘Bitek,  
Towards sunset, as the day‘s work is over, you can see, moving along narrow pathways, 
in single file, groups of men and boys, carrying logs or branches of wood, as well as their 
hoes. You can also hear the flutes of the herds—boys bringing the cattle home. The 
women and girls have returned home from the gardens much earlier to prepare the 
evening meal and to do other domestic chores. On arrival, the younger boys take turns to 
make the outdoor fire ―Mac wangOo‖, whilst the older men have their hot baths. Soon, 
all those not otherwise engaged, come and sit around the fire, waiting for supper. The 
stage is set for talking folk tales (1962:1). 
Being the main meeting place for all family members, wangoo was an important part of every 
homestead. Wangoo discussions were in most cases led by the overall homestead head. Apart 
from being a forum for ‗informal education‘ through which children and youth learned respect 
for hierarchy and authorities, wangoo was also a time to feed everyone in a homestead (ibid). 
Cultural practices like wangoo were strong cultural safety nets for the upbringing of orphans and 
taking care of the most vulnerable in the family and community. Because of their interdependent 
construct of personhood (we discuss this later in this chapter), such community-building 
practices aimed at discouraging discrimination and marginalisation of the most vulnerable: 
The Acholi traditional society thrived on communalism, collective action and respect and 
observance for long established traditions and institutions. Such included the norms for 
child upbringing and general relations among children and parents and other people 
within the society. Many social events were organised to encourage social integration and 
the appreciation of the society cultures among its own children.  In Acholiland we have 
always said that orphans would be fed via the wangoo. This was based on the fact that in 
any Acholi homestead food would be served outside at the wangoo and all people would 
eat together. Selfishness was discouraged and all women were compelled to cook and 
bring food for everyone within that homestead…, (a clan elder, as quoted in Ochen, 
2014:243).  
Although such cultural practices and dependence on kinship systems survived events of 
colonialism, immigrations, religion and trade, the effects of war eventually eroded them. When 
the war was intense, the primary concern for families was survival (food and security). Instead of 
looking forward to wangoo, families worried about where to spend a night. Frequently people 
left their homes and slept in the bush. Government later forced them to move into Internally 
Displaced Persons camps. In the confined space of a camp, the link between people and their 
important cultural institutions like wangoo were completely broken: ‗because of lack of 
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firewood, imposed curfews, and the dense population of camps with huts built quite close 
together, wango‘oo was no longer feasible or safe‘ (Gauvin, 2013:39). The IDP camp conditions 
were ‗vectors of social break down‘ (Dolan, 2009:69). Living in camps for over a decade, people 
were cut off from the culture that had nurtured them for generations and were forced to adopt 
new understanding/view of life: ‗people are not only physically displaced from their home, but 
also from where they socially ‗belong‘…in the IDP camp, the spatial and temporal rhythms of 
daily life in homestead and village—the centre of Acholi society in rural life—were disrupted, 
transforming gender and age roles and relations in the extended family‘ (Baines &Gauvin, 
2014:2). Because extended familial/kin networks did not end up in the same camp (people from 
different clans were mixed up), communication and dependence on these relations were also 
strained and gradually weakened: ‗in a camp, a new household came into being without extended 
approval and support‘ (ibid: 8). Although people have returned to their villages, life continues to 
be about survival. Community-building practices like wangoo have become a thing of the past.  
The greatest impact of displacement seems to have been on familial kinship networks and wider 
social organization (see Okello&Hovil, 2007; Hovil, 2012; Whyte et al. 2013; Baines &Gauvin, 
2014). In these new rural Acholi settings,dependence on familial relations and village social 
structure continues to be put under extreme strain by mistrusts, cultural degradation, lack of 
productivity and widespread poverty. Gender and age role transformation is also observable 
throughout these villages. Such is the social and cultural context in which many formerly 
abducted individuals and formerly displaced people are attempting to reintegrate, rebuild their 
lives, by themselves with limited support from their families.  
Relationship and Selfhood 
While extended familial unit and societal organization has been left disrupted, social structure 
and socio-cultural conceptions of personhoodin Acholi, like in many African contexts remains 
interdependent constructed. Beattie (1980) writes that Africans are extremely sensitive to the 
interdependencies among people and view themselves and others in the world as extensions of 
one another: the ‗self‘ is viewed not as a closed and independent but as an open field. This 
implies that the ‗self‘ is viewed not as a closed and independent but as an open field—this is 
known as the interdependent construal of the self (see Markus &Kitayama, 1991). In Acholi, for 
an individual to belong and be recognised, connection/relationship and views of other people 
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(clan and non-clan members) in immediate settings carry vast influence. The interdependent 
representation/view of self is still common in Acholi, and can be illustrated as follows. 
 
Fig 4, 2: Interdependent view of self in Acholi 
As illustrated in the figure, the significant self-representation (s) includes relationship to ‗others‘. 
This implies that ‗selfhood‘ is viewed as interdependent with surrounding contexts, and it is the 
‗other‘ or the ‗self-in-relation-to-other that is focal in an individual experience: ‗most Acholi 
people derive their wellbeing by caring for the wellbeing of others first…the human condition of 
the Acholi people collectively is secondary to their human relationships…their common 
humanity dictate their actions regardless of the human conditions pertaining on the ground 
(Ofumbi, 2012:117). An Acholi is not defined as an independent individual/self but in terms of 
social relations and groups one functions within, from family and clan, and spreading out to the 
relationships within the wider village (p‘Bitek 1986; Oloya, 2010, Porter, 2012; 
2013).Acknowledging that the fullness of ‗self‘ exists only within the bonds of familial and 
kinship relations, p‘Bitek wrote that, ‗man is not born free. He cannot be free. He is incapable of 
being free. For only by being in chains can he be and remain ―human.‖ What constitutes these 
chains? Man has a bundle of duties which are expected from him by society, as well as a bundle 
of rights and privileges that the society owes him‘ (1986:19). This interdependent construct is in 
contrast to Western view of an individual as ‗an independent, self-contained, autonomous entity 
who (a) comprises a unique configuration of internal attributes (e.g., traits, abilities, motives, and 
values) and (b) behaves primarily as a consequence of these internal attributes‘ (Markus 
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&Kitayama, 1991:224). Geertz (1975:48) writes that in Western culture, a person is viewed as ‗a 
bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center 
of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background‘. 
Unlike in Western cultures and understandings, where separateness of an individual is preferred 
and promoted, in Acholi connectedness is upheld where an individual is not seen as separate 
from the social context but as more connected to others: ‗the key word defining their [Acholis] 
lives is ―connectedness‖ … that describes their ethnic group, relationships between people 
humans and God, and relationships with the rest of creation‘ (Ofumbi, 2012:116, see also Porter, 
2012; 2013).This explains why in most cases, it is unlikely that a formerly abducted person will 
choose to integrate in unfamiliar contexts (in isolation of his or her people and culture). All the 
above reinforce the importance of family and kinship reunification and acceptance to formerly 
abducted individuals. Inability to find their families or/and cordially living with them threatens 
formerly abducted persons‘ opportunity to re-belong and redeem their social status. Also this 
connectedness or the expectation of it explains why formerly abducted persons find the stigma 
and ridicule they receive from their family and village members painful and incomprehensible. 
But most importantly, with the extended family and clan relations continuously loosening and 
weakening, household poverty escalating, tensions among people going unresolved, this 
connectedness is becoming endangered. Current reintegration literature focuses on individual or 
group experiences. The communities are often viewed as being static and unchanged, and 
therefore able, willing to accept and embrace the returnees. However, with changed and troubled 
formerly abducted children returning to a complex and changing society like Acholi sub-region, 
reintegration discourse cannot afford to focus on individual process and experiences only. To get 
a balanced analysis, we need to cast our attention to the social and economic dynamics of host 
communities as well. 
Livelihoods 
With regard to household livelihoods in Acholi sub-region, there is still heavy dependence on 
peasant farming for both consumption and exchange (Ministry of Finance, 2003:9; Finnstrom, 
2008). Land thus remains an important livelihood capital. It is estimated that up to 95 per cent of 
land in Acholi is still held under customary tenure, with penetration of freehold remaining 
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marginal (Adoko& Levine, 2005; Hetz& Myers, 2006). Atkinson wrote that before the war and 
displacement:  
Land rights were overwhelmingly customary and communal, not private, and were vested 
in localized patrilineal clans or sub-clans. Not all who lived and farmed on communal 
clan land were clan members; friends, in-laws, and others could be given access to use – 
but not own – clan land. And an individual clan member who was also a household head 
had personal claim to land that he and his wife (or wives) had under cultivation, or that 
had been cultivated but was lying fallow, and such rights passed from father to son. But 
ultimate rights to the land were based in clans (Atkinson, 2007 as quoted in Foley, 
2007:35).  
Individual males thus have claims on patrilineal clan land. This access is through and controlled 
by the localized patrilineal lineages and clans under the guidance of lineage elders. As was the 
case before the war and displacement, men are still given a priority over access to land, with 
females accessing and using it only through husbands and fathers (see Atkinson, 1994; 2004; 
2008; Human Rights Focus, 2013).  
Foods that are eaten routinely as staples are sorghum and eleusine (finger) millet.  Families are 
predominantly peasant mixed farmers who grow a variety of crops for cash and family 
consumption, including peas, beans, maize, leafy green vegetables, cassava, simsim (sesame 
seeds), ground nuts (peanuts), and cotton, among others (see also Atkinson, 1994:54;Finnström, 
2008). Although agriculture remains important in village life, compared to the situation 
described by the anthropologist Girling (1960), there is less dependency on crop production in 
present-day Acholi. In relation to women in agriculture, he wrote that: 
the average number of fields of food crop per married woman is about three...most 
women have no cotton fields and few men have any food crops (p.190)… On average, an 
Acholi household maintains the following crops: each wife, or mature female in the 
household, min ot, hut mother, as she is known in Acholi, maintains two fields of millet, 
one field of sesame, a small plot each of beans, spinach, ground nuts, peas, and gourds. 
There are other crops which are interplanted with the main ones, and which come to 
maturity at different times (p.191). 
The custom of cultivation as an obligation for households and individuals has been weakened by 
the lengthy war, and desire to participate in paid employment and trading (which bring in more 
cash). Unlike the three ‗cultivation fields‘ Girling talks about, women currently maintain an 
individual poto (‗cultivation field‘/ ‗garden‘) close to their homes, adopting little in the way of 
intensification techniques and making minimal if any use of hired labour.  
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In the 1930s, people in northern Uganda took up pamba (cotton) production (see Mamdani, 
1976). As a cash crop in Uganda, cotton became a man‘s produce in Acholi. An individual man 
maintained a number of cotton fields separate from the wife‘s or wives‘ food crop fields (Girling, 
1960:191). While women were habitually responsible for food crop production while men 
concentrated on cotton cultivation, this changed when coffee replaced cotton as Ugandan‘s cash 
crop (see Mamdani, 1976). Due to harsh climate and the colonial policy of divide and rule, 
coffee production did not spread to northern Uganda as was the case in the southern part of the 
country. With cotton production becoming unprofitable, men turned to food crop production, 
domestic animal keeping and seeking employment in the army and police. Today, only a few 
households still grow cotton, usually on a smaller scale than previously. For example, only two 
women in our sample reported that their households had attempted to grow cotton in the last two 
years.  
The study participants came from poor peasant families who use only family labour. Both men 
and women use simple tools: kwei (pl. kweri, ‗hoe‘), panga machete and axe. For most 
households, planting decisions are made principally with an eye toward what their family will 
need for subsistence during the coming season and not market prices. The gardens that this 
author observed during field work were less than an acre in size each. Some of their owners 
practised crop monoculture (growing the same crop (s) on the same piece of land year after 
year), while others carried out mixed cropping where two or more crops were grown on the same 
area of poto simultaneously. Nearer to their homes, some households maintained smaller gardens 
on which they produce tomatoes and leafy green vegetables to supplement their diets. In most 
cases, due to soil depletion, limited labour and irregularity of the rainfall, yields are reportedly 
poor. 
There are different explanations of why women currently do less cultivation; for instance women 
in pre-and post-colonial times relied heavily on community work groups/teams, hired young men 
to cultivate their fields or used ox-ploughs. Many households are no longer able to access or hire 
this kind of external labour, and/or are too poor to afford ox-ploughs. Instead, people work their 
garden themselves with the help of household labour.  Unlike in the colonial times where women 
and men were able to maintain separate plots (Girling, 1960:191), both women and men now 
have to depend on each other‘s labour to maintain a family poto. Gendered division of labour in 
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household is still observed as was documented by Girling (1960:7) and Atkinson (1994:60). The 
man is expected to perform the heavy agricultural work including clearing the bush, ground 
breaking (prepare the garden) and harvesting. The women plant, weed the garden, collect the 
harvest and process the food. Girls and boys are generally socialized into these diverse gender 
roles and domestic chores accordingly. 
Although crop cultivation has always been the primary livelihood in this region, many Acholi 
people also have always been cattle keepers (p‘Bitek, 1971:19; Atkinson, 1994:56–57). Apart 
from cattle being viewed as the principal sign of wealth, people depended on the animals for 
food and ploughing for large scale agricultural production. However, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, almost all the cattle and other livestock (including poultry) in Acholi were stolen, by 
government soldiers, fighters in opposition movements, or—mainly—by Karamajong29 (Weeks, 
2002:35; IRIN, 2003). The loss of cattle threw almost the whole of the Acholi ethnic group into 
extreme poverty and destitution (Finnström, 2008:71), a situation worsened by population 
displacement and long residence in IDP camps. Taken together, these further left households 
weakened with their main livelihood activity, cultivation, adversely affected.  So, in recent years, 
to complement their crop production, some people keep domestic animals, including chickens, 
goats, sheep, pigs, and cattle, among others. In rural Acholi, someone is considered well off if 
they keep domestic animals, particularly cattle. Also, because villagers increasingly depend on 
cash earnings to supplement their agricultural incomes, villagers are investing in small scale 
trade. 
Welcoming/Cleansing Ceremonies 
Writing Men without God in 1966, Russell, discussing Acholi culture, noted that ‗the evidence of 
the present shows overwhelmingly that clan ritual is not dying out. Probably 90% of the homes 
in Acholi still have connection with the clan ritual at times of need‘ (p.26). Although religion, 
education, modernity and civil wars have had an impact on how people view and interpret 
                                                             
29Karamoja is one of the poorest and most violent places in the northeast (Kenya–Uganda border), where cattle 
raiding has a long and well-established history. The Karamojong live separately from the rest of Ugandans in a 
traditional and highly stratified society centred on cattle, which figure prominently in all aspects of life, including 
status, religious and ceremonial and marriage practices (see Novelli, 1988; Ochieng, 2000). They often seek out 
cattle in armed raids on neighbouring ethnic groups, even across the border into northern Kenya. Traditionally, a 
cattle raid was originally carried out with spears, but in modern times the Karamojong have adopted the use of 
automatic weapons, variously stolen from or supplied by the government and other allies, in Sudan, Somalia and 
Kenya (Eaton 2008:89; Gray, 2000; Jabs, 2007). 
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tradition in Acholi, villagers in this Ugandan area continue to practise rich and sophisticated 
cultural ceremonies and rituals. These influence their attitudes and values towards acceptance, 
forgiveness, truth, justice and reconciliation. An individual is deeply rooted in his/her kaka and 
community (see Atkinson, 1994, 1999). A person‘s good health, happiness and spiritual welfare 
are based on the harmony between the individual and her/his kaka and wider community, with 
ancestral and religious spirits providing guidance on how to maintain such social harmony (see 
Porter; 2012; 2013). Equally, if an individual disrupts this harmony by failing to observe societal 
and moral codes, this may anger the ancestral jogi (‗spirits‘), leading them to visit retribution on 
the individual, as well as his or her clan and wider community: ‗social suffering is a result of the 
deliberate attempt to disrespect Acholi culture, values and spirituality‘ (Bernstein, 2009:20; see 
also Baines, 2005; Behrend, 1999). In her research in Acholi sub region, Baines found that: 
Historically, the good health and happiness of the Acholi individual was always situated 
in the context of the harmony and well-being of the clan. The ancestral and religious 
spirit worlds provided guidance to the Acholi people, maintaining the unity of the clan. 
Conversely, conflicts misfortune and poor health could be ‗sent‘ by angry spirits and 
extended not only to the violators of the moral codes, but to his or her family or clan. 
Thus, one person‘s actions always had ramifications for his or her family and clan who in 
turn assumed collective responsibility for the offence (2005:11). 
Retribution from jogi may be manifest in the form of misfortune or illness called cen 
(‗vengeance ghost‘ or ‗ghostly vengeance‘ (p‘Bitek, 1980)).30 In Baines‘ study, Acholi cultural 
elders explained this phenomenon as: 
…the entrance of an angry spirit into the physical body of a person or persons that seeks 
appeasement, usually in the form of a sacrifice or, in the case of a ‗wrongful death‘, 
compensation and reconciliation between the clan of the offended and offender. The 
spirit manifests as cen, which will ‗haunt‘ the wrongdoers by entering their mind or body 
in the form of visions and nightmares that may result in mental illness and sickness until 
the wrong is made right. Cen can also send nightmares and sickness to the rest of the 
family of the individual involved, so threatens not only the individual, but the family and 
community (2005:12). 
Cen is visible in an individual who participated in an unresolved murder or accidental death, or 
has come across the body of someone who was killed violently. According to Acholi beliefs, the 
spirits of such dead people will haunt the area in order to avenge their death, so cen may possess 
                                                             
30In Western terms and psychiatry applicability, one can relate cen to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that is 
framed in locally informed ‗spectra of distress and bad experience‘ (Finnström, 2008:160). 
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an individual who passes through such an area (Baines, 2005; Harlacher, 2009). Based on this, 
forest, woodland and wilderness areas in war-affected northern Uganda and South Sudan are 
perceived to be places inhabited by wandering spirits of the dead. Roaming and living in these 
areas made formerly abducted people potential vehicles of cen. It is difficult to determine how 
the impact of cen varies, but it seems the more cen one experiences, the greater its consequence. 
The latter become manifest when the person who has been exposed to cen starts behaving in 
what is considered a socially and morally disturbed way, before becoming violent and eventually 
lapsing into insanity. Cen can be transferred to the second generation of the ‗possessed‘; for 
example, a baby can be born with cen, if either parent was possessed; or, if not exorcised or 
‗cleansed, cen may be transmitted down the generations of the lineage of a carrier (Baines, 
2005:12; Finnström, 2008:160). Cen does not only target someone‘s personality; but also 
impacts his or her social and economic wellbeing as well. 
This explains why Acholi families, clan and villagers saw it as their responsibility to help their 
formerly abducted children to set things right by performing cleansing rituals to appease the 
spirits, whose other responsibility is righting wrongs. Thus, ritual performance (s) provides the 
remedy for containing and stopping cen from causing harm to an individual, his or her family 
and the general community (Finnström, 2008:160). Acknowledgement of wrongdoing is 
articulated through ritual, and successful completion of purification breaks the spirit‘s hold on 
the individual, and frees them from their deadly past. The justification of former child abductees 
going through cultural reintegration initiatives relies on this vital spiritual world view. 
Acholi culture is rich in traditional rites for a variety of purposes ranging from births to funerals; 
however, for present purposes, the concern is on the cleansing rituals related to reintegration that 
most interviewees participated in. Different rituals target the perceived requirement of: 
individuals who have been away for a long time; those presumed dead; those who were abducted 
but did not kill anybody during captivity; and those who had killed people. For example, Okumu 
(2005), Behrend (1999a:42), Harlacher, (2009) and Bines (2005) all describe the welcoming and 
cleansing ceremony nyono-tong-gweno(stepping on the egg). Harlacher (2009:166) and Bines 
(2005) explain the purpose and procedures of lwoko-pi-kwang (washing away the tears) and 
kwero-merok (cleansing someone who has killed) (see also Girling, 1960:103–104; Wright, 
1936:186; p‘Bitek, 1971).  Because fieldwork was done at a time when most of the participants 
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had already gone through these rituals, the author did not observe any of the cleansing rituals 
mentioned here. She relies on the interviews and existing literature to analyse the study 
participants‘ experiences of going through these rituals in this Chapter.  
Upon successful family reunification, some participants were approached by their parents to 
reveal whether they had done ‗something bad‘ like engaging in killings. A mother of three 
formerly abducted children (2 girls and a boy) explained how she approached the issue: ‗I was 
not able to ask Sunday (eldest daughter) many questions. I only asked her one question that, 
―could you have done something bad there [captivity]‖ and then she said, ―I did not‖. I was 
asking her so that I try to get the right traditional ritual to cleanse her of any bad 
thing.‘31Confessing to having killed or witnessed a murder caused the family to perform extra 
rituals with a deeper meaning and effectiveness like lwoko-pi-kwang (washing away the tears, 
performed for somebody presumed dead) and kwero-merok (cleansing someone who has killed). 
Although in most cases, clan elders preside over these ceremonies, family, on the behalf of their 
daughter or son negotiates, organises and provides an environment (compound or field) for the 
ritual performance (see  also Mpyangu, 2010:109-111). 
The village members that participated in group discussions argued that formerly abducted people 
must go through the ‗right‘ rituals for them to be: free of cen, fully accepted back in their villages 
and successfully reintegrate. However, what is striking is how most formerly abducted persons 
perceive this cultural belief and initiative. Early in the research, it was assumed that failure to 
access the right ritual would act as a constraint on successful reintegration. However, many 
women in our sample appeared to pay little or no attention to this aspect of their 
return/reintegration. For example, apart from participants whose families did not believe in their 
effectiveness or could not afford the items needed for their performance, 32or were orphans 
without sponsors to initiate and preside over arrangements, the majority of women who missed 
out on the rituals had simply refused to participate in them.  Such women dismissed the rituals as 
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32Participants who went through Lwoko-Pig-Wang or/and Kwero-merok could not confirm how much they cost as 
they had not been directly responsible for meeting the expenditures associated with the rituals. Costs were met by 
sponsors like fathers, uncles, brothers or the reception centre. We estimate between 60,000-100,000 Ugandan 
shillings ($24-40) were spent on the complete Lwoko Pig Wang or Kwero-merok. 
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‗useless‘ or ‗waste‘ of time. One argued that the performance of rituals could actually evoke cen 
in her and her four children, to justify refusal to partake in any of them. Other women justified 
participation by explaining that ‗the elders [family/clan] wanted/asked me to do it‘, ‗the elders 
said it will help/free me‘, ‗I was subjected to it‘ and ‗I had gotten saved‘ (see also Annanet al. 
2006).It is hard to determine, from the perspective of returnees, whether and how effective the 
rituals are or have been, particularly where there was little initial desire for, or belief in, the 
rituals in the first place.  
While at reception centres, formerly abducted persons were introduced and converted to 
Christianity, Pentecostalism in particular: ‗several centres allow[ed] the children to undergo 
traditional healing or cleansing ceremonies, while others discourage[d] this in preference to 
Christian religious ceremonies‘ (McKay &Mazurana, 2004:83).  This conversion has led to 
reduced interest in or rejection of traditional rituals (see Quinn, 2009:7). The adoption of 
religious beliefs is definitely transforming the understanding of cleansing ceremonies and Acholi 
spiritual worldviews in general. The findings provide support for Jalobo‘s observation that ‗the 
pendulum of beliefs among the Acholi (...) keeps swinging from traditional African to either 
Christianity, Islam and vice-versa, depending on how natural calamities visit an individual in a 
society‘ (1999:1). Thus converted returnees sometimes negotiated their acceptance in villages by 
participating in thanksgiving prayers led by a local religious leader, either at their homes or in 
local churches. However, if the family head still believed in traditional rituals and could afford 
the cost of their performance, returnees had little choice but to undergo the rituals. There are also 
cases where, after undergoing the rituals organised by families, an individual goes ahead to 
organise religious cleansing, which they considered more appropriate. It is not clear whether 
combining traditional and religious ceremonies can actually have negative consequences for an 
individual‘s wellbeing. What is certain is that women in our sample who went through the 
traditional rituals can still go for church prayers (see also Quinn, 2009:7). We later analyse 
whether cleansing rituals aid long term reintegration. 
4.2 Social and Economic Reintegration 
Although the Paris Principles (2007:2.9) emphasise that successful reintegration is achieved 
when the political, legal, economic and social conditions needed for reintegrating individuals to 
maintain life, livelihood and dignity have been secured, the concern in this study remains the two 
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gradual societal processes—social and economic reintegration—that we turn to in the following 
sections.  
4.2.1 Social Reintegration 
Kingma (2001:407, 2000:46) defines social reintegration as ‗the process through which the ex-
combatant and his or her family feel part of, and are accepted by the community.‘ The key issue 
of social reintegration is the ability of an individual to live among other people (acceptance) in 
the community. A community based Participatory Action Research (PAR) involving 
approximately 658 child mothers (with and without military background) living in three war-torn 
countries—Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Northern Uganda—found that successful social 
reintegration for formerly abducted child mothers is measured through their acceptance as actors 
and contributors in their families and communities (McKay et al.,2010). Similar determinants of 
successful reintegration were documented in a study by Save the Children in 2004 in which the 
211 participants, youngSierra Leonean soldiers, defined successful reintegration as ‗being loved 
and cared for by their families, being accepted and welcomed by the community, and living in 
peace and unity with others‘. Generally, acceptance at family and community level is considered 
an important factor for thriving reintegration (see Annan et al.,2006, 2008; Betancourt et al., 
2008; Boothby et al., 2006; Corbin, 2008; McKay &Mazurana, 2004:83). These definitions and 
descriptions of social reintegration offer valuable themes for analysis in the current study 
because of the broad base from which they address this societal process.  
The evidence suggests that the individual is initially accepted (not immediately rejected) to 
rejoin the community but lives under observation of how she or he behaves among other people. 
This is an important phase of social reintegration because it determines whether an individual 
will eventually be fully accepted or not—possibly what Kingma calls achieving, feeling part of 
the society. However, Kingma‘s definition of social reintegration poses challenges to the process 
whereby he does not define the determinants of feeling part of the society or after how long an 
ex-abductee should declare feeling part of the community. In the case of northern Uganda, this 
definition is challenging, because the former child abductees returned to families and 
communities that were heavily damaged by the lengthy conflict and camp system. It is possible 
that the communities were actually more wounded, so how does one feel part of such a 
community? 
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The quotation we saw earlier from Liberia offers a further perspective on social reintegration. It 
suggests that acceptance and ‗feeling part‘ of the community come with time (this may take 
years). As an individual goes on reintegrating, the community changes its perceptions and 
attitudes towards the individual(s) based on her or their progress in ‗normalising‘/socialising. 
Factors to consider at this stage are attempting to engage in marriage, engaging in village events 
like other ‗ordinary‘ people, and livelihoods. Sierra Leonean former girl soldiers identified 
similar indicators of progressive social reintegration, including family support, marriage and 
involvement in communal activities (Stark et al., 2009). In Mozambique, former male child 
soldiers associated successful reintegration with ‗just being like others‘, or ‗being normal‘ 
(Boothby et al., 2006). However, if ‗being like others‘ denotes successful reintegration, then this 
goal appears to be unattainable for  many former female soldiers who, after years of trying , now 
feel that  they may never ‗be like‘ anyone or everyone else. During their time with armed forces, 
These are people who  may have ended up with behavioural problems or ‗anti-social behaviour‘ 
(violent, aggressive, quarrelsome, using offensive/foul language, etc.) during their time in 
captivity, which affects the way they relate to other people (McKay &Mazurana, 2004:36; 
McKay, 2004:25, 2006:102). These may be hard to break, even after years of being in normal 
society. However, the opposite may also be true. When an individual socially progresses and 
achieves what others have, say acceptance or a stable marriage, that is and should be seen as 
positive reintegration.  
A Ugandan Survey of War Affected Youth indicated that former female soldiers have been 
accepted and have gone on to live relatively successful lives and are no more violent than their 
peers. The authors further write that a minority of formerly abducted females exhibit serious 
psychosocial reintegration difficulties, whether in the form of distress or persistent community 
and family rejection, prompting them to note that former girl and women soldiers are strong and 
resilient and not traumatized pariahs (Annan et al., 2008a). This assumption of equating 
successful reintegration to the absence of family and community rejection was shared by some of 
the reintegration agency staff interviewed for the present study. Current findings show that 
reintegration is not a straightforward and monolithic concept, but a complex, ongoing process. 
Analysing reintegration, changes and differences between individuals and categories of people in 
various contexts, such as social, economic, cultural and spiritual, should therefore be brought 
into consideration. Although optimistic outcomes of reintegration, including good family 
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relationships, resilience, and psychological strength, are documented with the participants, the 
current study treats them as indications of change and progress made by the women, their 
families and communities over time. Such positive outcomes/findings should not contribute to 
assumptions that the former abductees do not need support with their reintegration, but instead 
should stimulate further questions about the women‘s agency, relationships and how they use 
basic cultural resources in mediating their own reintegration (Veale & Shanahan, 2010:116). 
Such constructive findings reveal that the dynamics of successful reintegration are far more 
complex than simply grading former abductees as ‗traumatised‘ or ‗resilient‘ (ibid.).  
The findings also show that, as the hosts of reintegration, there is a need to focus on the family 
and village settings, and how the existing resources in these settings can aid the reintegration 
process (see also Sendabo, 2004). Usually, family and village initiatives are an important way to 
begin this process. In some African communities, initiatives like rituals to welcome and cleanse 
individuals are a fundamental consideration if an individual is to be accepted in the community 
(see, for example, Wessells& Monteiro, 2001; McKay &Mazurana, 2004; Honwana, 2006). 
Exploring the role of Gamba spirits and healers in post-war recovery in Mozambique, Igreja 
(2003:461) writes that, ‗the availability of, accessibility of and quality of local resources play a 
vital role in the recovery process because they provide a rationale of suffering that fits with 
explanatory models of the traumatized individual and families‘. In Angola and Mozambique, 
Honwana (2006:104) shows how local traditional welcoming and cleansing rituals were used to 
reintegrate and heal the former child solders. These cultural practices are not unique to 
Mozambique and Angola; as discussed earlier, they resemble those found in Uganda‘s Acholi 
where such traditional initiatives are similarly fundamental if an individual is to achieve 
community acceptance. In such African societies, cultural and holistic view of healing is 
preferred. In order to be effective and sustainable, reintegration of former child soldiers needs to 
be embedded in local world views (see Honwana, 2006; Wessells& Monteiro, 2001:262; Teuton 
et al. 2007).  
Literature argues that former girl soldiers benefit from traditional rituals (McKay &Mazurana, 
2004:49), but it does not explicitly explain in what sense the girls ‗benefit‘. Interviews in Acholi 
suggest that rituals impact social reintegration as a process and experience. Apart from signifying 
the conclusion of procedures of returning home, the performance of rituals intends to serve two 
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purposes: family and village acceptance; and erasing the stigma that comes with associating with 
the rebels. The literature and interviews show that on an individual level, cleansing plays an 
important role in facilitating social reintegration, signifying acceptance in a family, clan and 
village. Generally, undergoing the appropriate ritual(s) implies that an individual has been 
‗formally‘ accepted back in her or his family, clan and also in the wider village. It is therefore 
enormously comforting and reassuring to formerly abducted individuals that they are welcome 
with open hands and warmth when they first return, even if this is mostly by immediate 
family/clan. Following the completion of the rituals, an individual is granted privileges that come 
with village membership including freedom of association at all levels, seeking employment and 
engaging in marriage, among others. Rituals are also practical means for the host family and 
village to demonstrate their consent, their forgiveness and stakeholder-ship in an individual‘s 
reintegration. Going through the rituals implies that, in terms of returning home process, 
individuals achieve ‗formal‘ acceptance and are assumed to be in a better social position 
compared to those who do not. In theory, undergoing such rituals is one way for an individual to 
‗upgrade‘ from ‗rebel‘ status to an ordinary, accepted and respected village member. 
As highlighted earlier, rituals in Acholi also signify a chance to heal the effects of cen. When 
formerly abducted person goes on to live a ‗normal‘ life (with no psychological and anti-social 
behaviour), the rituals are assumed to have had a positive impact. However, this has not been so 
for many formerly abducted individuals who go on to suffer severe psychological effects of war, 
including those who went through some sophisticated cleansing. Among the women in our 
sample, 54% (n=31) still suffered with frequent symptoms of emotional distress, secondary 
effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)including: being easily irritated, fear, paranoia, 
lack of concentration, nightmares and flashes, loneliness, feeling helplessness, boredom, feeling 
unloved and useless, over-thinking, sadness, isolation, frustrations with others among others. 
Asked how the experience of soldiering in captivity was still affecting their wellbeing, one of the 
participants shared the fear she coped with on a daily basis: 
…at times it is like I have a hollow in my head and it makes an irritating buzzing 
sound…Also, when I hear a sharp sound like that of a grinding mill, it quickly takes me 
back to the recollection of a military helicopter hovering over us…it always feels like I 
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am actually hearing my enemies [UPDF] chasing us…these thoughts bring back bush life 
memories...33 
Such daily psychological disruptions make their life back home a daily test of their coping and 
resiliency capacities. A study conducted on the psychological resilience of youth in northern 
Uganda, the authors did not find a significant difference in occurrence of nightmares in 
individuals who were cleansed and those that were not (Annan &Blattman, 2006). From a 
psychological point of view, emotional distress and secondary effects of PTSD may be 
considered as obvious repercussions of abduction experiences but from an Acholi traditional 
perspective, such continuing psychosocial distress, behaviour, illness among formerly abducted 
individuals is an indication of cen which may require more vigorous cleansing rituals. Since 
spirituality is placed at the core of life in Acholi, with people interpreting daily social reality 
through spiritual outlook, such illness/insanity are not seen as coming from within the mind but 
rather as invasion from the evil/angry spirits. With this perception of psychological and mental 
illness, Western trauma healing process that targets an inner mental process may not sufficiently 
address psychological and effects of the war among formerly abducted persons. But also, 
because cleansing ceremonies in Acholi simply re-affirm cultural values with the primary focus 
on cultural and clan and not such individual needs, ritualsmay have less impact. Although the 
literature and Acholi findings show that the obvious way for former child soldiers to be assisted 
to manage psychological predicaments largely depends on social and cultural contexts, Western 
trauma healing ideas should not be completely ignored. They may be needed and helpful in 
supplementing the ritual cleansing that is considered adequate in this case: ‗there is strong 
potential for utilising traditional systems and practices to address rehabilitation and reintegration 
dynamics among children and young people, but complementary initiatives also need to be 
implemented to enhance the efficacy and, in some cases, adaptability of these institutions‘ 
(Ochen, 2014:1). 
Furthermore, upon successful completion of the right rituals, individuals are ‗supposed to‘, or 
‗should—in principle—be free from‘ any form of stigma (see also Granjo, 2007:382; Heeren, 
2004). In Acholi, however, there are double standards with the application of these rituals among 
most village members. Before field work was carried out, this author assumed that ultimately 
returnees who have not been cleansed should experience higher levels of stigma but as discussed 
                                                             
33Interview,CM16; 7/11/2012 
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in Chapter Six, this is not the case. Regardless of undergoing cleansing ceremony (s), there is a 
belief in the villages that all formerly abducted people are forever carriers of cen that could strike 
at any time. Although cultural cleansing was done to ensure purity and full acceptance in the 
families and villages, for many of the study participants, this had not been achieved at the time of 
interviews. Most of them were stigmatised irrespective of having gone through the cleansing or 
not. This negative treatment of formerly abducted people reaffirms that performance of rituals is 
largely to fulfil tradition rather than compelling community members not to stigmatise and 
marginalise such individuals. 
To capture different dimensions of successful social reintegration, the study relies on two 
measures: 
1) Acceptance. Acceptance at family and community level is considered as an important 
factor for successful reintegration (Annan et al, 2006; 2008; Mazurana, 2007; Betancourt, 
et al. 2008; Boothby, et al. 2006; Corbin, 2008; McKay &Mazurana, 2004:83). There are 
two schools of thought related to family and social acceptance of formerly abducted 
youth: i) that in the initial days of return home, rejection is widespread and persistent; ii) 
rejection is confined to a minority and reducing with time back home (Annan et al. 
2010:6). The literature on reintegration in northern Uganda mainly emphasizes 
widespread family rejection upon return from captivity (see Corbin, 2008; Catholic Relief 
Services, 2002). The current findings however portray a different picture for most women 
in our sample. They were warmly welcomed by their families when they first returned 
home. Annan et al. (2006) also observed very high rates of family acceptance in northern 
Uganda, with only 1% of returnees reporting that their families were unwelcoming (see 
also Blattman& Annan, 2008). However, although there is an often high level of family 
acceptance, community acceptance is not as widely spread (see also Annan et al 2006). 
Unlike at the family level, acceptance at community level is achieved after one has re-
lived in the community for a considerable period of time. However, it is important to note 
that initial family acceptance is a big step towards progressive reintegration because it 
boosts confidence in approaching reintegration in the wider community. 
From a long term perspective, not being accepted in the family or/and community level 
‗expresses a dominant sense of social distance, rejection and loneliness‘ (Christensen, 
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2007:77). Lack of complete acceptance becomes the breeding ground for violence and 
psychosocial problems. In Sierra Leone, a survey of former adults and child soldiers 
found an association between higher rates of exposure to violence with lower levels of 
family and community acceptance (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2004; 2007). This hinders 
long term reintegration process and widens the gap between former child soldiers and 
people in their immediate surroundings. Because of mistreatment, stigma and 
marginalisation represent obstacles to further reintegration in the community, thereby 
forcing them to relocate to other areas (Chapter Six). For such individuals, relocating to 
new areas meant facing the uphill challenge of reintegration by themselves, without the 
support of family and village. Therefore, this study treated participant who testified to 
facing ongoing difficulties in gaining complete acceptance from their families and 
villages as having failed social reintegration. This measure indicates a successful social 
reintegration has taken place or is taking place if an individual has no problems relating 
with family and village members.  
2) Stigma. Stigma is analysed from the participants‘ perspective as a major hindrance to 
social reintegration (Chapter Six). For the theoretical understanding of this long term 
reintegration challenge, the study relies on Erving Goffman‘s concept of stigma to 
analyse the term with regard to the former girl abductees‘ experiences in Acholi contexts. 
In Stigma: Notes on the Management of the Spoiled Identity (1963), Goffman is effective 
in helping the reader understand, from the standpoint of the stigmatised person, the types 
of stigma and their consequences when a person encounters other people that are not 
stigmatised  (‗normal‘). Hence, the study captures how stigma encompasses the women‘s 
lives, its forms and manifestation in their alliances with other people. Individuals who 
have relocated to new environments, or are facing daily scorn, resentment and 
stigmatisation due to their abduction past, are treated as facing failed reintegration. 
Participants facing no form of stigmatisation are treated as having received complete 
acceptance and successful social reintegration.   
4.2.2 Economic Reintegration 
Livelihood is said to be a crucial measure of successful economic reintegration, achieved when 
former soldiers re-establish sustainable means of earning a living (Kingma, 2001:407; 2000:46; 
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Sendabo, 2004:66). However, in relation to child soldiers, this definition of successful 
reintegration is problematic. Many young participants of war are recruited when they are 
adolescents, with no prior independent livelihoods. When they return to their communities, there 
are no livelihoods to re-establish, making economic re-integration anon-option for this category 
of soldiers. ‗Economic integration into civil society‘, as defined by the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, 1995), may be more appropriate for such young ex-soldiers or 
individuals that are born and have grown up within the armed groups. For present purposes, 
economic reintegration, particularly for former female abductees that stayed in abduction for a 
significant period of time, needs to be understood  simply as a societal process of beginning a 
new life in their communities by forming positive relationships and exploring local resources 
that can nurture their economic (and social) assimilation. 
With regard to determining economic (and social) reintegration outcomes, some studies, have 
compared former young soldiers to their civilian peers on how they have fared economically and 
socially (Taouti-Cherif, 2006; Annan et al., 2006, 2008). However, whether comparison to 
civilian peers is the best way to assess young soldiers‘ reintegration success demands further 
investigation. In the Acholi context, where people are languishing in poverty and 
impoverishment (Overseas Development Institute, 2010:3), assuming that successful economic 
reintegration is ‗being like anyone else‘ leaves a lot to be desired. Findings show that formerly 
abducted people have reduced livelihood resources (Chapter Eight) and, therefore, using peers as 
a yard stick of their reintegration progress cannot sufficiently explain reintegration as a process 
and experience. In reality, comparison should be made between reintegrating individuals and 
groups to determine why certain individual/individuals is/are able to register successful 
economic reintegration, but others are not. Considering that many of the studies on ex-soldiers‘ 
reintegration are carried out in the first months or years of their return home, only a few scholars 
get the opportunity to assess the impacts of war and to determine why some individuals and not 
others are able to successfully reintegrate even after a number of years (see Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2007; Tajima, 2009). Findings suggest that reintegration progress can be determined 
by comparing an individual‘s reintegration experiences when he/she first returned home and life 
after several years of post-conflict reintegration. Findings also show that one can have positive 
social outcomes but fail at economic reintegration, or vice versa. It will be more helpful if former 
child soldiers‘ reintegration progress is analyzed and measured against their fellow former 
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soldiers‘ well-being (reintegration cannot and should not be limited to achieving what non-
abducted peers have). The study found that this open ended and developmental process is not just 
about positive family re-unification, community reinsertion and individual resilience over time. 
With its outcomes varying according to time and space, reintegration should be analyzed from a 
long term perspective to find out why some formerly abducted people and not others, are able to 
register successful reintegration.  
To capture dimensions of positive economic reintegration among the participants, the study 
relies on one measure: meeting their own and their dependents‘ subsistence needs.A woman who 
is able to earn a living from agriculture or has secured decent permanent employment, is 
considered to have experienced ‗successful‘ economic reintegration according to this measure. It 
is successful because of activity outcomes: what goals the woman is pursuing, the ‗living‘ that 
results from their economic activities, including reduced poverty, increased incomes, food 
security, survival, wellbeing, capabilities and less vulnerability. On the other hand, if a 
participant is unable to depend on or participate in crop growing or does ‗odd jobs‘ for a living, 
that economic reintegration is unsuccessful (no/limited economic outcomes).  
4.3 Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has attempted to discuss themes of successful social and economic reintegration. 
To determine the factors that could explain why some individuals, and not others, are able to 
register successful reintegration, we have to go beyond individual/ group experiences. We need 
to pay close attention the host communities. From the Acholi case study, the chapter has shown 
that political, economic and social processes change communities. Experiences of war do not 
only change individuals but their communities as well. This transformation determines how 
long-term reintegration is understood, conducted and its outcomes measured in such post-conflict 
areas. In Acholi, extended family and clan relations continuously loosening and weakening, 
household poverty escalating among other problems make long-term reintegration more 
challenging. Therefore, in order to understand the reintegration experiences of former girl 
abductees in such a society, it is necessary to gain an understanding of how they survive and 
negotiate to engage in such dynamic and changing post conflict situations. The central themes in 
the lives of the participants, including life in captivity, stigma, marriage and livelihoods are the 
subject of discussion in the next chapters.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ABDUCTION AND LIFE IN CAPTIVITY 
 
This chapter explores the experience of captivity of study participants as a process of 
socialisation or transformation. As a result of their association with the LRA, their roles and 
identities were changed from that of ‗children‘ to ‗abductees/recruits‘. Also, this association 
came with a stigmatising identity of ‗rebels‘. The different sections of the chapter are therefore 
organised according to these different phases of socialisation/transformation, including the actual 
abduction, post-abduction, initiation ceremonies, military training and deployment for rebel 
activities, all of which are discussed as phases of this process. Further, the chapter discusses 
forced marriage and pregnancy in the context(s) of the LRA. The findings support the argument 
that, while soldiering in captivity, girls occupy multiple roles including fighter, helper, 
logistician, ‗medical personnel‘, slave and domestic labourer, mother, and wife, among others 
(see McKay &Mazurana, 2004:109; Amnesty International, 2001; Coalition to End the Use of 
Child Soldiers, 2001; Mazurana et al., 2002). The chapter examines the ‗wife‘ and ‗mother‘ 
identities the participants found themselves placed into, how they related to their military 
identities, and how these identities influenced their experiences (behaviour, decisions, feelings 
and emotions) and tied them to the armed group. Finally, the chapter maintains that taking on 
new multiple and stigmatising identities (rebel, forced mother/wife) did not mean girls forgot 
about their desired, accepted social identities as formed in their childhoods. Retaining knowledge 
of what they were before abduction, and maintaining hope that one day they would redeem it, 
became a motivation to survive in captivity and eventually to escape it. 
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5.1 Becoming a Rebel 
5.1.1 Abduction 
As the case of Catherine34 shows clearly (Table 5.1), the circumstances of abduction remain an 
important part of the experience of captivity, with many respondents remembering their age and 
the date, time and exact location at which they were forced to leave their families behind. The 
abduction details are imprinted in their memories, marking the day they were forced to end the 
life they knew. Such small details are significant for the participants because they help them find 
their place/position in this inconceivable experience. With these details, the women are able to 
make out the genesis of their struggle for adaptation to the stigmatised identity of ‗rebel‘. 
  
                                                             
34 Interview, CM 25, 7thNovember, 2012, Kitgum, Omiya-nyima Sub County.  In this case study, the author, as in all 
subsequent case studies has tried to repeat the participant‘s words as verbatim as possible in a bid to convey both 
their voice and words.  
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Table 5.1: Abduction and life in Captivity— Catherine’s Story 
In 1993, at the age of 14, Catherine was abducted from her parents‘ home in Omiyanyima, Sub County.  She 
grew up in an extended family, with many siblings. Like most households in rural Acholi, her family depended on 
peasant farming. Her father was predominantly a peasant farmer who grew beans, maize, ground nuts for 
consumption and cash. In addition to farming, her housewife mother brewed waragi (local gin) that she sold to earn 
some income as well.  Due to lack of finances, Catherine had dropped out of school before she could complete 
primary four.  
On the fateful day, around 7:00am, Catherine was abducted by the LRA‘s fighters. It was a Sunday, towards 
the end of the month of August. From her family two of them were abducted on that day, Catherine and her younger 
step sister named Suzan (her family called her Suu and she is suspected to have died in captivity). On the day of 
their abduction, along with other abductees, they walked through the thick bushes of Omiyanyima and connected to 
Wol Sub County, where they camped for some days, waiting for other abductors to catch up with them. When the 
abductors were ready to proceed, abductees were separated in different groups. Catherine and her step-sister ended 
up in different groups and she never saw her sister again.   
Catherine‘s group proceeded to Patongo Sub County where they stayed for a couple of weeks.  During the days 
they spent in Patongo,  all recruitees‘ foreheads, chest, feet and the back of the palms on both sides of the hands 
were anointed using oil squeezed from Shea Nut butter trees. In October, they left Patongo and headed straight for 
Sudan where Catherine stayed in one of the LRA‘s bases located in Aruu.  
At first, for a period of one month, she lived with a Commander named Onen Unita. Her assignment in Onen‘s 
household included harvesting, chopping into pieces and drying Okra (leafy vegetables) which Onen had grown in 
his courtyard. She also helped with domestic chores. Catherine was later handpicked by another high ranking 
officer, Commander Charles Kapere to undergo some elementary military training. At the age of 14, Catherine was 
also considered old enough for marriage and child bearing. Commander Kapere who was also Kony‘s escort, 
became her husband.  He was an Acholi himself and had four wives. Catherine had one kid with Kapere. The boy 
was named Nono Charles: ‗I had never heard of such a name Nono until when he gave it to my boy. I still don‘t 
know the meaning of that name. I thought he named the boy Nono because he got me for ‗free‘ as a wife just like he 
did to others. But he told me that he named the kid after his uncle who was called Nono.‘ In 2003, after 10 years in 
captivity, Kapere arranged for Catherine‘s escape, with their son. She later learnt from other escapees that Kapere 
had been killed in the fighting with the UPDF.  In 2005, after two years of being home, she got married to another 
man. At the time of our interview, 26 years old Catherine was a mother of four children. 
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On the day of abduction, the participants encountered the reality of their life for the coming days, 
months or years in captivity: being separated from their families, constant attacks from the 
national army or other militias, death, suffering and trauma (see also Temmerman, 2001; Stavrou, 
2004; Veale &Stavrou, 2003). Most participants talked about horrifying battle confrontations 
between the LRA fighters and the Ugandan army on the day of abduction and during their 
immediate post-abduction. These battles were an indication that they were no longer ordinary 
‗Acholi girls‘ but ‗enemies‘ of the state. Pursued by the UPDF wherever they went, the ‗civilians‘ 
(the LRA, in their derogative manners referred to the newly abducted as ‗civilians‘) had to find 
ways of surviving the first day(s) of abduction, including collaborating with their abductors and 
learning survival and protection skills. Nevertheless, as amateurs in the jungle, many still lost 
their lives while others received serious injuries. Meralin‘s first day in the ‗world‘ of the LRA is 
informative: 
When we got to Palabek, we encountered an ambush set by the government soldiers. 
They started shooting us from the ground and there was also a helicopter gunship 
hovering over us. They fired at us and that helicopter was killing many people. Those 
who entered nearby houses, they were bombed and burned inside them. I also got an 
injury, I was shot in the stomach and when I saw it [the injury], and I plunged down and 
started crying. Then the commander of the group I was in told his escort not let me 
escape. The escort held my hand and began running with me. When fighting stopped, 
UPDF carried their wounded and dead in their helicopter while the rest of the LRA 
fighters and abductees continued with their journey to Sudan.35 
Even after receiving such grave injuries, they were forced to proceed with the journey: ‗on the 
day I was abducted, it was around midnight; we walked and fought the enemies [UPDF]. In the 
morning, I realized I was shot in the thigh. There was no food or water, nothing to survive on. 
With my injury, the rebels were still forcing me to walk and carry heavy luggage…‘36 
The way they were unexpectedly and brutally snatched from their families was the same way 
they had to adapt to the reality of the armed group—fighting for survival. The sight and presence 
of the fierce rebels that some of the participants had heard of back in the villages would have 
indicated entering a new and risky military environment where old rules and perspectives did not 
apply any more. Since resistance was likely to lead to torture and even death, the abductees had 
to promptly pick survival skills by creating personal identities befitting them before their 
                                                             
35Interview CM37, Kitgum town 
36 Interview, CM 30, Omiyanyima 
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abductors. ‗Identity is the set of meanings that define who one is when one is an occupant in 
society, member of a particular group, or claims particular characteristics that identify him or her 
as a unique person‘ (Burke & Stets, 2009). In social identity theory, Hogg and Abrams (1988) 
argue that social identity is a person‘s knowledge that he or she belongs to a social category or 
group. A social group is a category of individuals with a common social identification or a set of 
people who view themselves as members of the same social group. In this case, a rebel group 
like the LRA can be seen as a social group where members have a particular social identity 
(being like others in the group, and seeing things from the group‘s perspective). When the 
participants were forced to join the armed group, their sense of who they were based on the 
social group they subscribed to (children/adolescents/teenagers) changed to another social 
identity of ‗female abductees/recruits‘. They became part of the armed group, although they 
continued to resist it and its works. Adapting to its characteristics and means of survival was a 
crucial step to stay alive on the day of abduction, on the journey to Sudan (the LRA‘s then base) 
and life in captivity. The days that followed their abduction were significant turning points for 
the participants and, fundamentally, a first step into their new social identities and roles. 
5.1.2 ‗Being taken to the bush‘: The Journey to Sudan 
The participants referred to their immediate post-abduction experience as ‗being taken to the 
bush‘ and the time spent in captivity as ‗life in the bush‘ (see also Coulter, 2009). Their moment 
of clarity regarding their new environment (the bush) and ‗belonging‘ came in the few days that 
followed the abduction, with every passing day confirming their ‗being taken to the bush‘ and 
raising the spectre of permanent stay with the olum-olum (‗people of the bush‘). Although in 
Acholi, olum means grass, it also means ‗bush‘: an unsafe, fearful and mysterious place that 
should not be visited without good reason. People who stay in the ‗bush‘ are considered either 
dangerous or mentally unstable. This shows the tension between ‗bush‘ and ‗village‘ spaces. 
Aware that ‗the bush‘ is a place where wild animals, criminals and evil spirits reside, the longer 
girls stayed there; the more their identity was forcefully becoming changed to that of olum-olum 
(‗people of the bush‘/‗rebels‘), an identity that was disgraceful in the eyes of the people back 
home. In this regard, length of abduction is irrelevant, because any form of association with the 
olum-olum, however short, was/is considered horrendous by an individual and society.  
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Apart from the continuous battle, confrontations and attacks, stories reveal further post-
abduction experiences the participants endured, including trekking for days without resting and 
undergoing intense torture and suffering. They particularly described the journey to Sudan as the 
most daunting and difficult part of their initial life in captivity, comprising extreme suffering and 
survival. It involved weeks of trekking in the bush, going for days without food and/or water 
while carrying heavy loads of looted materials on their heads and backs (see also Temmerman, 
2001).For the majority like Catherine (Table 5.1), the journey to Sudan took weeks; and for 
others, months. However, for those that were abducted from areas bordering Sudan, or who were 
kidnapped when the rebels were heading to Sudan, the journey did not last as long: 
I was abducted at around 12:00am. We moved and joined up with a bigger group at 
around 2:00am. We were abducted by about 6 rebels. After meeting up with a bigger 
group, they prepared food and people ate. We then left that place at around 4:00pm and 
we walked until midnight. We got to another place where they started cooking and that is 
where we slept. We then resumed moving the following day, heading to Sudan. They 
abducted us when they were heading back to Sudan. The journey to the Uganda-Sudan 
border took us three days and nights.  It took us more than two days and nights longer to 
reach their base inside Sudan. On our way there, people died because whoever could not 
walk anymore, mainly because the person had a swollen leg would be killed.37 
 Forcing abductees to walk long distances while carrying heavy loads was a training strategy the 
LRA commanders exploited (Dolan, 2009). Traversing the remote bushy areas of northern 
Uganda toughened and introduced abductees to the crafts of surviving the harsh conditions of 
‗life in the bush‘.   
However, due to their young age, walking long stretches for days with heavy loads eventually 
wore many of them down. Complaining about heavy loads, swollen legs, or showing any signs of 
weakness called for death or beatings for slowing the convoy. For example, Stella, abducted at 
the age of 15, narrated how a young boy in her unit was killed following his exhaustion and 
deteriorating health as they journeyed to Sudan: 
…If they sensed that you were fearful or weak, they would kill you, for example one 
young boy who said he was tired and begged to rest. He thought they were going to leave 
him there to rest but instead they hit his head and they told him; ―now you rest here.‘ 
They asked us all to line up and touch the dead boy‘s body while saying; ‗pretence does 
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not help/work‘. Then after that, they said ‗everyone should put in effort to walk because 
if you pretend then you will be killed like this boy…‘38 
Our Journey to Sudan began on January 31st 1999 but I was only able to reach there on 
February 9th while the rest of the group had reached a day before [February 8
th
]. I was 
left behind because I was too weak to move anymore. I was battered and left for dead. 
We had spent 7 days without food and I think I lost consciousness and only regained it 
later, maybe because of the cold at night. I could not walk any longer but the next 
morning, I began crawling on my knees and stomach. I followed the track the group had 
taken to locate them. I had crawled for some hours when I suddenly came across an 
elderly fighter by the bank of the stream with his wife.  When he saw me crawling to find 
the other group members, he was gripped with sympathy and he carried me to their 
base.39 
The Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY) found that, unlike abducted females, males were 
more likely to experience acts of violence associated with combat, and witness killings or the 
burning of houses with people inside (Annan et al., 2008:28). However, the interviews and wider 
literature show that both boys and girls experienced extreme levels of violence (see Annan et al., 
2011:9). Many participants reported perpetrating violence, including killing their peers and 
civilians, or witnessing a murder in some traumatising fashion: 
When we came to Uganda for the first time to fight, some of us tried to escape but we 
were captured on the way. The rebels decided to kill all of us. They first beat us. I was 
beaten over 300 strokes and battered six times with a panga on my back. All the other 
people were also beaten like that. Then Kony sent a message to his commanders that the 
person who brought the idea of escaping should be killed, instead of them killing us all. 
And one commander shouted, ―You must all kill that woman!‖ They gave us machetes 
like pangas to kill the woman. Because of their orders and fear, we had to kill her. After 
killing her, they told us to raise her body upright. We raised her body up but of course it 
could not stand. And they said, ‗If she does not want to stand, then you tie her on the tree 
and leave her there‘, which we did.40 
Violence was an instrument of control in the LRA, and even short periods of abduction involved 
exposure to significant brutality (see also Annan et al., 2006). From early experiences with the 
LRA, we identify how the armed group instilled fear into the new abductees by forcing them to 
witness acts of extreme violence or to take part in such acts (see also Temmerman, 2001; Cook, 
2007; Stavrou et al., 2000). Such brutalising strategies and experiences have been widely 
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reported in other African armed groups, for example in Liberia and Sierra Leone (see Ellis, 1997; 
Peters & Richards, 1999).  
Following these initial brutal experiences with armed groups, it is argued that girls (and boys) go 
on to view killing and blood as ‗normal‘ and as part of survival tactics (see Denov&Maclure, 
2005). However true this may be, the evidence from Acholi shows that even when girls 
eventually see killing as ‗normal‘ or as the only way to survive, girls are aware of the 
implications of such acts that reinforce their stigma and guilt of having killed or witnessed a 
murder. For example, when one of them was killed, tortured or left behind to die, the experience 
reconfirmed the bad, terrifying circumstances the participants now lived in. They also became 
concerned about the evil associated with killing, particularly the possibility of cen (evil spirit of 
the dead) haunting them in future (Chapter 3).  
The LRA leaders also instilled fear into the abductees through the vicious acts including heavy 
caning, starvation, threats, and torture. This was done as a way of transforming them from 
‗civilians‘ to soldiers. This process introduced the abductees to excruciating pain and many of 
them lost their lives as a consequence: thus, ‗when we got to Ogili Mountain, they severely beat 
us with a machete saying they were turning us into soldiers. They trickled a burning jerry-can on 
our backs and when we were close to River Aswa in Gulu district, my brother died two days later 
from that injury‘….41; or, similarly, ‗I was abducted with my young sister. We stayed together 
for only one day and they separated us. I was so terrified and couldn‘t eat for days. All I wanted 
so much was to go back home. Because of not eating their food, I was stabbed in the arm with a 
machete/knife. I had to start eating but I suffered from serious diarrhoea and almost died‘.42 This 
kind of brutality by the commanders in the early days of life in captivity was a deliberate attempt 
to instil fear into the abductees and scare them out of attempting to escape, so that the present 
terror overcame the previous experience and memories (see also HRW, March and July, 2003).  
When armed commanders are creating effective child soldiers, they do it by breaking them down 
through brainwashing, breaking their self-esteem and destroying bonds to family and 
communities (Fujio, 2007). In ‗Brainwashing: The science of thought control‘, Taylor (2006:97) 
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writes that ‗brain washing aims to achieve behavioural change, but behavioural change is 
secondary: its main goal is to change the thoughts of its victims to fit its preferred ideology.‘ 
Following this brainwashing phase, the abductees started acting as though their old life meant 
nothing to them and they were ‗willing‘ to work and promote the ideology of their captors. As 
part of the brainwashing process, abductees were also told that if they escaped, government 
soldiers and/or people in the society would kill them (see also HRW, March and July, 2003). 
Therefore, they had only one option to survive: abiding by the rules of the armed group, which 
was now their new family and society. The participants found themselves doing whatever they 
could so as not to jeopardise their relationship with the olum-olum, even if that meant 
committing atrocities and participating in violent operations as a sign of their loyalty to the 
agenda of the group. 
5.1.3. Initiation /Purification Ceremonies 
The third phase of the role and identity transformation process was going through the armed 
group‘s elaborate initiation rites. The study found that the LRA took the initiation ceremonies 
seriously and all the ‗civilians‘ had to be cleansed. Until then, they were not to dine with, sit 
among or cook for the LRA members. Almost all the participants (97%) went through these 
mandatory cleansing ceremonies. Mainly because of fear, there were no cases of ‗civilians‘ 
refusing to go through the initiation rites. Whereas the wider transformation process started with 
abduction and continued for the duration of the time in captivity, ‗formal‘ initiation took place 
after arrival in permanent LRA camps in Sudan. For the abductees like Catherine (Table 5.1) 
who went through it before getting to Sudan, commanders (supervisors for the rites) only 
smeared the yard oil on their limbs in a cross sign. At the start of a ‗formal‘ ceremony, the 
‗civilians‘ were ordered, in most cases by the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, to an assembly in the 
courtyard, a big open ground they referred to as a yard. Camp commanders (for military rankings 
in the LRA, see Cakaj, 2010) were also to assemble in a manner that formed a circle around the 
‗civilians‘. Abductees were forced to strip to the waist while they sang songs. The first step of 
the rite was known as camoflash (‗camouflage‘), in which marks of the cross were painted on the 
‗civilian‘ bodies using some white liquid which according to the informants was made from ash 
mixed with local herbs. The next step involved anointing their foreheads, chest (heart region), 
feet and hands using moo yaa (shea-butter oil, or yard oil as it was known in LRA camps).They 
were then made to drink water collected from a swamp containing some red substances, locally 
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known as pala (clay from swamps, usually used for decoration in Acholi culture), mixed with 
other herbs unknown to the participants. This solution was called ‗combined‘ and the initiates 
were told it would give them courage and make them brave in confronting all the forthcoming 
challenges. The ceremony was concluded with the commanders sprinkling ‗holy‘ water on the 
‗civilians‘. Sprinkling ‗holy‘ water can be related to the Christian rite of baptism in which the 
person is anointed with ‗holy‘ water to indicate acceptance into the community of Christians. 
Their clothes being considered ‗unclean‘, replacement clothing was distributed and initiates were 
instructed not to look back while walking to their accommodations. They were not allowed to 
bathe or engage in sexual activity and were kept in isolation for the entire duration of the 
initiation period. The initiation ceremonies were similar across all the LRA camps. The rite 
lasted between one to four days depending on the camp commanders, who also decided who had 
successfully completed the rites and could be ‗accepted‘ as full members of the group or 
community. It is not clear what happened to ‗civilians‘ whose initiation rites were not successful. 
These rites were psychologically effective because they confirmed an ‗agreement/contract‘ 
between the abductees and their abductors, forcing the former to surrender and be loyal to the 
latter‘s cause. The rites signified acceptance into the armed group, formally attaching or bonding 
the abductees to the rebel group. The ‗purified‘ individuals had survived the day of abduction 
and journey to Sudan, and now, in their new home, they were expected to act and behave 
according to the rules and regulations of the new community.  
As in other African armed groups (see Denov&Maclure, 2005), these rites in the LRA were done 
for solidarity and submission purposes. The rituals were an extension of brainwashing: the 
abductees were made to believe that the ceremony cleansed all the evil—particularly witchcraft 
connections—they had carried from their homes; that following successful completion of the 
rites, they would be loyal and not think of escaping; and if they did escape, they would be 
caught. The rites also reinforced the new identity of olum—they were now ambassadors of the 
LRA. As confirmed members, they had to be loyal promoters of LRA ideology, rules and codes, 
with transgressions being punishable by death. Additionally, completion of rituals granted 
abductees privileges that came with full membership of the group. Along with longer established 
members, they could proceed with military training and other operations (fighting, looting and 
abducting) and get married. Since new abductees seemed to join the LRA camps regularly, the 
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rituals accorded earlier abductees a higher status compared to that of ‗civilians‘ (new abductees) 
who were not yet accorded privileges.  
5.1.4 Girls as Actors: Military Training and Deployment for Work 
Research shows that many girls abducted by armed forces in African countries receive military 
training (see Stavrou, 2004:43; Save the Children, 2005; UNICEF, 2005; McKay&Mazurana, 
2004:74; Denov&Maclure, 2005). Although the LRA had many camps in different parts of 
Sudan, their main camps were Nisitu and Jabelene, located near Juba Town. These areas were 
also their main military training wings. This is where Catherine (Table 5.1) and other participants 
(88%) received their ‗formal‘ military training. The participants who did not receive any form of 
military training had either escaped before they got to Sudan, were already pregnant by the time 
they got to Sudan, or were abducted as mothers.  
After the initiation ceremonies, girls, like boys, underwent basic military training on how to 
operate the guns, including target shooting, dismantling, cleaning and re-assembling the machine 
and naming its different parts. They were taught how to loot, carry luggage, check for enemy 
movements (while on patrol), stage an ambush or defend themselves if they were caught in one, 
and to spy on the enemy. The military training period ranged from two weeks to six months 
depending on the camp‘s commander. The training starting at four in the morning and the 
trainees came back to the camps for lunch at 13:00, then resumed at 14:00 and finished for the 
day at 19:00. Scholars who have focused on girl soldiers, such as Denov&Maclure (2005), 
present a good case regarding the depth, content and quality of physical and technical military 
training girls receive in armed groups: an intense, fearful and anxious experience for them. The 
participants talked about the exhausting marches and parades, standing under the sun for hours, 
and constant beatings during training that left them worn out. Military training not only enhanced 
their fighting and survival skills, it affirmed their fighting identity and role. At the end of the 
course, most of them were given a gun, though not all were deployed or became fighters (see 
also McKay &Mazurana, 2004:57).  
Although equipped with these basic military skills, girls were expected to learn on the job as they 
worked alongside the more experienced members of the group. In the LRA, girls assumed ready 
to fight were immediately deployed for front-line combat and looting operations in Uganda and 
Sudan. Of the women in the sample, 93% reported that girls aged 13 and above were deployed in 
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front-line combat roles alongside boys and men, and 40% of the participants were actively 
involved in mainstream fighting. Selection to return to Uganda for battle was done by 
commanders along with—for married girls—their husbands. Husbands decided which of their 
wives were to be deployed for any military work: ‗…I was married to an old man, 56 years old 
… if I said no to sex, he sent me to fight on the frontline and if there was no operation, he put me 
on ‗standby‘, among the boys where we slept in the bush, on guard duty and laying ambushes‘.43 
From the military training and deployment for work narratives, the study identifies three broad 
categories of females in the LRA: active fighters, aiders (carrying out supportive tasks) and camp 
runners (those who stayed in camps): 
Active fighters 
Most active female fighters in the LRA first returned to Uganda as reserve soldiers. However, 
many of them ended up engaging in ‗rebel activities‘ of attacking villages, abducting adolescents 
and looting, among others. Girls who showed courage and interest during military training and 
operations gained more trust and attention from lupwony (translated as ‗teacher‘, this is how the 
senior officers and commanders were addressed.) In the long run, such girls were often deployed 
for front-line combat roles. Some went on to work closely with their lupwony, as escorts or 
heading their own small units. Prossy‘s experience shows the possibility of girls progressing 
through the ranks. Abducted at the age of 10 for 11 years, she went on to progress from ting-ting 
(servant) to higher status, heading a unit: ‗… by the time I exited the armed group; I was a 
corporal, heading a squad of eleven soldiers. I was given that rank following my good 
performance in the frontline combat roles…‘44 Some girls in the LRA grew to hold command 
positions such as captains, lieutenants and corporals (see also McKay &Mazurana, 2004:57) and 
have been described as the ‗brightest and bravest in battle‘ (Finnstrom, 2008:191). Girls taking 
on significant positions in armed groups is not new; after spending years with their recruiters, 
they become capable, enthusiastic and fierce fighters who terrorise and abduct civilians (see 
Denov&Maclure, 2005; HRW, 2004:29; Richards, 2005:89; Mazurana& Carlson, 2004:14; 
MacKenzie, 2009a:206).  
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Aiders 
This category of females in the LRA moved with the fighters as aiders, performing support tasks 
including fetching firewood and water, preparing food, carrying looted materials, moving 
weapons and ammunition, and nursing the sick and injured, among others. The major role here 
was to ensure that the fighters were taken care of. However, while these girls mainly carried out 
supportive roles, they still had to carry guns, and losing them called for serious punishment: 
Acan was a nec(‗nurse or health personnel‘), and she still carried her gun as she executed her 
role: ‗when we reached the time for fighting, the commander said I was young but a fast learner 
and could be good at another role, like a nurse. From there and then, I began moving with them, 
nursing injured people. I still carried the gun but did not fight.‘45 They were told guns would 
make them brave and strong hearted: ‗females carried firearms for defensive more often than 
offensive use‘ (Annan et al., 2011:9). From the interviews, it is hard to determine whether 
holding a gun created any sense of security for girls in the LRA, but in other African contexts 
holding a gun has been found to be a source of power for girls (see Denov&Maclure, 2005). 
Camp Runners  
Last but not the least, another category of females in the LRA included those who remained 
behind running the camps. The LRA leaders relied on this category of girls and young women to 
keep the camps functioning and provide a labour force for domestic work and for transporting 
supplies (see also McKay &Mazurana, 2004:57, 109; Temmerman, 2001; Carlson &Mazurana, 
2008:14–15; Annan et al., 2011). In her analysis of systematic rape and sexual abuse of women 
during armed conflict in Africa, Turshen (2001:61) argues that ‗controlling women‘s productive 
labour is one of the gains from rape and abduction in civil conflicts.‘ This was reflected in the 
abduction strategies of the LRA. In addition to sexual and domestic services, the armed group 
relied on girls and women to provide an agricultural labour force: weeding, harvesting and 
transporting the food to the camps, among other activities. Even when food was looted or 
provided by the locals, preparation tasks of peeling, drying, cleaning, pounding and cooking 
were explicitly within this category of work. This was done alongside other daily tasks in the 
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camps: child rearing, taking care of their ‗husbands‘, and participating in looting sprees in 
Sudan. 
For all these categories, military training and deployment for various operations, of whatever 
nature, concluded the process of becoming a ‗rebel‘. Deployment helped girls to progress from 
being mere members of the LRA to contributors as fighters, abductors, looters, aiders and home-
makers. Although girls who carried out supportive roles did not participate in front line fighting 
or undertake important military operations like spying or setting ambushes, their shared 
experiences with young soldiers and ability to execute their assigned roles diligently cannot and 
should not be overlooked. Through their supportive roles, they were subjected to a great deal of 
rough treatment. To ensure the fighters were fed and taken care of, girls carried their heavy loads 
wherever they went. Girls also risked their lives carrying cooking stoves while food was being 
prepared on them: ‗…they would put sand in a washing basin, then a stove was placed in and 
then you carry the basin with food cooking on it.‘46 Such activities left some of them with 
stigmatising marks of a burnt skull or skin, or chest complaints and chronic headaches that they 
continue to live with as reminders of their life in captivity.  
McKay &Mazurana (2004) write that domestic roles including cooking, laundering, fetching 
firewood and water, and taking care of children are, in the context of armed groups, sidelined 
and viewed as insignificant. The service (apart from sexual) offered by the girls to the LRA is 
not often recognised as their experiences are analysed. However, it is evident that girls—young, 
energetic and resilient—were invaluable to the very survival of the LRA. Therefore, describing 
abducted girls simply as a ‗vulnerable group associated/involved with armed groups‘ limits clear 
understanding of functional work-related notions of logistics, health corps, combat and service 
support. Not specifically labelling their work (combat and non-combat) extends gender 
discrimination on the basis of division of labour to the armed groups (Stavrou, 2005a). Girls 
carry out critical work that is essential for the survival of these armed groups. Their work should 
not be simply considered a natural extension of their domestic responsibilities (that is, considered 
‗unworthy‘ and not significant enough). These girls are courageous and hardworking, and all the 
work they do should be appreciated and recognised. Therefore, taking their roles as an integral 
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part of the conflict, and focusing on their roles and how they survive warfare, will reveal the 
centrality of the militarisation of girls in fuelling and supporting armed conflicts.  
5.2 ‘Forced Marriage’ as a Cohesion Strategy 
McKay &Mazurana (2004:58) note that ‗nearly all abducted girls are raped and girls associated 
with fighting forces almost universally report sexual violence.‘ Almost all the participants in this 
study reported one type of sexual violence—forced marriage (see Neha, 2008). Unlike in other 
African armed groups where gang rapes and sex slavery are reported to be common (see, for 
example, Coulter, 2009:126; Denov&Maclure, 2005), gang rapes were not reported in the 
interviews (see also Kramer, 2012). Instead, as Catherine‘s story (Table 5.1) tells, girls were 
subjected to early forced marriage and pregnancies with one fighter, and when he died on the 
battlefield or through natural causes, she was transferred to another man.  
The analysis of the system and practice of forced marriage in the context of the LRA remains 
sketchy in the literature. One perspective is that the armed group‘s forced marriage system 
evoked the historical Acholi marriage tradition (Allen &Schomerus, 2006). The authors argue 
that ‗marriage by capture‘ is not new in this region, where ‗girls are mostly taken to become 
‗wives‘ in much the same way as chiefs and war leaders in the past … In taking young women as 
‗wives‘, the LRA has systematically manipulated and corrupted certain existing conventions and 
moral norms.‘ However true this argument may be, Allen and Schomerus overlook the fact that 
the marriage institution in this region has changed and continues gradually to change from what 
it was 20–50 years ago (Chapter 7). Although Acholi culture still accords pride to marriages 
arranged through courtship and payment of bride price (customary marriage), modernity has 
produced alternatives including religious unions, cohabitation, elopement and single 
parenthood—but not ‗marriage by capture‘.  
The other viewpoint is proposed by Carlson &Mazurana (2008), who extensively describe the 
character of forced marriage within the LRA. They argue that the practice endured because it 
was systematised by the group‘s leadership with the aim of increasing their effectiveness. The 
current study draws from this argument and discusses how forcibly marrying off girls to older 
men/commanders was a strategy for the top leadership to control girls (and the fighters) and 
induce unity in the armed group. Girls were a prize or inducement to stabilise male fighters, 
avoid them raping civilians or otherwise engaging in rape outside marriage, and maintain their 
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loyalty (focus) with the army (see also Kramer, 2012). Adult females were seen as potential 
carriers of sexual diseases, and thus were not distributed as wives to the fighters. Betty, abducted 
at the age of 30, explains that: ‗their [LRA] interest was on the young girls because they did not 
have any sexual infections. But for us who were abducted when we were mothers, we did not get 
much attention from the fighters.‘47 
Hypothetically, unlike gang rape and rape outside of these marriages, rape within marriages 
seemed to have a social and ethical validity within the armed group, and marriage offered 
stability. In not permitting gang rape and rape outside marriage (adultery), the leadership was 
exerting control over all fighters and ensuring they respected Acholi marriage norms (even when 
they broke most of them). Writing about the marriage system in the LRA, Annan et al. (Aug 
2009:12) note that ‗abduction and forced marriages, combined with prohibitions on sex out of 
marriage, [were] effective tools for creating social cohesion and maintaining control when 
material resources [were] low.‘ Gang rape and loose relationships were seen as a threat to this 
cohesion and the group‘s effectiveness. Thus, forced marriage and prohibiting sex outside 
marriage were promoted as antidotes to this threat.   
Research shows that girls in armed groups face a higher risk of being infected with sexually 
transmitted diseases (see McKay &Mazurana, 2004:63), but this seems not to have been the case 
with the LRA. Through their strict codes of marriage, the leaders avoided practical complications 
like spread of sexually transmitted diseases. The participants returned home without HIV/Aids 
infections. The study did come across one confirmed case of HIV. Betty, whom we met earlier, 
reunited with her polygamous husband after two years in captivity. Three months before our 
interview, she had tested HIV positive and started on antiretroviral drugs.  
This is the strict system Catherine (Table 5.1) and other newly abducted girls found themselves 
in when they reached Sudan. Since rape in these marriages occupied a big part of their daily lives 
while in captivity, it is hard to ignore this experience. Besides, doing so reinforces the 
representation of rape victims as ‗faceless victims of war‘ (Enloe, 2000:108). Hence, the chapter 
analyses this experience and life in captivity in terms of survivors‘ stories, and not merely stories 
of victims of sexual violence. Their stories present unimaginable experiences borne by girls who 
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endured and survived to narrate them. The chapter concerns the journey and experience of 
becoming a ‗wife‘ in the context of an armed group, including how younger girls were prepared 
for marriage, the manner of girls' distribution to men and the composition of these unions.  
5.2.1 ‗Little‘ Girls in Military Service 
In the contexts of the LRA, female age mattered in that, upon reaching the camps in Sudan, the 
female ‗civilians‘ were divided into three groups: prepubescent girls, adolescent girls and adult 
women. Women in these categories experienced the journey to marriage and becoming a wife 
differently, as discussed below.  
After successful completion of initiation ceremonies, anyira-matino (‗little girls‘, less than 13 
years)—commonly referred to as ting ting (servants) in the camps—were randomly distributed 
among commanders as their subjects. Alternatively, a little girl was attached to mego 
(mother/senior woman) that had been with the group for a significant period of time to act as her 
caretaker/nanny. When they got to Sudan, many of the participants first acted as ting ting. Their 
roles were to serve as house helpers: babysitting, farming, and carrying out domestic chores 
including fetching water, laundry, and preparing food, among others.  
At this stage of their journey, in commanders‘ homes and with older women, their experience 
was characterized by suffering, mistreatment and hard labour from older females and ordinary 
soldiers. Unlike older girls (aged 13 and above), the ting ting had commanders‘ protection and 
were not heavily punished in the camps or deployed for fighting or looting operations. However, 
in the absence of the commanders and senior officers, they underwent various forms of violation 
and suffering at the hands of the commanders‘ wives, older women and other ordinary soldiers. 
Being the lowest in the LRA structure, ting ting worked continuously and were subjected to hard 
labour, exploitation and assault: ‗when commanders sent older people for rebel activities and 
they [commanders] were also away; their wives assaulted us [ting-ting] so much, and they 
warned us not to report it to their husbands…,‘ 48(see also Annan et al., 2010:10; Carlson 
&Mazurana, 2008:21). Even those who did not serve as domestic ting ting had their share of 
suffering. As an escort to a female commander, Josephine carried her luggage and ran her 
errands: ‗working with females in high ranks was not easy because they were bad and very rude. 
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They did not even smile with you. They did not want you to answer them back. If they called 
you, you should respond by saying ‗yes mother/mummy‘ and yet she was not even your 
mother.‘49 
The participants reported that the commanders‘ wives mistreated the ting ting in their households 
because the latter were seen as competitors, who could snatch the former‘s husbands (see also 
McKay &Mazurana, 2004:93). Without the favour and protection of their husbands, the 
commanders‘ wives would be exposed to more suffering in the camps and during military 
operations. As in other armed African groups where the commanders‘ wives (and females in 
high ranking positions) took charge of the camps (see McKay &Mazurana, 2004:93; 
Mazurana&Carlson, 2004:14; Rosen, 2005:70; MacKenzie, 2009a:206), such females in the 
LRA controlled and manipulated younger girls (and boys) to do as they pleased. Since they 
knowingly committed a high level of violence on others, they cannot be dismissed simply as 
victims; but were perpetrators of violence. Although girls‘ war experiences are increasingly 
being documented, the distinctions in girls‘ and women‘s war experiences are not yet well 
understood (McKay, 2006). The added difficulties and ill-treatment faced by younger girls at the 
hands of older females may influence their decisions as they grow up in armed groups. However, 
how this plays out remains unclear.  
5.2.2 Distribution of Girls to Men 
Findings and literature show that because of their varying ages, girls were married off at different 
times and through different methods. When a ting ting became of age (started menstrual cycle), 
she was considered a woman, ready for marriage and bearing children. This regulation was often 
violated in some camps where girls were married off as young as eleven, but in most cases, at 13 
and above, a girl was attached to a man as her husband. Studies link sexual violence and 
patriarchy, explaining that this abuse confronted by girls during armed conflicts can be viewed as 
a reflection of peacetime attitudes (see Viseur-Sellers, 1999). To some extent, LRA leaders 
seemed to be products of a culture that underlines patriarchal values—that females exist for the 
sexual fulfilment of males (Eno, 2002:6). The LRA leaders clearly extended a custom of 
marriageable age to their camps. Customarily, a girl becomes marriageable in her early 
adolescent years (12–16) (Girling, 1960:27, 68). The LRA leaders distributed the younger girls 
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to commanders‘ and older women‘s households to guide and help them come of age and prepare 
them to become homemakers. Upon a girl‘s first menstruation, she was forcefully removed from 
her caretaker/nanny, who had absolutely no say over how the girl should be treated. Girls were 
married off to usually older men (see also Carlson &Mazurana, 2008). In cases when a ting ting 
came of age while in a commander‘s house, it was up to the commander to decide what to do 
with her; either to take her for himself or, in rare cases, to give her to another man, probably his 
escort. 
If prepubescent girls were kept as ting ting and given out as wives later, older adolescent girls 
like Catherine (Table 5.1) were married off upon reaching the LRA camps, after the initiation 
rites. The narratives show that the most common ways of distributing girls to men followed two 
systematic procedures. In one instance, girls were gathered in the yard, in a line or circle, and 
men picked their wives according to their rank, with commanders going first. Carlson &Mazuran 
(2008:20) note that commanders chose females as wives based on the girls‘ beauty and education 
levels. In the current study, physical appearance was reported as a determining factor for 
marriage selection, but education was not. When commanders identified a girl as unattractive 
(with any sort of deformity), the abductor was quizzed on why such a girl was recruited. Because 
no woman was allowed to stay in the camps ‗unmarried‘, if a girl was rejected by all men, she 
was freed to return home. It was only at this stage that a man could reject a girl as his ‗wife‘, not 
after sleeping with her. The second distribution method included soldiers collecting their military 
uniforms in one spot. Girls were ordered to pick a uniform each, one at a time. The girl became 
the ‗wife‘ of the fighter whose uniform she picked (see also Carlson &Mazurana, 2008).  
The majority (82 per cent) of the participants in this study were forcibly given out as wives 
through the above mentioned methods. A further 8 per cent were courted by young men and 
‗willingly‘ got married. Although the majority of girls were forcibly given out to men and others 
were given a ‗choice‘ to pair with men as couples, this was all rape. Because it was difficult to 
live a single life in captivity, pairing with a man cannot be seen as having been a choice either, 
but only as a way of surviving.  
The remaining 10 per cent of the participants were never married, either because they were 
abducted as adults and mothers or turned into full-time fighters. Although many girls were 
turned into servants and wives when they arrived in Sudan, some of the abducted girls 
121 
 
(particularly between the ages of 12 and 17) were purposely selected to join active fighting. Such 
girls skipped the ting tingand marriage distribution phases and were confined to the full time 
fighters‘ group that was often deployed back in Uganda:  
When I reached Sudan, I was picked and taken for training. We were 29 young girls 
among about 90 men that were selected for military training to become full time 
soldiers…After training, I later started full time fighting … the first four ambushes; we 
carried it on the UPDF and not the civilians … I was not given out to any man until I 
returned home.50 
5.2.3 Marriage Compositions and Experience in the LRA 
Although these marriages were/are not recognised by customary law in Acholi and Uganda, they 
were designed and carried out to look like ‗proper‘ marriages as practised in Acholi. They had 
the ‗traditional characteristics of shared domicile, bearing of children, domestic responsibilities, 
exclusivity and sex‘ (Carlson &Mazurana, 2008:7, 14–15). As in normal society, marriage was/is 
the basic central unit in the LRA where strict regulations and power structures existed to regulate 
how women related to men—through control of sexual behaviour, productivity and distribution 
of supplies. Following the normal Acholi society customs of masculinity and marital obligations, 
a husband provided for his ‗family‘ and ensured everyone in the household lived according to the 
LRA regulations. In this respect, the status accorded to a man through marriage gave them power 
over women and authority to take care of their wife/wives by providing an authorised house, 
food, coordination among wives and security. On the other hand, the ‗marriages‘ forced the girls 
to take on roles as sexual partners, mothers to the children born from these relationships and 
domestic workers (cooks, water collectors, porters, food producers and gatherers). At household 
level, men had many wives, with some commanders housing up to 25 wives (see also Carlson 
&Mazurana, 2008; Annan et al., 2008). Two or three wives shared a house and a husband had 
his own house where one of the wives cooked and spent one night with him at a time. The 
participants talked about girls and women sharing a cordial relationship with their ‗co-wives‘, 
where a new wife was expected to respect older ones. However, since they had to compete for 
supplies and attention from the husbands, sharing a man with many other young women was far 
from easy, and conflicting relations among the wives were reported (see also Kramer, 2012).  
The participants described a range of feelings towards their ‗husbands‘, with 55 per cent 
reporting fair treatment from their ‗husbands‘, including being loved, protected, provided for, 
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and not being unnecessarily punished or overworked during movements. As Evaline‘s 
experience relates, the ‗good‘ husband‘s care and compassion intensified when the ‗wife‘ 
conceived:  
…although he was much older than me, he showed me care by treating me nicely. He 
never beat me or made me carry heavy loads. When I conceived his child, he cared for 
me so well by providing necessities and ensuring my safety. Whenever we were under 
attacks, he would not leave me but stopped to fire while I ran for my life. He was not like 
other men who left their wives on their own in such circumstances.51 
 
This high figure is surprising because LRA fighters have been generally portrayed as only 
‗monsters‘ that treated abducted girls in an inhumane manner. This evidence suggests that as 
individual ‗husbands‘, it is possible they sympathised with the abducted girls even when the 
system they served did not permit them to do so. This good treatment should not nonetheless be 
taken as evidence that all men were sympathetic and capable of caring and providing for their 
wives. Some of the participants suffered further familial abuse at the hands of men they ended up 
with. Such ‗husbands‘ were described as very harsh and abusive, overworking their wives and 
often punishing them for petty mistakes. This domestic violence made life in captivity even more 
difficult for young girls who did not know how to handle family issues. Abducted at the age of 9, 
Akumu‘s experience portrays the difficulty of being a wife at an early age in armed groups: 
…when the man I stayed with turned me into a wife; I had not learnt much about 
cooking…I could not properly mingle posho (maize bread). Even the sauce, they liked 
Adyebo (green leafy vegetable), I did not know how to properly cook it. Every time I took 
my food with other wives, to a place where these commanders ate from, my food was 
always rejected. As a punishment, he beat and accused me of being careless and a poor 
cook. Some days, if he didn‘t feel like beating me, he forced me to eat all of my food and 
drink 5 liters of water.52 
In the interviews, using the word ‗marriage‘ to describe the unions in which the participants were 
placed seemed misplaced. While they eventually called these relationships ‗bush marriage‘, 
many simply referred to phrases like, ‗I was forced to live with this man‘, ‗I had to be with this 
man to survive‘, and ‗this man did not treat me bad‘. With only two women in the sample still 
married to their ‗bush husbands‘ at the time of field work, most women did not understand these 
relationships as actual marriages for them and never considered a long-term relationship with the 
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men once they returned home. This can also be related to stigma attached to these relationships 
in Acholi (Chapter 7). As discussed in the marriage chapter, the former female abductees prefer 
marrying men with no abduction past as one way of redeeming their identity, which has been 
stained by their association with olum-olum.  
Although girls in the LRA went through more or less similar experiences with regard to the 
journey of becoming a wife and subsequent marriage experiences, each story remains different 
and distinct, reflecting what they remember most clearly about this part of their captivity 
experience, including the ting ting times, the first day they were raped, or their treatment by their 
‗husband‘. Also, falling under different female categories (women in high ranks, commanders‘ 
wives, senior women, ordinary wives and non-wives—ting ting and full time fighters), their 
interests and experiences of marriage were not uniform, but shaped by their status. Depending on 
their age and time spent in captivity, they had flexibility to progress from one status to another 
and negotiate their marriage positions at household level and in the camps. The other experiences 
of captivity and marriage that stand out in their narrations are their pregnancy and motherhood 
experiences.  
5.3 Pregnancy and Motherhood in Stressful Conditions 
As Catherine‘s story (Table 5.1) demonstrates, apart from the abductions, initiation ceremonies, 
military training and forced marriage practices, another level of connecting the abducted girls to 
their abductors was through early forced pregnancies. The unions the girls ended up in included a 
familial aspect where children were born and raised by abducted mothers and their captor 
husbands (see also Carlson &Mazurana, 2008:7, 14–15). It is clear that forcibly impregnating 
girls and women was a multiplication strategy for the LRA leaders. They forced every couple to 
have as many children as they could. They were against any form of birth control method. 
Studies estimate that 30 per cent of girls that exited the armed group did so as child mothers 
(Mazurana& MacKay, 2004:9). UNICEF noted that in 2005, 3,500 child mothers had exited the 
LRA (cited in ACORD, 2007:47). There is overwhelming evidence that half of abducted girls 
bore children as a result of the marriage practices in the LRA (see McKay &Mazurana, 2004:88, 
Annan et al., 2006, 2008; UNICEF, 2006). In the current sample, most of the participants bore 
children fathered by the LRA fighters (68 children were born, including those that died in the 
LRA camps and back home. At the time of fieldwork, 59 children were still alive). 
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The longer term effects of marriage and child bearing practices were diverse. Child mothers were 
to care for children and maintain affiliation with their ‗husbands‘. This adherence allowed the 
continuation of supplies, because without husbands, child mothers reported facing challenges in 
looking after their children. Basically, having a child to depend on the mother, and the mother on 
the husband, underpinned the marriage system. Breaking these dependencies became difficult for 
child mothers.  
Bearing children was one way of keeping girls in the LRA for a long time, exerting control on 
them and dissuading them from attempting to escape. Bearing children was effective in 
controlling child mothers, both physically and psychologically (Carlson &Mazurana, 2008) and 
that partly explains their prolonged stay with the armed group in comparison to non-child 
mothers. For example, the participants‘ length of life in captivity ranged from 3 months to 12 
years, averaging 5 years. Most of those who stayed for less than 6 years were never married or 
were married but returned with no children. Unlike other female abductees, child mothers had 
limited opportunities to leave the armed group since they could not easily escape with children. 
Many of them did not consider leaving them behind; for example, only one participant purposely 
escaped without her two-year-old son because she thought the child was better off with the LRA 
rather than with her back home. Such actions show the fear and stigma that engulfed girls when 
they thought of returning home with children born in captivity. Not knowing how their families 
and communities would react, they questioned and postponed the option of returning home. It is 
no surprise that many of the participants escaped as soon as they realized they were pregnant. 
Apart from being less stressful and less risky giving birth back at home, such girls could also 
disguise a child‘s birth roots. Considering that having a child out of wedlock leaves an Acholi 
girl negatively perceived and devalued in the society (Chapter 7), giving birth cemented child 
mothers‘ already stigmatised identity. With a child, they could not deny their association and 
illicit intercourse with the rebels. Returning home presented a dilemma, and this could explain 
why some of them saw leaving the children with their fathers as the only alternative. 
Pregnancy and motherhood stories reveal added specific difficulties the participants faced while 
in captivity: their pregnancy and motherhood was described as the toughest experience in 
captivity. This experience varied, however, according to location and helpfulness of the husband. 
Surviving pregnancy and childbirth was more likely in Sudan than in Uganda. While it was the 
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duty and responsibility of girls to engage in battles and loot food, pregnant and new mothers in 
Sudan stayed behind in the camps looking after themselves and their children. Allowances were 
made for people with special needs (expectant mothers and the injured) who were confined in a 
sickbay (a camp for children, new mothers and the injured, commonly referred to as bay) in 
preparation for delivery. The LRA trained some of their abductees as medics, and these treated 
illnesses and prescribed medicine for the sick, and also served as traditional birth attendants and 
‗obstetricians‘. Unlike those who had to carry out operations in Uganda, expectant mothers in 
bays at least got some good care and attention from the medics, other mothers and ting ting. 
Although the findings propose that, in Sudan, there were arrangements for antenatal care in Juba 
hospital; this was mainly for wives of senior officers/commanders. Most child mothers gave birth 
with the help of the birth attendants, using rudimentary methods: Nighty, who delivered her first 
child at the age of 13 in Juba hospital, had this to say about her second birth: ‗…for my second 
child, I almost died. Those older women who were acting as birth attendants and midwives had 
to put a mingling stick in my mouth so that I could push the baby out…‘53 Such rudimentary 
tools and measures used ended up doing more damage to the girls and their children. Some were 
left with damaged bladders and other reproductive health difficulties. 
On the other hand, while working in Uganda, it was business as usual for pregnant women and 
new mothers, moving up and down, constantly under attack, going on without water and food, 
just like other soldiers. In the absence of birth attendants, women relied on the help of their 
husbands, who were often advised to be as close to their wives during movements, as they would 
be the only help available at the time of labour:  
Labour started while I was in the company of only the young girls who had never given 
birth. Luckily, my husband had isolated himself to travel with me. While in Sudan and 
Uganda, I was one of those untrained ‗obstetricians‘ and I helped deliver other women. I 
had witnessed many girls and women giving birth so I knew precisely what to do during 
labour. I pushed with his encouragement. I knew how to separate the baby from the 
mother using the experience I had gained helping other women…54 
Upon ‗successful‘ delivery in the jungle, some new mothers were forced to continue with 
military operations, risking their lives and those of their babies further: ‗a month after delivering 
my baby, I went for the operation where I was shot and injured. The bullet ripped through my 
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back passing out through my stomach consequently incapacitating me to move in the speed of 
the group.‘55Some of them lost their children during intensive fighting or due to lack of health 
care. Taking care of a baby in the jungle was hectic and more draining for the women: Evaline 
started trekking to Uganda with her unit, two weeks after delivery: ‗…as a new mother, walking 
long distances with a child was exhausting, for example the group reached the next destination in 
the night and rested but for a mother, you had to boil water to bathe the baby and at times all you 
wanted was to get some sleep…‘56Such anecdotes show the extremely difficult circumstances 
child mothers go through while with armed groups.  
 
Difficult pregnancy, motherhood and life in captivity that the participants endured are revealed in 
the reasons they gave for choosing specific names for their children, including Aneno/Oneno-
can(meaning ‗I have suffered a lot‘), Acayo/Ocayo (‗I am despised‘), Aciro/Akanyo (‗I have 
endured a lot of suffering‘), Komakech (‗I am unfortunate‘), Akwero (‗I did not want her father 
and the relationship was not my choice‘: kwero means ‗to refuse or reject‘), Ocan/Acan(‗I have 
problems‘), Olara(‗God saved me from death‘), Aryemo (‗her father was always chasing me 
away from his home‘: ryemo means ‗chase/send away‘), Aloyo, (‗I am victorious‘), among other 
names.57 The names obviously depict the pain and suffering these mothers went through in 
captivity and their future plight. Writing about children born in captivity in northern Uganda, 
Apio (2007:101) notes that, ‗these names compile all the bad experiences of a mother into the 
name and give it a living reminder in the nature of her baby‘. 
5.4 Exiting the LRA 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the day of abduction remains an important part of the 
participants‘ experience. In the same way, the day they exited the LRA remains a defining 
moment for them; a day they left a violent and stigmatising life in captivity and changed their 
status to ‗former abductees‘. Like many of the abducted children in Uganda (see Medeiros, 2014; 
McKay &Mazurana, 2004; Veal &Stavrou, 2003), the participants left the armed group in three 
ways: rescue, release and escape. A small number of them was rescued by the UPDF during 
crossfire or were released by LRA fighters and leaders, while the majority (77%) escaped. 
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Although the consequences, in the form of brutality and death, if they were caught trying to 
escape were well known to them, escape stories recount individual and collective efforts to flee 
or to step out of a stigmatising and violent environment. This ability demonstrates a capacity for 
rational choice and for resistance, resilience and determination with astonishing bravery.  
They escaped during times of fighting and when supervision was low (sleeping time, when sent 
to collect water/other materials or during convoys). It was difficult to escape from Sudan, and 
they waited until their units returned to Uganda to fight, abduct and loot. Constant attacks on the 
LRA by the UPDF facilitated opportunities to escape. This particularly favoured girl combatants 
who had gained the commanders‘ trust. They took advantage of this trust and rank privileges to 
facilitate their escape: ‗I was never under tight security because the LRA commanders did not 
think I could escape… One day I decided to escape… I returned with seven people.‘58 Such 
courage reveals that girls and young women often consciously and effectively devise ways to 
make the best of their adverse life situations, and such efforts must be taken seriously, even 
though they may entail grievous risks for themselves or other people. 
Apart from the determination to be free, friendship (with fellow soldiers and commanders), 
bombardments from opposing groups, and knowledge of locations girls found themselves in also 
evoked escape plans. Their personal escape or negotiation for release were not only arrived at 
because of a sudden chance to escape or feelings of being tired of life in captivity, but their exit 
came out of such unanticipated factors and opportunities that enabled them to break free of their 
captivity. Recognising a village, a mountain, a stream, or a trading centre, they found the courage 
to attempt escape. For those who did it collectively, they did not need to be friends, or with the 
same status. When the escape opportunity availed itself, they become one category—‗captives‘, 
united by the idea, opportunity and desperation to be free. Abuu remembers how their 
commander‘s wife initiated the idea of escaping: 
…there was a woman who had lived in the bush for years, and was married to our unit‘s 
commander … she came to us [two friends] and suggested that ―since we are in Uganda, 
near home, we should think about escaping before going back to Sudan.‖ Then at night, 
around 9:00 pm, in March 2004, we escaped, four people. We brought a girl that had 
been given to the commander to take care of her, and the three of us.59 
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Despite the grave violence and abuse they lived under, the participants made rational choices that 
helped them develop social relationships with girls in similar situations and made the best out of 
these.  
Since it was more difficult for child mothers to escape alone, they relied on friendships 
developed (including with their husbands) to leave the LRA. After a number of years in 
captivity, some girls found themselves in a position to negotiate their release with the top 
leadership or their husbands. For example, when her group had returned to Uganda to fight 
Catherine (Table 5.1) negotiated with her husband to have her and their son released: 
I did not just escape. Kapere released me to return home when I requested him to do so… 
I told him we would meet again in future if God had destined us to be together again… 
on the day, he gave me six soldiers to accompany me up to my home Trading Centre. He 
instructed them to hand me over to civilians in their gardens or let me go if they failed to 
find some civilians…60 
Such anecdotes show how some male rebel fighters sympathised with female abductees as their 
wives. The favoured treatment was evident not only in terms of protection and provision, but 
also through this collaboration to exit the armed group. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
We have seen in this chapter that, in a single day, in the LRA context, the participants‘ 
acceptable identity as ‗Acholi girls‘ was stripped of them and they were forced to adopt or accept 
a new identity of olum-olum (‗people of the bush‘ or ‗rebels‘). Their routines and responsibilities 
changed and although they still carried out domestic roles and served others, as was the case in 
their families, these roles became secondary. Instead they were trained to walk long distances, 
work with the gun and fight in a brutal conflict in which many survived only with severe injuries 
or were otherwise traumatised. Performance of certain stigmatising acts was imposed on them, 
including violence, looting, killing, rape and early pregnancy, among others. Coming from a 
culture that detests illicit sexual activities and bearing children out of wedlock and any form of 
violence, their new identify becomes—as Martin-Baro (1994:132) calls it, a ‗stigmatising 
identity‘—of olum (‗rebel‘). 
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As with the day of abduction, a successful escape is remembered in detail, but this time with a 
sense of triumph and achievement. The individual accounts have a shared theme with their 
principal mission being to survive, reunite with their families and reclaim their freedom and 
identity. Reading their stories, one begins to understand the courage they must have had to risk 
their lives and those of their children by attempting to escape. Although some of them had been 
in captivity for a long time and were traumatised, they were able to trace their families when they 
escaped. Passing through one or more unfamiliar communities or going through reception 
centres, they finally reunited with their families. At the time of the interviews, the majority had 
been home for a long time (6–10 years) and were attempting to rebuild their lives. The following 
chapters discuss the other three central themes of their socio-economic reintegration, including 
stigmatisation, marriage and livelihoods.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
‘THE WOMAN WHO WAS IN THE BUSH’: LIVING WITH STIGMA 
The Integrated DDR Standards note that reintegration is ‗primarily taking place in the 
community at the local level‘ (UN, 2006: Chapter 1.10.2). The interviews suggest that the 
community is the most important reference point for formerly abducted individuals. The women 
in the current sample often declared that maintaining good relationships with people in the 
surrounding settings was a necessary element of a successful reintegration into civil life. 
However, a healthy relationship with their community members is something many of the 
participants still struggled to achieve at the time of this study.  
Early in the research process, it became obvious that what the participants have in common is the 
stigma they experience as a consequence of their abduction and life in captivity. Thus, the 
analysis of their reintegration progress and experience cannot be explicit and comprehensive 
without exploring this stigma. The findings overwhelmingly support the hypothesis that 
stigmatisation hinders long term reintegration. It separates former abductees from the rest of the 
people by devaluing and discriminating against them. In Uganda, the notion of ‗stigma‘ has been 
explored in relation to HIV/AIDS and mental illness, but it has not been extensively examined in 
studies of female soldiering. As a defining element of social acceptance in the society, the 
chapter analyses stigma from the perspective of the participants. 
6.1 Stigma 
The term ‗stigma‘ derives from a Greek word that refers to bodily signs/marks believed to 
expose something abnormal and bad about the moral status (flawed and polluted) of an 
individual, who was therefore to be avoided in the public sphere (Goffman, 1960:11). Since its 
initial articulation in the 1960s, the concept has undergone significant shifts in definition: stigma 
is used more to mean ‗social disgrace‘ rather than referring to any bodily evidence. However, 
analysis is still too heavily focused on psychological approaches (see Major & O‘Brien, 2005) 
compared to attempting to understand stigma and stigmatised individuals in local contexts. 
Although Goffman (1960), in discussing the concept, included both psychological and social 
elements of stigma, his characterization and ideas have mostly been used in studying and 
analysing the psychological impact of stigma on individuals—processes by which it is 
internalised and how it shapes behaviour. However, how stigma affects and changes the social 
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life and relationships of individuals in local contexts is still less explored (Parker, 2003). For 
instance, it is only recently that the fields of sociology (see Link & Phelan, 2001) and 
anthropology (see Yang &Kleinman, 2008; Link & Phelan, 2007) have started contributing to 
understanding stigma and its impacts.  
Scholars of stigma regard the concept as a social construction (a label attached by society) and 
observe that it varies across individuals and stigmatised groups, and across time and cultures 
(Goffman, 1960; Crocker et al., 1998; Jones et al., 1984). Goffman (1960:12) defines stigma as 
an ‗attribute that is deeply discrediting‘. An individual is stigmatised when he or she possesses 
(or is believed to possess) ‗some attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is 
devalued in a particular social context‘ (Crocker et al., 1998:505). According to English 
(1971:162), ‗stigma might be best considered to be the negative perceptions and behaviours of so 
called-normal people to all individuals who are different from themselves.‘ Thus, the discrediting 
attribute reduces the individual with the attribute/character from a complete and normal person to 
a ‗stained‘, ‗polluted‘, ‗devalued‘, ‗spoiled‘, ‗flawed‘ and ‗inferior‘ one (Crocker et al., 1998; 
Jones et al., 1984).  
These definitions and characterizations share the assumption that individuals who are stigmatised 
actually have an attribute that marks them as different and leads them to be devalued in the eyes 
of others. This classic view of social stigma suggests that the stigmatised individual is born with 
this ‗deeply discrediting attribute‘; for example, all the physically disabled and mentally ill are 
seen through this lens (Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984). On the other hand, other stigma 
scholars acknowledge that stigma is a social construction, but argue that the stigmatised 
individuals are not different from ‗normal‘ people and that they engage in the same life processes 
as ‗normal people‘ (see Crocker et al., 1998). Cumming and Cumming (1965:449–50) note that 
‗whether it is a visible mark or an invisible stain, stigma acquires its meaning through the 
emotion it generates within the person bearing it and the feeling and behaviour toward him of 
those affirming it. These two aspects of stigma are indivisible since they each act as a cause or 
effect of the other.‘ Drawing from sociological and anthropological analyses of the concept (see 
Yang &Kleinman, 2008; Link & Phelan, 2007), this study looks at stigma as being embedded in 
contextual experiences.  
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6.2 Interpreting Stigma in Acholi 
Studies have shown that former child soldiers often experience stigma in their communities (see 
Annan et al., 2007, 2011; Betancourt et al., 2008b; Boothby, 2006; Williamson, 2006). As 
Helen‘s case in Table 6.1shows61, stigmatisation was one of the major problems encountered by 
the participants when they first returned home (see also Mazurana& Carlson, 2004; HRW, 2002, 
2003a, 2003b). More than 80 per cent of them reported still facing stigmatisation in their families 
and communities at the time of interviews. The study does not view formerly abducted 
individuals (the stigmatised) in Acholi as different from the rest of the people in the society. 
Their stigma came as a result of their forced recruitment and stay in captivity. As a result, they 
are persons with a particular moral status in a society where moral standing is determined by the 
local social world. Maintaining this moral status is dependent on meeting social standards, 
obligations and norms. However, because of their association with the LRA (‗people of the 
bush‘), formerly abducted individuals are not fully able to meet these social moral standards. Due 
to their stigma, their ability to establish and hold on to what is important to them, such as their 
social interactions, relationships and marriages, is constrained, hence limiting their life 
opportunities.  
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Table 6.1: Living with Stigma—Helen’s Story 
Thirty six year old Helen was abducted on July 1st, 1990 at about 9:00 am from her parents‘ home in Kitgum district. She 
was 14 years old. After 14 years in captivity, she returned to her parents‘ home in Kitgum. While she faced many challenges 
in her village when she first returned home, like other returnees, stigmatisation was the worst. People abused and stigmatised 
her publically: ‗this made me feel and live like a stranger in my mother‘s house. Life at home became an entirely new thing‘.   
Some people in the village said she had returned as LRA intelligence collaborator spying on their lives and would invoke 
LRA killings in the area. Others accused her for having led LRA fighters to commit atrocities like murdering their family 
members and torching their huts in their village while she was still in the bush. She laboured to explain herself in vain. There 
were farmers‘ groups which she attempted to join but she failed. Because of the amount of stigma she received from the 
village members, she found it difficult to freely interact with them. It took her a long time to begin to move around and 
associate with other people.  
After four years of reintegrating, Helen got married in a neighbouring village. Stigmatization followed her there. Her 
husband had agreed to look after her three daughters that Helen had returned with from captivity. However, people 
cautioned and advised him against taking care of the children, calling them rebels. The husband started getting very negative 
towards the children and Helen took them back to their grandmother (Helen‘s mother). 
In her marital home and village, Helen faces high levels of stigmatisation. Some people say because she was used to hacking 
people to death while in the bush, she is dangerous. Others tell her husband to leave her because he is only keeping a rebel,  
who is not suitable to be a wife. In all social gatherings, in drinking joints and meetings in her village, people keep 
reminding her of her past each time she attends and tries to contribute her opinions to the matter under discussion: ‗I regard 
all this negative treatment as serious insults of my sufferings because I never joined the LRA willingly and it pains me when 
I see it is increasingly spilling over to the children. All this stigmatisation makes me wonder why I even returned home. 
Honestly, if there was a way of returning to the bush so that I could be free from this stigmatisation and harassment, I 
would….‘ Although the children are accommodated at their grandmother‘s home, they are also stigmatised by the family 
members, neighbours and at school. Helen has visited their school to try and discuss with the teachers to protect the children 
against stigma but this has not helped.  Helen‘s daughters are now approaching their teens and are beginning to question why 
they are insulted and stigmatised. They are demanding their mother to show them their ‗real‘ (father‘s) home.  Helen is 
worried about her daughters‘ future and how she will explain their predicament to them.  
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As Helen‘s case demonstrates, formerly abducted persons face resistance in their attempts to 
regain the complete trust and acceptance of the people in their surroundings. Because of their 
association with the rebels they also became, from the perspective of their families and 
communities, ‗people of the bush‘, whatever the circumstances of their recruitment (see also 
Coulter, 2009:209). They are perceived to be dangerous, or feared. They are feared because they 
are from an ‗unknown‘, ‗suspicious‘ and ‗stained‘ background, and people imagine that what 
they did while in captivity can be easily repeated in the community. Inability or unwillingness to 
Contd. 
In her five year marriage, Helen is finding it very difficult to associate with others in her homestead and village: ‗I am very 
unhappy about what people including my husband tell me especially when drunk. He insults me using very bad words that 
keep reminding me of my past. He also tells me of certain annoying things that people tell him. My relationship with my in-
laws is the worst kind of relationship I have ever seen. Some of them are among the people who talk very ill about me and 
sometimes they insult me over no clear reason… I am continuously unhappy and in dilemma.‘ 
When Helen learnt that returnees could find help from the sub county authorities, she sought help to stop people from 
attacking and stigmatising her and the children. This has been in vain however. She first took her case to the village local 
council (government) leader who was reluctant to address the issue. Helen later approached the sub county Amnesty 
International agent/officer. She also sought help from the Community Development Officer. These officers took up her case 
and had some of her stigmatizers arrested.  However, nothing was done about them and they were later released without any 
punishment. This made Helen very frustrated: ‗the challenge remains getting someone who can help me get justice, so that 
those behaving in unkind manners to me are punished. When we [formerly abducted people] report our cases to sub county 
authorities, we do not get justice.‘ With the authorities reluctant to address stigmatisation, Helen is left with limited options: 
‗all I am doing now is to concentrate on things I can do with minimal interaction with others. I isolate myself from those 
abusive people. I no longer attend some of the community gatherings. I prefer to spend my time alone in my home. To 
avoid being a bother to the sub county leaders, I have also stopped visiting them to follow up on my complaints…‘ 
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fully forgive, accept and reintegrate them indicates the social incapability to cope with their past 
experiences (Coulter, 2009:201). Whereas humanitarian workers and researchers may perceive 
former abducted girls (and boys) as innocent victims, their communities nevertheless look at and 
treat them with caution, as potentially dangerous.  
As we have seen from Helen‘s case (Table 6.1) stigma promotion in Acholi is more applied to 
negative stereotypes that are ascribed to the formerly abducted individuals than to their 
association with the LRA itself. In any culture, stereotypes (positive and negative) and 
evaluations are generally widely shared and well known among the inhabitants (Crocker et al., 
1998; Steele, 1997). These stereotypes and evaluations become a basis for excluding members of 
the negatively stereotyped category (Leary &Schreindorfer, 1998; Major &Eccleston, 2004). 
This implies that stigma is manifested when negative stereotyping, discrimination, labeling, 
rejection and exclusion processes unfold (Link & Phelan, 2001). Often, terms like 
discrimination, labelling, rejection and exclusion, among others, are used interchangeably with 
‗stigma‘, but the data and other research suggest that the concept is broader and more inclusive 
than any of the above mentioned processes. The current study contends that, although stigma 
may share features across contexts, it uniquely impacts individuals in local contexts, hence 
understanding such unique social and cultural processes that create stigma should be the focus of 
efforts at addressing stigma.  
While people in Acholi acknowledge that formerly abducted individuals were recruited against 
their will, their stigmatisation derives from their assumed ‗stained‘ and ‗polluted‘ personality 
(possession of cen) and what they did or was done to them while in captivity. As discussed in 
Chapter three, a person‘s ‗pollution‘ arises from being in contact with unresolved murder, 
accidental death or coming across the body of someone who has been killed violently. 
Individuals who were abducted and who are therefore expected to have killed or have seen 
people being killed or passed through areas where murder was committed are believed to be 
‗polluted‘ or ‗haunted‘ by the vengeful spirits of the dead (cen). They are seen as the vehicles 
through which cen might enter the community and are in need of cleansing. Because of her or his 
experience, a former abductee in Acholi is basically seen as someone possessing two 
personalities, a ‗normal‘ and the ‗tainted‘ or ‗polluted‘ self. Benson, a former boy soldier, 
described in a family discussion an incident he had encountered in his village a few weeks before 
136 
 
the interview: ‗recently, the Village Health Team was given bicycles and this caused a saga. The 
community members were saying that one of the guys who got a bicycle was an individual with 
two personalities—a ‗bush‘ and a ‗normal‘ man…‘62 Due to their association with the LRA, 
former abductees are no longer seen as entirely whole individuals, but as persons whose being is 
‗stained‘, ‗confused‘ and ‗mentally unsound‘. Agnes remembers how her sanity was questioned 
when she first returned home after six years in captivity: ‗some people said because I had spent 
six long years in the bush, I could be mentally unstable. It did not go down so well with me 
because I knew I was mentally sound despite the bad things I had gone through while in the 
bush…‘63 As Helen‘s case (Table 6.1) points out, because of their stigma, they are discriminated 
against in village events and projects and are seen as highly unfit to relate with ‗normal‘ people 
in their communities. They are seen as unfit to occupy significant village positions: 
…the never abducted people think and look at us who have returned from the bush as 
senseless. For example in community meetings, if they are electing any leader, they do 
not think we [returnees] have reasonable opinions. Instead they think that in case we are 
angered, we can turn against the people. This is the reason why they don‘t elect us into 
local leadership positions. In such meetings, even if you raise your hand, they will not 
point at you until you go back home…64 
Throughout the field research process, it was apparent that people distrust former abductees and 
this is because of the belief that their stay with the LRA left them ‗contaminated‘. Irrespective of 
gender, age and length of abduction, they are seen as possessing the ‗bush mentality‘—
dangerous, unintelligent, offensive, intolerant, terrible and uncivilised mindset or behaviour. This 
supposed bush mentality is the attribute dictated entirely by their stay in captivity (the ‗bush‘), 
which creates an identity that is devalued and associated almost exclusively with negative 
connotations (‗evil‘, dangerous, possessed, etc.). This kind of attitude is not unique to Acholi; for 
example, in eastern Congo, former girl soldiers are seen as possessing ‗military mentality/spirit‘, 
meaning one can easily get angry or that he or she is affected and possessed by a demon/evil 
spirit (Tonheim, 2012:284; see also Coulter, 2009:216 in Sierra Leone). Hence, stigma 
promotions are the negative reaction(s) that formerly abducted girls (and boys) receive from 
community members because of their military background/experiences. They are stigmatised 
                                                             
62Former male child soldier, Family Member Discussion (FMD03) 
63Interview, CM28, Omiya Anyima, Kitgum, 8/11/2012. 
64Formerly abducted participant in FGD04 with Young Women in Pader. 
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because they are seen as having deviated from the cultural norms of honesty, intelligence, purity, 
wholeness, attractiveness etc.  
The findings suggest that two worlds exist for the former abductees, living side by side as 
separate entities—a ‗bush‘ identity and the ‗normal‘ world of life in the village—and they are 
confined to the ‗bush‘ world. Although they have complete access to the ‗normal‘ world, and 
they live in close physical proximity with other ‗normal‘ people, because of this trait (bush 
experience), they are singled out and labelled ‗different‘, ‗strange‘ or even ‗dangerous‘. 
Commonly, being a former abductee is associated with worthlessness and disgrace, and, as Festo 
remarked in an interview, an abduction past is commonly used as a form of abuse: ‗for example 
if a person wants to describe your bad behaviour/action (s), they say ‗you behave like someone 
who has returned from the bush.‘65 In essence, this bush world does not exist, it is simply a 
negative stereotype associated with the LRA members, and when this association is known to 
others, it blemishes an individual‘s identity by cutting him or her ‗off from the society and from 
herself so that she stands a discredited person facing an un-accepting world‘ (Goffman, 
1960:31).  
According to Dijker and Koomen (2007:6), stigmatisation is ‗the process by which an 
individual‘s or group‘s character or identity is negatively responded on the basis of the 
individual‘s or group‘s association with a past, imagined, or currently present deviant condition, 
often with harmful physical or psychological consequences for the individual or group‘. When 
‗stigmatisation‘ is used in the current study, it means stigma promotion (to negatively portray or 
branding participants as disgraceful), including any off-putting thoughts, feelings, inappropriate 
language or actions intended to constitute defamation or slander of the participants. 
Stigmatisation in this sense targets the formerly abducted individuals because they are seen as 
what Behrend (1999) calls ‗internal strangers‘ in Acholi. In her analysis of the rise of Lakwena‘s 
movement that gave way to the LRA, she notes that when the Acholi ex-soldiers returned home 
after the National Resistance Army took power in 1986, they were believed to have contracted 
cen following their participation in fighting. However, following their refusal to go through 
cleansing ceremonies, they were stigmatised and accused of bringing trouble to Acholi. Their 
failed social reintegration is said to have contributed to the continuation of the war in northern 
                                                             
65Former boy abductee (Male01), interviewed alongside his former captive wife (CM57), Laroo,Gulu 07/02/2013. 
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Uganda (see Chapter 2). This is similar to the LRA returnees, who are also believed to have 
contracted the potentially deadly cen, and their abduction past not only stands in the way of their 
complete integration (as ‗normal‘ Acholi persons), it is a foundation of the wall dividing them 
from the non-abductees. Their acquaintances use inappropriate language which is stigma 
promoting, including, ‗stupid‘, ‗rebel‘, ‗bush behaviour‘, ‗mentally unstable‘ and ‗evil spirit 
possessed‘, among others (see also Carlson &Mazurana, 2004:8; Burman& McKay, 2007). Such 
a negative language that exhibits varieties of discrimination aims at explaining the stigmatised 
person‘s state of ‗differentness‘ or to account for the danger he or she represents and, effectively, 
often subconsciously reduces an individual‘s life opportunities. 
As we saw with Helen‘s (Table 6.1) experience, stigma promotion in Acholi extends to children 
born in captivity as well (see also Mazurana& Carlson, 2008; Coulter, 2009:232; Ndossi, 
2010:134). ‗Name-calling‘ for children was reported in the interviews to be common in the 
family and wider community. Most mothers who lived with their children in new marriages 
reported stigmatisation from step-fathers, in-laws and people in the surrounding settings. In 
families and communities, boys and girls are stereotyped differently with respect to name-calling 
and abuse. Boy children are, for example, commonly referred to by their ‗LRA‘ fathers‘ names 
even if their mothers changed their names upon return. Because their fathers are/were rebels, the 
children (particularly the boys) are seen as having inherited their fathers‘ negative behaviour. 
The boys are more prone to remarks of ‗uselessness‘: ‗people really stigmatise my child a lot 
saying his father is a rebel and he will have no use to the community in the future…‘66 ‗I 
abandoned my marriage after only 8 months there because I could not stand stigmatisation. 
People said that if my boys [born in captivity] grow up, with the bush mentality inherited from 
their father, they will break the man‘s home...‘67 Girls are linked to their mothers‘ perceived 
weak points when they (girls) are short of favour—which occurs frequently in comparison to 
other categories of children. Step-fathers were reported to model insulting words for these 
children on their mothers; words like ‗stupid‘, ‗senseless‘, ‗bush mentality/behaviour‘ were 
commonly applied to both mother and girls. In other cases, whereas the child‘s extended family 
treats him or her with love and care, stigmatisation was expressed by neighbours, peers at school 
and in the playground, or other community members.  
                                                             
66 Interview, CM9, AmidaSub County. 
67Interview CM 35, Kitgum town. 
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Such findings imply that when girls return home with children fathered by the rebels, because the 
father is unknown and/or an enemy, the girls‘ stigma becomes greater. Also, because children are 
commonly viewed with contempt and as potential rebels of tomorrow, even if the girls are 
welcomed and accepted back in their families, nevertheless, as long as their children are resented 
and stigmatised, this still affects the mothers‘ wellbeing and relationships with their families and 
communities (McKay &Mazurana, 2004:53). This kind of stigma promotion not only acts as a 
barrier to long term reintegration, it also increases the individual‘s daily emotional distress by 
generating a sense of guilt that triggers feelings of helplessness, loneliness and depression. The 
fact that mothers cannot protect their children from stigma creates further emotional distress. 
This consequence of stigma is destructive to their psychological recovery, as it reminds them of 
the life they lived and desperately want to forget. Due to widespread stigmatisation, such young 
women (and their children) are unable to build confidence, self-esteem and trust in their 
interactions and relationships in the community, hence hindering their social reintegration. 
The negative perception towards this category of youth comes from four assumptions:  
1) They were accustomed to violence and looting in the LRA and are still capable of such 
wrongdoing back in the community. Two illustrations may be cited: ‗suppose a thief is 
arrested and taken to the local councils, you will hear people asking themselves that, 
―hasn‘t that person [thief] been in the bush?‖ These generalizations pain and affect us 
[former abductees] who are innocent because we are all equated to wrongdoing‘ 68 ; 
‗people say we [abductees] are insane, crazy and are capable of doing any bad things to 
people in the community…‘ 69  Generally, people seem to be sceptical of former 
abductees, and they are often the first to be accused when something bad or unhelpful 
occurs in the community. Such accusations, where public wrongdoing is often attributed 
to them, are stigma promoting. Similar perceptions have been commonly reported in 
other African post-conflict settings (for examples, see Carames et al., 2006; Coulter, 
2009:215–16; Jennings, 2007; Tonheim, 2012:283; Avin, 2007:22).  
2) All abducted girls were gang raped and possibly have HIV/Aids. Also, that they violated 
the traditional norms by engaging in sex and bearing children outside culturally 
                                                             
68Former male child soldier, FMD03. 
69Interview, CM7. 
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recognised marriages (see also McKay &Mazurana, 2004; McKay, 2005; Coulter, 
2009:216). This is explained further later on, under deviation stigma. 
3) All former abductees participated in killings, leaving them contaminated with evil spirits 
of the dead (cen). Due to this contamination, when possessed, they can be harmful and 
unknowingly wreak havoc in their families and community. Seen as carriers of 
cen(‗vengeful spirit‘), they should be avoided so that the evil spirits do not attack, kill or 
transfer to the ‗normal‘ individuals. As Abalo‘s circumstances show, this negative 
attitude comes to life when the women make ‗mistakes‘ or if they pick a quarrel with 
other people: ‗in any misunderstanding, people still insult me that I should not kill them 
with my rebel vengeful spirit‘.70 
4) They were used to killing and hurting people while in captivity and are still capable of 
striking and being destructive if things do not go their way. This particularly affects the 
females‘ attempt to get married. In his anthropological study on northern Uganda, 
Finnstrom (2008:191) writes that ‗many of my young male informants in Gulu town 
claimed that former rebel girls are morally compromised, thus dangerous, and not 
suitable marriage partners.‘ One of his participants in a group of elderly men remarked 
that ‗she [abductee] can even kill you while you are asleep.‘ There is a lingering 
suspicion that such women can do something bad without thinking.  
Although both males and females face stigmatisation, it remains severe for the females. A survey 
in northern Uganda found that formerly abducted females were at least twice as likely to report 
persistent family and community problems as males (Annan et al., 2011:18). Finnstrom 
(2008:193) also found that ‗in deeper sense, however, girls are also more often held to be impure 
sexually and thus morally more dubious, even more dangerous, than boys‘ (see also Angulo, 
2000). Due to their perceived contaminated background (spiritually unclean), especially their 
children born in captivity, former girl soldiers face a greater stigma. They are seen as 
unmarriageable with an ability to introduce misfortunes and illness to their marital homes (this is 
discussed further in Chapter Seven).  
                                                             
70Interview, CM21. 
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6.3 Physical and Deviation Stigma 
The data reveal two kinds of stigma among the formerly abducted persons. These are similar to 
the types that Goffman (1960:14) identified particularly the physical deformities and deviation 
stigma. To conceptualise the term further, he (ibid: 14) reveals two perspectives of the types of 
stigma: discredited and discreditable. Discredited perspective describes an individual who 
‗assumes his differentness [stigma] is known about already or evident on the spot‘, while 
discreditable is used to describe an individual who ‗assumes it [stigma] is neither known about 
by those present nor immediately perceivable by them‘. With the known record of having been 
part of the LRA, the above types and perspectives of stigma are of great importance in the stigma 
analysis in Acholi. The physical and deviation in personal qualities are particularly used to 
explore the forms of stigma in relation to the participants. 
6.3.1 Physical Stigma 
Evidence has shown that child soldiers suffer all manner of physical injuries, and some have 
become handicapped with visible scars that cannot be healed (see Cohn & Goodwin-Gill, 1994). 
Basically, this leaves the former abductees with an extra stigma that is physical in nature 
(external deformations; scars and physical disability) that tends to be discredited rather than 
discreditable. Due to their observable scars or being physically handicapped, they cannot keep 
information about their stigma secret. Since people can straightforwardly identify the physical 
stigma, it can easily be used to attack the individual. Susan‘s condition illustrates this point: 
‗insults that target my injured body like, ‗your leg is half‘, or ‗your damaged face‘, are painful. 
Mentioning these affects the way I relate with such persons.‘71 Although such comments from 
the public could be innocent descriptions of an individual, if connected to the person‘s past (how 
she got the scars), the appearance becomes a source of questions and stigmatisation. An 
individual who is ‗…fully and visibly stigmatised, in turn, must suffer the special indignity of 
knowing that they wear their situation on their sleeve, that almost anyone will be able to see into 
the heart of their predicament‘ (Goffman, 1963:152). From Susan‘s circumstances, we also 
identify internal/self-stigmatisation among formerly abducted individuals. Any description of 
their appearance (innocent or not) is received with resentment and through a stigmatisation lens. 
This causes unnecessary tension between an individual and people around him or her.  
                                                             
71Interview, CM30. 
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6.3.2 Deviation Stigma 
Due to their association with the ‗people of the bush‘/a criminal group (LRA), illicit sexual 
intercourse and motherhood before marriage, all former girl abductees fall under this type of 
stigma. As we shall see in Chapter Seven, a girl giving birth without being legally married runs 
contrary to Acholi tradition and is perceived as a threat to the institution of marriage. When the 
abducted girls engaged in early marriage and pregnancy, either voluntarily or not, they deviated 
in personal qualities and are seen as damaged young women. There is an abiding assumption that 
girls were repeatedly raped by different men (gang rape) while in captivity and possibly are 
infected with HIV/Aids and other sexually transmitted diseases. Comments like ‗do you know 
how many men slept with/used that one?‘ are common among the male youth: ‗suppose people 
hear that a certain man is dating you, they will start scaring him by asking him questions like, 
―this woman who returned from the bush, don‘t you think she is infected with HIV/AIDS72, 
knowing how in the bush there, the LRA were roaming with them [abducted girls] just 
anyhow?‖73 Such quotations indicate the perception that they were willing wives of the rebels or 
simply gang rape victims (see also Stavrou et al., 2000:16). However, as was seen in their stories 
of abduction (Chapter 5), this was not the case with the LRA, where gang rapes were not 
reported in the interviews. The girls and women were instead attached to one man until he died 
on the battlefield or of natural causes and then were transferred to another man. That explains 
why the spread of sexually transmitted diseases remained low in the LRA and the fact that all the 
child mothers know the men that fathered their children.  
The roles the abducted girls undertook while in captivity, and how the marriages and child 
rearing policies were negotiated, are not well known in the community. The shock and wonder 
Kenneth and Diana (research assistants) expressed when we first started interviewing the women 
was revealing. Although they had heard abduction and life in captivity stories in the media and 
through neighbours, friends and previous research projects they had worked on, they had never 
encountered such detailed female narrations of life in captivity. Each story challenged their 
attitude to and understanding of the women‘s ‗bush‘ experiences. These two Acholi youth are 
                                                             
72 This perception and ill treatment is often directed at already married rape victims where they are either rejected by 
their husbands, other family members or lose support from spouses. Men fear that their raped wives could have been 
infected with the HIV virus (Human Rights Watch, 2005:34; Isis-WICCE, 2001:46). 
 
73Interview, CM30, Kitgum town. 
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not alone; a single argument of sexually violated girl abductees persists not only in the literature 
but among the people of Acholi region. In general terms, former abductees (female and male) are 
simply called olum-olum, but on the basis of their assumed gender roles while in captivity, 
former boy abductees are commonly referred to as ‗Kony soldiers‘ and the females, ‗Kony 
wives‘ (victims of gang rape). Adopting this thought pattern (negative stereotype about the 
female experience in captivity) has left the former girl abductees‘ identity compromised. From 
this perspective, their stigma as arises from the relationship between the attribute of abduction 
and the negative stereotype of what could have happened to them while in captivity. Hence, their 
stigma goes beyond being part of the rebel group and is further linked to the undesirable 
characteristic of their past. The acquired stigma of being a former abductee, coupled with 
resentment and discrimination in the communities, makes the women feel as though they have 
indeed transformed from a whole person to someone seen by others as substandard and 
unworthy.  
A report by Save the Children noted of girls who participate in armed groups that ‗if a girl has 
had sexual contact with a man outside marriage—voluntarily or not—she is considered to no 
longer have value to the society‘ (2005b:12). The current findings do not, however, entirely 
support this analysis. It is evident that the rape, forced marriage and child bearing strategies 
employed by the LRA to repress and control girls not only created terror, but also damaged the 
girls‘ deepest values that any woman depends on in Acholiand. People are aware that many of 
the girls were abducted when they were still virgins and also recognise that they were sexually 
violated by the rebels. Although seen as ‗spoilt/damaged‘ goods, formerly abducted girls are not 
ostracised or publically blamed for the loss of their virginity. Also, it was not reported or sensed 
in the interviews that people viewed the women as completely useless to their families and 
community. They are still considered helpful, with some financially supporting their families 
(Chapter Eight). Having returned to their communities emotionally stressed, many are 
considerably regaining their self-confidence and self-esteem and becoming more helpful in their 
communities. 
Back to their stigma, under normal circumstances, the women‘s deviation stigma should be more 
likely to be discreditable than discredited. However, considering that they live in settings where 
everyone knows his or her neighbours and their backgrounds, their stigma is common knowledge 
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and difficult to conceal. Hobson (2005) writes that ‗girl soldiers often feel the need to conceal 
their identities and blend into their surroundings due to fears of community retaliation or 
becoming ostracized.‘ However, in Acholi, it was extremely difficult for former girl abductees to 
simply blend in upon return. Actually, for any former abductee to have sneaked into the camps or 
villages and gone unnoticed was not possible. Because whenever children and adults were 
abducted, their families did not keep it as a secret. Villagers knew whose 
daughter/son/husband/wife had been recruited, and who had returned or was still missing. For 
those who returned with children, concealing their identities was not an option because the 
presence of their children made it impossible to deny their LRA experiences.  
In Acholi contexts (where returnees, particularly in the villages, are known and easily 
identifiable by neighbours and friends), the individuals and their stigmatisers are not strangers or 
coming into contact for the first time, but acquaintances and intimates. However, in such 
settings, some individuals can still control information regarding their stigma. Although they 
often share the depth of their abduction experiences with other people like family members and 
close friends, findings suggest that some are not prepared to narrate their life ordeals to their 
acquaintances. On the one hand, this can be attributed to shame (internal stigma), worry of being 
heavily stigmatised or inability to respond to stigma promotion. Benson‘s experience is helpful 
in explaining this point: ‗if any one asked me about my abduction experience, I could bend my 
head down. Because of shame, I did not like to talk about it … many times I could keep quiet or 
leave the place but this would still affect me. My mood would change as soon as I heard people 
talking about us [former abductees].‘74 On the salient issues for formerly abducted youth in 
northern Uganda, Annan et al. (2009:650) write that, ‗when youth experienced problems with 
neighbours or other community members, most of them described reacting passively–staying 
silent or walking away.‘ In Gulu town, 29-year-old Janet, abducted at the age of 16 for six years, 
returned with two children. While seeking her consent to participate in the study, she said to this 
author in English, ‗...my sister, I cannot tell you everything that happened to me while in 
captivity, it is very hard.‘ Then she asked to look at the interview questions, and with a fading 
smile, she said, ‗…the questions are moderate‘ and granted me an interview. It was difficult to 
comprehend what she meant by ‗hard‘: did she consider her experience too sensitive and 
                                                             
74 Former male child soldier, family discussion (FMD02), Kitgum, 12/10/2012. 
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unexplainable, was she ashamed of it or some of it, or did she simply not want (or know how) to 
tell it in detail? The reluctance to disclose what they did or was done to them in captivity can be 
interpreted as controlling the information on their stigmatising past (which is considered 
sensitive and private), confining it to their thoughts or behaviour consciously and 
subconsciously. Sharing as little as possible helps them avoid further stigmatisation from family 
and community members (we return to this later on).   
It is possible that formerly abducted people do not simply want to be reminded of their past, or 
they are genuinely unable to articulate their experiences. However, considering that many 
women in the sample said that one proactive way of coping with or overcoming stigmatisation 
was to freely interact with community members, controlling information regarding their 
experiences or shying away when confronted works against this strategy. But again, through 
their close relations, some are encouraged or persuaded to confess their captivity experiences. 
The former abductees feel the need to confess to their families and friends the extent of their 
involvement with the LRA in the hope for acceptance, sympathy or the right cleansing rituals. In 
addition, before they commit themselves in a sexual relationship, they have to reveal their real 
identity to potential partners because, considering the nature of their communities (particularly 
villages), it is difficult for a man to intimately relate with a woman without learning about her 
background. So it is better if it comes from the woman and not the public. In return, the partners 
want to know more about what the women did or was done to them while in abduction, hence 
revealing in-depth information about their past (this partly explains why stigmatisation is higher  
in marriages, see Chapter Seven).  
Nevertheless, based on how much of their experience they confess, there may be a difference in 
the way former abductees are stigmatised in the community. For example if one confesses to 
having killed while in abduction, he or she will definitely be seen as having deviated from 
personal quality and being a confirmed carrier of cen. On the other hand, if one limits the 
atrocity information, this leaves people in suspense regarding what that person may or may not 
have done while in captivity. In the latter scenario, the individual is able to limit the information 
on his/her deviation stigma, and it becomes internal stigma, which can also be a powerful 
survival method. It protects a person from being targeted for stigmatisation, and she or he is left 
to cope with the generalised stigma of ‗being a former abductee.‘ Since not telling people the 
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truth is not the same as denying being a former abductee, individuals rely on this strategy to 
silence their critics. When people call them ‗rebels‘, some confidently reply by saying ‗it was not 
their choice to be abducted or stay in abduction for a long time‘. They do not say they were never 
part of the LRA.  
Furthermore, individuals relocate to new environments, for example moving to towns where they 
are not stigmatised (see also Carames et al., 2006). When this happens, individuals are able to 
control their stigma and pass as non-abductees (‗normal‘ people). An illustration may be cited. 
Florence and her husband Festo (both former abductees) left their villages and relocated to the 
outskirts of Gulu town, where their past is unknown. Because people do not know their true 
identity (former abductees), their military background is discreditable. Although Festo lost one 
of his legs to a land mine while in captivity, and he has to cope with the physical stigma like any 
other disabled person, his abduction past remains discreditable (unknown), ‗…I like sitting 
where men are gathered. I hear many bad comments about us [former abductees]…For example, 
you hear people saying, ―so and so behaves as if she or he is from the bush‖ … every time I go to 
where people are gathered, I must hear this comment … that tells me that we are still stigmatised 
and discriminated…‘75 Aware that their experiences are not valued and they are expected to 
adopt the values of the community, it is a conscious decision for such individuals not to reveal 
their past in their new environments because of fear of driving people away from them.  
Anonymity as a coping mechanism has been, in most cases, attached to female soldiers who 
chose ‗spontaneous reintegration‘—those who found their own way back to their villages, 
perhaps moving in with family members, friends, or sympathetic adults, and going on to keep 
low profiles (see Burman& McKay, 2007; McKay, 2006:100; McKay &Mazurana, 2004:25). 
However, findings in Acholi indicate that, for different reasons including stigmatisation, even 
women who are ‗formally‘ reintegrated in their communities of origin can relocate to new places 
where they can practise this secrecy coping method. Secrecy is a common strategy to deal with 
stigmatisation because it safeguards the individuals from resentment and discrimination. Under 
secrecy, the person is seen as a valued member of the community and this helps him or her to 
establish interpersonal relationships and evade betrayal. For example, Festo, with his abduction 
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past not assumed right away by people he meets in his new environment, is able to break the 
socio-cultural barrier to be among other men.  
However, according to Goffman (1963:86), ‗…there is hardly such a thing as complete 
anonymity regarding social identity. It may be added that every time an individual joins an 
organization or community, there is a marked change in the structure of knowledge about him –a 
distribution and character–and hence a change in the contingencies of information control.‘ 
Former abductees who relocate to new environments or do not give a full account of their 
abduction must face having formed some acquaintances while in captivity that they may have to 
meet in the community. For instance, if Festo meets one of his former abductee acquaintances in 
town or in his male gatherings, they will probably greet each other. This gives people (third 
parties) a chance to inquire and discover how the two know each other. Thus, the third parties 
may get to know of his deviant stigma. Therefore, Festo and others must face the fear of some 
people knowing about their past and identifying them as returnees, without them (Festo and 
others) knowing that such people exist and know. However, without such scenarios, Florence, 
Festo and the other six women in the sample who relocated to towns where their neighbours and 
friends have no idea of their past live free of negative perceptions. They instead concentrate on 
managing the information about their stigmatic attributes so that they are not exposed and 
rejected. They must live in secrecy and in paranoia of their true identity being revealed as one of 
them expressed, over and over at the end of our interview: ‗you [interview team] should not tell 
the community members that we were abducted because they will start talking about us for 
example, for me, I have never told anybody that I am from the bush.‘ 76  This shows how 
resentment from people is too painful for them to face. 
One may wonder why many more of these women do not leave their stigmatising villages for 
new environments where their past is unknown. But as we saw earlier, in Acholi, for somebody 
to belong, be recognised and possess a defined social identity, connections and the views of other 
people carry vast influence (Chapter Four). A formerly abducted individual becomes complete 
and useful when embraced by the appropriate social relationship, including family and kinship. 
The formerly abducted (and other) women with no education or training to support their 
independent lives have to rely on this interdependence construct to survive. For many of 
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formerly abducted girls, marriage seems like the only viable option to leave their villages, but 
this is still limited, because many of them end up marrying men in their immediate and social 
settings who already know their past. Staying in their villages or areas where their past is 
common knowledge means to face, every day, those who know their past and thus constant 
stigmatisation.  
6.4 ‘You coming here to take my story has again upset my neighbours’: Sympathising with 
the Stigmatised 
The first category of ‗sympathetic others‘ are those who share an individual‘s stigma (Goffman, 
1963:31). The findings reveal that the former abductees rely on their fellow abductees to cope 
with the stigma and other challenges of reintegration (see also Bines, 2008). This was apparent in 
the initial days of their reintegration where former abductees who had already become used to 
the community advised the new returning abductees on how to cope with the stigmatisation and 
general life back home. Prossy‘s experience is illustrative:  
There was a girl who had returned from the bush before me, she gave me advice of not 
being alone, so as to avoid thoughts of what I had been through. She also encouraged me 
to keep attending church and get to know God. I liked to stay among my fellow former 
abductees.77 
Knowing from their experience what it is like to have this particular stigma, some of the girls 
provide their peers with advice and techniques of drawing moral support from surrounding 
people—for example, how to behave, who to associate with and how to respond to 
stigmatisation. This set of ‗sympathetic others‘ also offers acceptance, the comfort of feeling at 
ease, just like a ‗normal‘ person.  
While formerly abducted girls in the same village can easily identify and relate with each other, 
this remains on an individual basis. Groups pioneered by the former abductees in Acholi remain 
low. In the current sample, only one participant, Prossy in Gulu (see Table. 8.1, Chapter Eight), 
had founded Rubanga Aye Twero (meaning ‗God is Able‘), a group for formerly abducted child 
mothers. Prossy informed the study that members often meet to discuss and advise each other on 
the daily life issues: ‗I feel good about our group. It is good to be in a group. In a group, you 
share ideas. When you have problems, you can be helped easily. If a problem comes to one of 
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the members, as a group, you will have the capacity to support that person faster.‘78 Although 
many women in the sample are part of the general village saving or agricultural groups along 
with non-abductees, joining groups formed by their fellow abductees, their own kind, suffering 
similar stigma may be ideal and considered real ‗groups‘ for them.  
Unlike in the public eye, where they are seen as ‗mentally unstable‘, with bush behaviour and as 
only helpless victims who are unable to express themselves, in a group of fellow former 
abductees, they are accepted, loyal to one another and can talk genuinely about their stigma and 
general life struggles. In such groups, they do not have to cover up their stigma or hold 
back/pretend so that they are accommodated by others. Like Prossy, they are expressive, 
understanding and advisers to each other on economic and social issues within their own group. 
Being part of the group helps them to recognise more ways in which they are stigmatised and 
how to respond to different kinds of stigma. Although the study did not establish how often the 
participants in villages or towns talk to each other (or how the community perceived this), it is 
deduced that such relationships develop between women with similar past experience and is 
evidence of them exhibiting agency. 
However, while being part of a group is useful, some of them, due to shame and fear of being re-
stigmatised in the community, may not desire to join or be part of groups for former abductees. It 
is also possible that women who think they have a better standard of living (level of education, 
earning some money or simply living in towns) may not wish to associate closely with their 
formerly abducted peers who are worse off. However, this assumption may be contrary to 
Prossy‘s case because, of all the participants, she is the most economically ‗successful‘ with a 
stable tailoring job in Gulu (see Table 8.1, Chapter Eight). Although she is not educated, having 
served as a corporal in the LRA for years left her equipped and confident with leadership skills 
that enable her to manage a group and be a source of counsel to other young women. 
The second set of ‗sympathetic others‘ are people who are ‗normal‘ but, because of their special 
situation, are able to be intimately close to the secret life of the stigmatised. With such wise 
persons, the stigmatised do not need to feel ashamed nor pretend, because they are aware that in 
spite of their past/experience, they will simply be seen as an ordinary other. They do not need to 
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exert self-control or cover up their stigma as they interact with the sympathetic others (Goffman, 
1960:40–43). These can be of two types: the first is a person whose experience comes from 
working in an organisation which caters for the well-being of the stigmatised. In reference to the 
former abductees, this can be a person working closely with the reintegration centers or NGOs 
that advocate for the well-being of former abductees in Uganda. For example, Christopher, 
KICWA‘s project manager, being a former abductee himself, relates to and sympathises with the 
stigma of other former child abductees. Similarly, some of the other staff members at the 
reception centres have siblings, clan members and friends with abduction past or who are still 
missing or assumed dead in captivity. With this background, they are in a position to sympathise 
and reach out to the formerly abducted individuals.  
Also, because formerly abducted boys and girls are aware that the staff at reintegration centres 
like KICWA understand and are supportive of them, for different reasons, some of them drop in 
at the organisation‘s office or approach their staff while in the field. Although they are back in 
the community, there is still an ongoing relationship between them and the reintegration 
agencies. The community is also aware of this special relationship and sympathy: ‗when 
reintegration agency vehicles like KICWA or Amnesty are passing through the villages, 
community members tell us [the formerly abducted] that ―there is your vehicle passing‖‘.79 As a 
consequence, this relationship and projects targeting formerly abducted individuals re-stigmatise 
them. The community becomes jealous and resentful towards them because they are seen as 
benefitting from their stigma. Their friends respond unsympathetically, insensitively and at times 
harshly to their struggles to survive and improve their lives: 
If they see any NGOs come looking for those who returned from the bush, they will say 
we have enjoyed a lot for having been in the bush, that the rebels should have abducted 
all people since we are enjoying our abduction. Now that you are meeting us and taking 
our stories, people think you came with money to give us. People look at us with hatred.80 
As we saw with Helen‘s experience shows (Table, 601), the other kind of ‗normal‘ sympathiser 
is the individual who is biologically related to a stigmatised individual, e.g. a parent or sibling. 
Because of the shared relationship, the wider society tends to treat both individuals (returnee and 
parent or sibling) in some respects as one. Therefore, these sympathisers are obliged to share 
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their daughter‘s or sister‘s stigma. They embrace this fate and go to support and live within the 
world of the stigmatised person to whom they are related. Some of the participants have the 
support of their families who take care of their children as they embark on their reintegration. In 
this way, they are supported, defended, sympathised with and share their stigma burden with 
family members:  
When I returned to my village, my elder brother was constantly being insulted because of 
my presence at home. I was also scared of the people. Because of people‘s attitude, he 
worried that they would harm me and he asked me to go live with my aunt in Kitgum 
town and maybe one day by God‘s grace, if I get my own place, I will be happy and safe 
there.81 
Although the evidence demonstrates how stigma is sympathised with and shared at the family 
level, it should not be assumed that all of the biological families express sympathy towards the 
abductees‘ stigma. Those with troubled family relationships in particular are shunned, insulted, 
rejected and intentionally or unintentionally stigmatised by their own family members. For those 
who are intentionally stigmatised, their experience ranges from snubs or adverse comments to 
rejection. When people are drunk or during family misunderstandings, the individuals are 
unintentionally stigmatised instead of being sympathised with. The experience of the eldest 
participant in the sample, abducted in her thirties for nine years, is illustrative: 
I live with my old husband. He disturbs me when he is drunk that I should go back to my 
bush husband. He calls me a rebel. My son does the same when drunk. But my daughters 
support and do not stigmatise me. They respect me. Some of my in-laws also call me a 
rebel; and not mentally stable. This usually happens when we have a quarrel or some time 
when drunk. My family talking about my bush experience really hurts me. Even in the 
wider community, there is stigmatisation in this area. People say I am from the bush and 
not mentally sound.82 
Compared to the marital/conjugal home (stigmatisation as an obstacle to marriage is discussed in 
Chapter Seven) and wider community, stigmatisation in biological families (parents and siblings) 
remains low. Neighbours and friends resent and publically stigmatise the formerly abducted 
individuals. Twenty-four-year-old Irene‘s recollection of how she was rejected by some of her 
neighbours when she first returned to her community after three years with the LRA explains this 
point: ‗people in my village made it really hard to live with them again. Some women told me 
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not to associate with their family members, saying I could kill their children just like how I had 
been killing people in the bush. Such accusations pained me because I knew I could not hurt 
anybody.‘83 It is not clear who among community members stigmatises the formerly abducted 
more—contemporaries or older people, males or females. One would imagine the elderly, 
particularly females, sympathise with the formerly abducted more, but this is not the case. 
Formerly abducted girls are harassed by their peers as well as the older women in their 
surroundings (see also Acholi Religious Leaders‘ Peace Initiatives-ARLPI, 2002:19).  
6.5 Stigmatisation as Hindrance to Reintegration 
As discussed in this chapter, stigma in Acholi is manifested when discrimination, envy, labelling, 
rejection, exclusion and negative stereotyping processes unfold. Although stigmatisation was 
intense in the initial years of reintegration, even after a number of years being home, it continues 
to hinder the former girl soldiers‘ lives and social reintegration. Studies have shown that stigma 
affects social interactions (Harris et al., 1992; Lennon et al., 1989), self-esteem, and depression 
(Link, 1987). Stigmatisation also contributes to fewer positive opportunities and less access to 
protective resources such as community and sometimes family support (Link & Phelan, 2001, 
2006). Studies also illustrate a risk for poor mental health outcomes among former child soldiers 
(see Derluynet al., 2004; Singer, 2005:194; Wessells, 2006; Kohnt et al.,2008; Pfeiffer & Elbert, 
2011; Bayer et al., 2007), indicating that long-term psychosocial adjustment is influenced not 
only by past war experiences, but also by post-conflict factors like scarcity, vulnerability of their 
children, stigma process (discrimination and rejection), economic hardship and bleak future 
outlook, among others (see Horn, 2013:17).  
Although stigmatisation reduces with time, some years after reintegrating, the participants are yet 
to completely overcome this hindrance. Most of them have been home for 6 to 10 years, but as  
Helen‘s case signifies (Table 6.1), they still face widespread stigmatisation, hindering their 
capacity to effectively relate with other people and engage in community activities (see also 
Gulu Support the Children Organization-GUSCO, 2010:17; Annan et al., 2006). As already 
mentioned, because they are considered to be lacking discipline, or seen as violent and 
destructive people who cannot be trusted (even when there is no evidence to suggest so), the 
community marginalizes or simply overlooks the formerly abducted individuals. 
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Also, as Helen‘s experience shows (Table 6.1), formerly abducted individuals feel a need to 
avoid engaging in community activities because they fear being stigmatised. Listening to 
negative responses being repeated over and over again strains their relationship with others, 
making them continuously unhappy and lowering their self-esteem. Because they are aware of 
their personal and social circumstances, they are keenly conscious when they are stigmatised in 
speech and action. Being branded with stigmatising labels like ‗rebel‘ ‗bush 
behaviour/mentality‘, ‗mentally unstable,‘ or ‗evil spirit possessed‘, among others, along with 
finger-pointing and accusations, inflicts so much pain on them that, although they are not 
physically rejected and driven out of their villages, they are not fully accepted by others. This 
experience limits their participation in community activities that are meant to support their 
reintegration.  
The literature considers acceptance at family and community levels as an important factor for 
successful reintegration. Complete acceptance and being free from stigmatisation was also 
described as an indicator of successful social reintegration in the interviews. Helen emphasised 
that, ‗when a returnee is living a happy, normal life and people are kind to him/her, no longer 
experiences any form of stigma, that person will confidently say, ―I have successfully 
reintegrated‖. But how can he/she say that when everyday people are rude, insulting and 
mocking him/her for no good reason? ...‘84 Living peacefully with others, without people being 
unkind to them, they would then describe themselves as free and peaceful, with positive 
reintegration. However, as long as they are still greeted with rudeness and resentment on a daily 
basis, having a peaceful mindset, which is a pre-condition for a total healing process from all the 
sufferings endured while in captivity, remains unachievable. Instead, unkindness and stigma 
promotion rekindle the bad war memories for them. If the community members could be more 
kind and peaceful, this would facilitate their healing, forgetfulness of the past and progressive 
reintegration. The community is often expected to bring in (expose) the civil alternative to 
military life, but this can only be done through accepting and pardoning former child soldiers and 
not stigmatising them. According to the participants in FGDs, successful reintegration will 
happen only when formerly abducted persons stop paying much attention to stigmatization. They 
implied that returnees will always be stigmatized but how they react to it will determine how 
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well their social reintegration is progressing. One of them concluded this argument with the 
following remark. 
…the way they [returnees] react when they are stigmatized will show if they are fitting 
well in the community or not. If they take [stigmatizing] comments lightly, it will show 
they are changing attitudes and moving on well. I remember in the days when they had 
just returned from the bush, they reacted with extreme violence. Some used to move 
around with panga or knife [machete] and if you stigmatized them, they would physically 
attack you. This is changing and it shows they are moving away from their bush 
mentality….85 
People cannot afford to continue living in the past, using formerly abducted individuals as 
scapegoats: ‗the important thing that I want to tell you in this meeting [interview] is that, it was 
not our [formerly abducted persons] choice to be abducted. People behave as if they don‘t know 
that. The government should sensitize people in the communities so that they stop stigmatizing 
us…‘86There is great need for people living with such individuals to avoid stigma promotion and 
instead encourage direct positive thoughts and friendly attitudes toward them. Currently, the 
relationships between them and the community is one way where the former abductees live 
cautiously and on guard so that their reactions and actions are accepted by their friends and 
neighbours. Anger, aggressive or simply expressive behaviour can easily be interpreted as signs 
of ‗bush behaviour‘. They are cautious and concerned about how their responses to 
stigmatisation will be judged. Interviews also show that former abductees in a sense help to 
maintain the wall that divides them from other people. Due to their suspicion that a non-abductee 
will always see them as ‗evil‘, ‗disgraceful‘ and ‗inferior‘, they often seem to look out for 
evidence that will confirm this mistrust. In some cases, because of fear of being hated and 
stigmatized, formerly abducted people find themselves building walls that separate them from 
other people:  
…there are some neighbours who talk to me but I know they are not happy I returned 
home. For example, there is one family whose child was abducted after me but was later 
shot by the UPDF.  The Mother and the other family members got the report of their 
son‘s death, way before I returned home.  When I came back home, the mother and other 
people again began asking me if indeed their son had died in captivity. I confirmed with 
them that he had died. I feel they do not like the fact that I returned home safe and their 
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son did not. I am very cautious with that family and other people in this village; I don‘t 
mingle a lot with them.87 
As already noted in this chapter, to respond to stigmatisation, some of them simply ignore their 
stigmatisers. They often react meekly rather than aggressively and avoid confrontations (see also 
Annan et al., 2011:25; Annan et al., 2009). Few said that when it gets worse and they fear for 
their lives or being judged for exercising their ‗bush mentality‘, they simply report their 
stigmatisers to local authorities rather than standing up to them: ‗I am a peaceful person. If 
someone tries to provoke me with insults, asking for a fight or quarrel, I keep quiet or will 
simply go to the local leader so that the community does not say that I am offensive because I 
was in the bush, and I have the bush mentality‘88—thus, a 28-year-old Akumu abducted at the 
age of 9 for nine years explained this vulnerable position that many of the returnees find 
themselves in. But as we have seen from Helen‘s experience (Table, 6.1), reporting their 
stigmatizers to the local authorities does not help address their predicament either.  
Many participants said silence was the best way to respond to stigmatisation; however, silence as 
a coping method can also be easily misunderstood by people around them. As Beatrice‘s 
circumstances demonstrate, silence exposes someone to more dilemma and torment: ‗at times I 
just sit here [at the door step] in silence. Then my neighbours will start saying that, ‗now the cen 
has come upon her; she might harm people‘, yet I am even thinking about something different 
from what they are talking about.‘89 Although silence may be naturally associated with calmness 
and peace of mind, in reference to abductees, it can be also interpreted by others as being 
mentally disturbed or harbouring evil spirits. Beatrice‘s circumstances illustrate that retreating 
into silence cannot protect this category of women either. Apart from silence, as the case for 
Helen (Table, 6.1), some of them still seek solace in isolation as a means to escape being 
stigmatised. Confined to their families, they stay away from communal gatherings or events that 
will bring them close to other people. For example, 20-year-old Aciro, ten years in abduction, 
relies on isolation to cope with stigma. She only leaves her father‘s compound on Sundays for 
prayers. To avoid mixing with people who know her past, she does not attend the village church, 
but walks for almost two hours to Kitgum town. These women are trapped in experiencing 
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resentment and further unsympathetic, insensitive treatment, and retreating into isolation, which 
widens the separation between them and the non-abductees. Although relying on these strategies 
(secrecy, silence, and isolation) can to some extent protect them from stigmatisation, these 
strategies can easily be manipulated by their stigmatisers. If responding to stigmatisation 
aggressively is seen as confirming the bush mentality, and with silence and isolation as being 
mentally unstable, possessed by cen or anti-social, the women are left with no effective coping 
strategies, and at the mercy of their stigmatisers. 
Because they are aware of the negative meanings that people associate with their past, each 
additional resentful comment, slander, or demeaning reaction from their families, friends and 
neighbours simply reinforces this belief. Even if many of them have been home for several years, 
each negative encounter is a painful reminder of how they and their past are devalued. Also, this 
sends a message to them that however much time they spend in the community, how well they 
endeavour to live with non-abductees, this awful treatment is not about to stop. Thus some of 
them try to live with stigma by ignoring their stigmatisers. 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
Chapter Six has discussed participant experiences of abduction, life in captivity and eventual exit 
from incarceration. It shows that stigmatisation is a persistent challenge facing the formerly 
abducted girls in northern Uganda. It is still widespread at household and community levels, 
hindering individual attempts to genuinely relate with other people. This persistent stigmatisation 
affects returnees‘ social relationships and reduces their life chances. However, to advance their 
reintegration, many still attempt to engage in community initiatives like marriage and 
livelihoods. We now turn, in Chapter 7, to their attempts and experiences of engaging in 
marriage and show how stigmatisation and other factors affect these attempts to participate in 
this important institution.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
REINTEGRATION AND REALITIES OF MARRIAGE 
As a cultural determinant of successful reintegration, marriage was a recurring issue in the 
interviews. Getting into and sustaining a marriage is viewed by the participants as a sign of a 
progressive reintegration. However, this remains a challenge for most formerly abducted girls. 
The central argument here is that the challenges and frustrations confronting their marriage 
aspirations are beyond their direct war participation, emerging from multiple influences 
including traditions, families and the general public.  
7.1 The Role of Marriage in Acholi 
Keesing (1981:252) defines marriage as ‗an institution which legitimates sexual relations and 
parentage; …it defines the social position of individuals and their memberships in groups; it 
establishes legal rights and interests; it creates domestic economic units; it relates individuals to 
kin groups other than their own…‘ This definition is important for analysing the marriage 
institution in Acholi. It describes issues and aspects of marriage that apply and affect the 
participants. For the present purposes, marriage is defined as formal union accepted by the 
Acholi community to be ‗marriage‘, exclusive of courtship, dating and any other loose 
partnerships. 
Marriage is an initiation from wang-tino (‗childhood‘) to maturity. According to Acholi tradition, 
an unmarried person is still a child no matter how old she or he may be. Marriage status is still 
such an important aspect of an individual‘s socialisation (recognition, respect, pride) and well-
being. There is tremendous pressure to get married, both for females and males of marriageable 
age. A bachelor and spinster have no room in this culture. The unmarried young adults are 
disfavoured and stereotyped as incomplete, unserious, irresponsible and unable to effectively 
execute their allocated roles (Finnstrom, 2008:235; Dolan, 2005:282). However old an individual 
may be, as long as he or she remains unmarried, their presence and voice will in most cases be 
ignored or overlooked. The late p‘Bitek (1966) puts it precisely: ‗you might be a giant of a man, 
you may begin to grow grey hair, you may be old and toothless with age, but if you are 
unmarried, you are nothing‘. Conversely, because they have children and run homes, all married 
adults are perceived to be responsible, respectful and reliable (Dolan, 2005:282). With this 
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stereotyping, the unmarried youth find it hard to have their concerns considered and urgently 
met. Their participation in social, economic and political life is also limited (ibid.).  
Beyond an individual understanding, marriage is a significant aspect whose central role is to 
unify kaka (‗clans‘) and control procreation (see Girling, 1960; Artkinson, 1994). Marriages are 
patrilineal and patrilocal (Girling, 1960:21; Baines &Gauvin, 2014:287). When nyaka (‗a girl‘) 
gets married, she joins and becomes part of her husband‘s clan. Through this union and transfer, 
she gains a place in that family and community as a woman and mother. Apart from marriage 
defining an individual‘s ability and status in the community, it is one of the most important 
institutions of support for formerly abducted and other young women (see also Justice and 
Reconciliation Project-JRP, 2006). As discussed in Chapter Eight, when a woman partners with a 
man in a formal marriage, she achieves a right to access family resources (land for farming, 
livestock). Marriage is social security, which for some women may only be gained from such 
association. Also, apart from representing a principle basis of respect, self-esteem and pride, with 
an unmarried woman experiencing limitations, isolation and stigmatisation in the community, 
marriage provides a woman the freedom to function as an accepted member of the wider society, 
which is considerably limited for an unmarried female of marriageable age. 
7.2 Customary Marriage: The Significance of Otongo-keny (‘Bride Price’) 
Achieving Acholi customary marriage is a lengthy procedure which starts with a young man 
meeting and identifying a potential girl and going on to pursue her for marriage (see also Baines 
&Gauvin, 2014:189; Porter, 2013). In the past, to meet girls to marry, young men commonly 
relied on traditional courtship dances, community gatherings and places where water and 
firewood or mushrooms were gathered (p‘Bitek, 1967; Girling, 1960:68). However, today this 
selection tradition is waning because communal events like dancing seasons where men targeted 
meeting girls are no longer common in the villages. Instead, young men meet and select girls for 
marriage from schools, churches or market places; for example, most of the participants met their 
husbands in IDP camps or village markets.  
In theory, when a young man has identified a girl to marry, he alerts his family and clan 
members who approach the girl‘s family to ask her hand in marriage and to agree on the 
sufficient otongo-keny (see Baines &Gauvin, 2014:189). The important issue here is the 
agreement and promise to pay the assigned bride price. As in most African societies (see Goody, 
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1973; Anderson, 2007; Mwamwenda&Monyooe, 1997; Obeneba-Sakyi&Takyi, 2006; Wojcicki 
et al., 2010), paying bride price is still common in Acholi. In fact, most Ugandan ethnic groups 
still consider bride price as a significant practice for authenticating a customary marriage (see 
Hague et al., 2011). With the groom‘s family paying bride price in exchange for the woman‘s 
reproductive and productive value, Acholi families hope to gain from this marriage practice. 
Bride price typically consists of livestock, household items, foodstuffs, iron objects and money. 
The value depends on the status of the girl; for example, whether educated or not (Justice & 
Reconciliation Project, 2006). However, traditionally, reasonable otongo-keny should include 
cattle (see Girling, 1960:71). 
During the bride price negotiations, the bride to be is not consulted. Also, the girl does not 
directly benefit from whatever is given to her family as bride price. The materials or money are 
saved to offset the bride price levied on one of her brothers when it is his turn to marry (see also 
Justice & Reconciliation Project, 2006). However, due to poverty, bride price today comes in 
handy as a support to the rest of the family. While she is not consulted when her bride price is 
negotiated upon and does not benefit from it, she is aware of the consequences of defaulting on 
this practice. Without her husband completing the agreed otongo-keny, her family are likely to 
force her to abandon the man and the marriage. This is a big concern because, instead of 
focusing on the values of compatibility, an individual girl is now forced to consider the man‘s 
economic condition first. This is to ensure that he can afford to complete the required bride price 
and offer extra support to her family in the long run.  
When the bride price negotiations are completed and the first instalment is paid, the couple is 
considered engaged and the young man takes the girl to his home—Girling (1960:21, 72) calls 
this stage of customary marriage ‗cohabitation‘. The couple can be engaged or cohabiting for a 
while and up on the final completion of bride price payment, the bride‘s status changes from 
nyako(girl) to dako-ot (‗house wife‘). Completing the bride price serves to finally sign a contract 
of marriage between the couple and their families/clans (see also Baines &Gauvin, 2014:189). 
Until this custom is fulfilled, the woman and children formally belong to her kaka and the 
husband has limited rights to dominate the welfare of his household.  
While full payment of bride price enables a girl to become a housewife, her status and position in 
her husband‘s family and community is made permanent after giving birth. Procreation is the 
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ultimate goal of marriage and a way of extending Acholi practices and values to the next 
generation. Therefore, marriage is confirmed with the birth of the first child (Girling, 1960:21, 
72; p‘Bitek 1973:52; p‘Bitek, 1966:105; Ocitti, 1973:27–8; Baines &Gauvin, 2014:287). 
Traditionally, paying full bride price implies that ‗the man‘s clan has established a right to a 
productive womb in the woman‘s family‘ and a couple‘s inability to produce is typically blamed 
on the woman (Girling, 1960:72). Because children are highly prized and giving birth within a 
marriage remains so significant, the barren and impotent are considered cursed and in need of 
cleansing. 
Until the birth of the first child, the newlywed young woman sleeps in the husband‘s ot (pl. odi—
‗hut/house‘) but continues to share domestic items and fireplace with her mother- and sisters-in-
law. Here, the mother in-law treats her as one of her daughters, watching and teaching her how to 
be a wife. After giving birth, the couple moves into their own ot, where the dako-ot now 
becomes the min ot (literally, ‗hut mother‘). With this accomplishment and establishment, the 
young woman stops being a menial assistant to the mother-in-law and becomes the owner of the 
household, with her own poto (garden), granary and cooking hut (see also Girling, 1960:21, 72). 
Being formally married is therefore a huge achievement, and this explains why the participants 
referred to being married as ‗having a home—―my home‖‘ as opposed to ‗our home‘, meaning 
the parental home. When a female reaches marriageable age, she is expected to leave her 
‗mother‘s home‘ and look for ‗her own home‘ (get married). With this accomplishment, a 
woman‘s position, social role, identity and right as a wife and mother in the society are 
established (see also Baines &Gauvin, 2014:189).  
The above discussed process of formally getting married in Acholi is not limited to formerly 
abducted girls. All females have to go through these procedures as they attempt to achieve a 
formal marriage. We have also seen that customary marriage in Acholi can be in two forms: 
fixed marriage (bride price completed) and cohabitation (instalment(s) of bride price paid: this 
marriage may be acknowledged by the community over time or not). However, as discussed later 
in this chapter, there is a shift from fixed customary unions towards cohabitation and other loose 
forms of marriage, including single parenthood and elopements. For instance, only two 
participants, both still married to their LRA husbands, had their bride price completed at the time 
of fieldwork. The rest were/are either in cohabitation, elopement marriages or practising single 
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parenthood living. Of these, the majority are/were eloping: elopements are sexual relationships 
where a girl lives with her partner without him paying any instalment of the customary bride 
price to receive their parents‘ marriage blessings (see also Justice & Reconciliation Project, 
2006). The study treats the two participants mentioned as having achieved legal marriages and 
the rest as having failed to secure culturally acceptable marriages at the time of interviews.  
7.3 Early Marriage, Sexual Activity and ‘Child Mothers’ 
Apart from sharing early motherhood experiences, former girl abductees and their non-abducted 
peers end up in comparable situations when it comes to the kinds of marriages they accomplish. 
For both categories, the motivations to remarry, and the obstacles and dilemmas they encounter 
in those marriages, are in most cases similar. Although the chapter seeks to examine the 
particular marriage realities for former girl abductees, to understand the situation in which they 
find themselves, marriage is and should be situated in the local/regional landscape and in the 
context of social change.  
Since most of the participants gave birth before they were 18, this section is concerned with the 
occurrence of females giving birth in their adolescent years in Acholi. During the war, apart from 
the abductions, many adolescent girls engaged in sexual relationships, were raped in the camps 
or were forced into early marriages (see Women‘s Commission, 2001; Okello&Hovil, 2007; 
Akumu et al., 2005; Isis-WICCE, 2006; Liebling et al., 2008). This was reflected in the FGDs 
with the young women: apart from the unplanned pregnancy mothers, most of them were rape 
survivors and ‗forced‘ mothers/wives. When former girl soldiers exited the LRA, they became 
part of this category of ‗women‘ or ‗females‘ (child mothers/young women) in Acholi districts. 
A child mother can be living with her partner (impregnator), parents or alone. The important 
factor here is giving birth at a young age and before one is rightfully married. The realities of the 
lives of abductee child mothers will therefore be analysed in comparison with other child 
mothers. 
It is important to recognise that ‗child mothers‘ in the context of the LRA have been, to some 
extent, treated as an isolated phenomenon in Uganda (Allen &Schomerus, 2006). However, this 
is not the case, because child mothers did not start with the LRA in the northern part of the 
country. When the notion of ‗child mother‘ is cast in the wider context of early marriage and 
pregnancy in Uganda (the age of consent at marriage is 18), a history of adolescents engaging in 
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sexual relationships and child motherhood emerges. A household survey carried out in 1995 
showed that 43 per cent of teenagers in the 15–19 age bracket either were mothers or were 
pregnant with their first child. In 2000–2001, this had however declined to 31 per cent with the 
median age at first birth standing at around 18.5 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2001:48). 
Although the 2006 and 2011 Demographic Health Surveys show that the fertility rate for the 
same age bracket (15–19) has considerably decreased, early marriage and pregnancies among 
adolescent and teenagers remain high in the country. With the majority Ugandans below the age 
of 30, apart from Uganda facing significant challenges in meeting young people‘s needs, it faces 
the problem of an adolescent and teenage pregnancy rate of 24 per cent and increasing (Uganda 
Population Report, (2013:52). Consequently, early marriage and pregnancies remain a big threat 
to Uganda‘s girl children (Daily Monitor, July 11, 2013; New Vision, 2012). 
In Acholi, Adolescent pregnancy is a rising concern that provides clear evidence of sexual 
activity among very young people (see also Women‘s Commission, 2001; Schlecht, et al., 2013). 
It is apparent that this raises moral issues that many people find uncomfortable. Traditionally, 
when both male and female youth were in their early to mid-20s, following a lengthy 
engagement and/or cohabiting, they got married. However, this is changing. The practice of girls 
and boys engaging in sex and marriage at a much younger age escalated during the war and has 
continued in the aftermath (see Schlecht et al., 2013).   
Research suggests four major reasons why adolescents may engage in early sexual activity or 
marriage in any society: 
1) Out of a wish to escape abusive or/and chaotic surroundings: to create a different family 
and environment, adolescents may be forced to engage in sexual activities (see Beers & 
Hollo, 2009). In a study of school-age mothers, Horwitz et al. (1991) argue that, due to 
emotional deprivation, adolescents may need to fulfill missed intimacy through early 
sexual relationships that could lead to early pregnancies.  
2) Early sexualisation behaviour, initiation and promiscuity expose adolescents to 
sexualactivity in the short and long run.  
3) Exposure to all kinds of abuse increases the likelihood of engaging in sexual intercourse 
(see Black et al., 2009). History of abuse leads to low self-esteem, difficult behaviour 
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and/or initiation into anti-social behaviour peer groups (Kaplan et al., 1979; Madigan et 
al., 2014).  
4) High poverty rates (United Nations Population Fund, 2012; World Vision, 2013; Refugee 
Law Project, 2007; UNICEF, 2005; International Center for Research on Women, 2006a; 
etc.).  
All these reasons can be related to the Acholi situation: poverty, dysfunctional family conditions 
and cultural erosion have increased young girls‘ vulnerability to engaging in early sexual 
activities and further abuse. Although early pregnancies can be associated with lack of basic 
sexual and reproductive health education and access to affordable contraceptive options, among 
other factors, findings show that scarcity/poverty forces girls to engage in early sexual activities 
and marriage. Poverty is also responsible for the increasing child prostitution in the region (see 
Rodriguez, 2014). Parents reported that poverty drives their adolescent girls to engage in early 
sexual relationships and marriages, an occurrence that affects not only the girls, but their parents 
as well. Being unable to provide for the girls and protect them from early sexualisation leaves the 
parents in a helpless position, as two of them expressed in a group discussion: 
….as a parent, I see a problem with our children these days. This kind of marriage that 
they go into when they are not prepared for it is not right.  Most of these children go to 
pubs and dancing clubs and from there, because of their material needs, they feel they 
should marry that man they have just met, even if they do not know him at all, whether he 
is HIV/AIDS free or not. Generally, the family poverty will send away your daughter to 
look for a well-to-do man and when they get a problem from there [elopement], they 
again run back to you with their children and this is very bad and oppressing us, as 
parents.90 
For a young girl of 14 to 15 years to go for an early marriage, to us parents, that is like 
losing her to death. It is likely that when she conceives, because she is not strong enough 
to deliver a child, she will end up in hospital seeking operations that could lead to her 
death. This [death or operations] brings you [parent] more problems, yet your child 
should have stayed at home with you. It is simply sad…91 
Cultural degradation and erosion that started in the camps and progressed to the community has 
opened up windows for adolescent and teenage girls to engage in sexual activities and become 
child mothers. This can be linked to the fact that some of the adolescents are orphans, growing 
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91 Respondent, FGD01, Community Members, Kitgum town 
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up with no solid source of advice on sex education, marriage and life in general. Traditionally, a 
girl lived under firm ethical household codes with brothers and parents ensuring she was not 
taken out by boys to engage in illicit sexual intercourse (see Southall, 1960). However, this is not 
to suggest that in the past, there was no illicit sexual intercourse that could have resulted in 
unwanted pregnancies. For example, in the process of courtship, it was common for a girl, before 
committing herself to a young man for marriage, to spend a night with him in his bachelor hut 
just to be certain he was sexually all right (see Girling, 1960:69; P‘Bitek, 1964). Actually, 
Girling (1960:69) writes that ‗there seems little doubt that in the past, as today, intercourse took 
place before marriage, and a child born to an unmarried girl is usually described as anywal-
kiototogo, conceived in the bachelor hut‘. But if a girl was caught having sex with a man who did 
not intend to marry her, she was punished by heavy beating (p‘Bitek, 1964).  
The war and displacement weakened such protective family ties; family relations, social roles, 
and Acholi culture in general (Okello&Hovil, 2007). The camp system affected rural families 
and the extensive kin networks that Acholi culture relied on to educate and discipline its 
adolescents and teenagers:   
…within the internally displaced persons‘ (IDP) camps, mothers, fathers, aunts and 
uncles were no longer able to perform their familial roles as providers, disciplinarians, 
and heads of households; daughters and sons no longer had traditional responsibilities, 
moral obligations, and dependence on the familial social structure; and all forms of 
familial relations were put under extreme strain by violence, insecurity, immobility, lack 
of productivity and poverty (Baines &Gauvin, 2014:283) 
Dysfunctional families, reduced strictness and weakened moral codes have left the 
parents/families unable to enforce the cultural norms on sex or provide appropriate 
guidance/counsel and protection to their children. Life in the camps reduced their authority and 
power to effectively execute such important roles (Baines &Gauvin, 2014:289). With their 
children increasingly becoming disrespectful to their parents, a moral gap between the two has 
been created: ‗children blame their parents for failing to provide for and protect them (their 
rights as children), and parents complain that children no longer respect them and are 
disobedient‘ (Cheney, 2007:199). With respect and obedience for parents and elders as the two 
significant markers of an ideal Acholi childhood identity, their scarcity causes a moral challenge. 
Due to dysfunctional families, troubled relationships between parents and children, and 
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hostile/insecure environments, individual adolescents and teenagers have taken on the decisions 
of how to live, survive and deal with delicate matters like meeting their intimate concerns.  
7.3.1 Child Marriage 
The other factor causing early motherhood in northern Uganda is forced child marriages (see 
Isis-WICCE, 2001; Women‘s Commission, 2001). Since 1948, the UN, international agencies 
and nations have attempted to end child marriage, but their efforts have not stopped this global 
practice. In 1989, at the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the international law defining 
children as persons below the age 18 years was established (Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 1989, Article 1). With this convention, any country that allowed child marriage (legal age 
for marriage set at 18) would be committing a violation of human rights. Article 16(2) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that individuals must be at full age when 
entering a marriage and this union should be started on the basis of free will and with full 
consent.92 The 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) is also against child marriages and considers the practice illegal (Convention 
of Women, 1979, Article 16). Although many nations including Uganda have subscribed to these 
international laws, the law has not been extensively executed and many girls are still forced into 
taking on marriages before their 18th birthdays (see UN-Population Fund, 2005, 2012; Mathur et 
al., 2003; Bruce, 2003).  
Although engaging in premarital sexual activities is increasing (Wellings et al., 2006), the age of 
women at marriage is increasing in almost every developing country (see Dyson, 2010:174; 
Shapiro &Gebreselassie, 2014; Khan & Mishra, 2008). This is true in Acholi. Due to improved 
education for girl children in Uganda, there is a desire for families to have their daughters 
educated. Although this is still for marriage prospects (an educated girl fetches an enhanced 
bride price), an extra year in school keeps a girl away from early marriage or engaging in sexual 
activities (see UN-Population Fund, 2012; Center for Research on Women, 2006a; Mathur et al., 
2003; Mensch et al., 1998; Gupta et al., 2008). Formal schooling has been suggested as the 
solution to early marriage (forced or not): delays in age at marriage are influenced by additional 
years in school, school attendance takes girls out of the domestic environment, and improved 
literacy and education help them possess ideas and values that may compete with traditional 
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customs and livelihoods offered in early marriage (see Westoff, 1992:7; Shapiro &Tambashe, 
2003; Shapiro &Gebreselassie, 2014). 
With a low number of girls entering secondary education (Annan et al., 2008), underage girls, 
particularly in remote villages, are still denied education and forced to take on domestic work or 
get married. Although most early motherhood experiences seem to be as a result of illicit sexual 
relationships and not forced marriages, a girl being persuaded into starting a marriage is still 
common in Acholi. A girl becomes a ‗forced‘ mother/wife after being challenged and pressurised 
into marrying a man her family identifies as suitable (fairly economically well off) or finding 
herself any man who will afford bride price (see also Isis-WICCE, 2001:45). This brings us back 
to widespread household poverty. Girls are seen as a source of money that could offset the 
family‘s constrained financial situations:  
This marriage that has not been prepared for is not good. At times the girl‘s parents have 
money problems and will tell you [their daughter] that, ‗you have grown up and you 
should go and look for your home; I am feeding you for nothing, go and bring for me 
money‘. And this will irritate the girl and she will decide that, ‗I am being insulted for 
nothing, let me go to my home‘. She might get a child from there and when the marriage 
fails, she comes back home. This will again increase her problem at home.93 
Forced marriage in this case is not coupling a girl with a man who is not of her choice (as was 
the case in the LRA), but being ‗forced‘ to leave her parents‘ home to start ‗her home‘ before she 
is of appropriate age or simply ready for marriage. Such actions by family members, particularly 
fathers and male siblings, are motivated by the desire for money and other material factors and 
not the fact that she is too old to be at home. Laker (aged 16, one of the non child mothers who 
participated in one of the FGDs, no abduction past) shared her struggle of resisting early 
marriage. She stood up to her family‘s pressure to get married in favour of education. Meeting 
her own needs, she had completed grade seven at the time of our interviews:  
…It all started with my eldest brother wanting me to get married. I told him how I knew 
many young women suffering out there because they abandoned school and ended up as 
single mothers. I pleaded with him to let me continue with school but in vain. He caned 
and insulted me a lot. I reported the matter to my mother [alcoholic] who ended up siding 
with my brother on the matter. She reasoned that I never wanted to get married so I might 
misbehave with bad boys in the village. I was so angered when she asked my father 
[separated from the mother] to put more pressure on me in order to get married. I still 
                                                             
93 Participant in FGD01, Young Women, Kitgum town 
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refused. If I was not a confident girl who loves school, I would be married now because 
of the disturbances I received from some of my family members…94 
The women leaders interviewed for this study pinned the early motherhood trend on the war and 
camp system that have left parents devastated by the absolute poverty. There was a general 
feeling among them and other community members that early marriage is a bad practice and they 
sympathised with young girls who are often pressured into them. However, their sympathy is 
contrary to Acholi cultural marriage norms. As noted in Chapter 5, traditionally, a girl became 
marriageable in her early adolescent years, between 12 and 16 years (Girling, 1960:27), making 
child marriage an old phenomenon. This history seems to correlate with the provisions for age of 
consent in customary marriage arrangements in Uganda: Section 11 provides that ‗customary 
marriage shall be void if (a) the female party to it has not attained the age of sixteen years; (b) 
the male party to it has not attained the age of eighteen years‘ (The Customary Marriage 
(Registration) Act 1973, Chapter 248, emphasis added). 95  With the age of parental consent 
standing at 16, the customary marriage arrangement is contrary to the 1995 Constitution of 
Uganda. The constitution, Article 31(1), provides that ‗men and women of the age of eighteen 
years and above have the right to marry and to found a family and are entitled to equal rights in 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution‘ (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995). 
Here, marriage consent is at the age of 18 (for both parents and marrying parties).  
7.3.2 Experiences of Child Mothers: Stigmatisation and Scarcity 
Unmarried child mothers in Acholi are considered to be personally responsible for their fate. 
They are believed to have consciously chosen not to act in a culturally accepted manner and are 
liable to stigmatisation. They are despised and scorned for being irresponsible, spoilt girls who 
misused their education opportunities to engage in early sex. However, for many non-abducted 
child mothers, given their family backgrounds and financial circumstances, it does not appear 
that their future opportunities would have necessarily improved if they had deferred sex, 
motherhood and marriage beyond teenage years. In addition, others are rape victims who are also 
perceived to be blameworthy. Although early motherhood increases their dependence as single 
mothers on other people, having a child or marriage gives many of them a responsibility for 
looking after another person and grants them some levels of stability as women and mothers.  
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95http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/248. 
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Engaging in sexual intercourse and getting pregnant before one is married is seen as betraying 
and shaming the family. Some are chased away to find their ‗impregnators‘ who are at times too 
young or poor to sustain a family. The child mothers who are allowed to stay with their parents 
are neglected and/or deprived of food: for example, one respondent (no abduction past) reported 
that while she was pregnant, she was denied food because she had not participated in its 
production and processing. When their children are sick, some of them are not given support: 
...when a young girl, say at the age of 13 gets pregnant, her parents feel betrayed by their 
daughter. She is accused of betraying the family trust, embarrassing the family and is told 
to find her own home with the man who impregnated her. But in most cases, the 
responsible men reject such pregnancies, leaving the parents thinking they won‘t benefit 
much out of their daughter. For this, they become disrespectful to the young mother and 
often insult her in different ways or/and punish her by denying her basic needs. Her child 
will also suffer in the process…96 
Rape victims are not spared either: 
When community members learn that a girl got raped, they highly stigmatise her and 
make her feel very dejected. She will want to lock herself behind closed doors or never 
move around to avoid people talking bad about what happened to her. This is bad for the 
healing process of such girls because rapes happen against their will97 
Some community members will never believe that the rape happened against a girl‘s will. 
They will insist that she should be married to the perpetrator. She will surely be forced 
into marrying the man on claims that it is useless for her to continue living in that 
homestead.98 
Due to stigmatisation, lack of support and contempt drive many of the child mothers to desperate 
measures like moving in with the men responsible for their pregnancy in the hope of securing a 
marriage: ‗pregnant girls feel betrayed when the parents are able to provide for them but refuse 
to do so. Human needs vary among girls in that state. The urge to meet them where they have not 
been provided drives them to opt for early marriages in quests to have their needs met.‘99 
Evidence however shows that, in most cases, this does not last or result in the desired customary 
marriage. In some cases, such men have their wives and are not interested in long term 
commitment to an individual child mother: ‗some of the old men still go to the child mothers 
knowing they are young and probably made a mistake with their first pregnancies. These men do 
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not love these child mothers but simply want to satisfy themselves sexually‘.100 Unable to secure 
a marriage with the men responsible for their pregnancy, and with stigma and harassment at their 
parents‘ homes, young women are left with one option, living by themselves as single child 
mothers: 
I feel that for my case, if my father and brothers had not chased me from home, there is 
no way I could think of looking for a house to rent because for a girl to start renting, it 
will again spoil your image, and men will be coming to you and you will end up 
conceiving again. But I had nothing to do, whatever they tell me, I feel I should follow 
what they want.101 
Although staying alone can be an option for the child mother, single parenthood has its own 
social and economic hardships that force them to engage in loose marriages. Child mothers are 
likely to be associated with these informal unions.  
7.4 Rising Cohabitation, Elopement and Single Motherhood Marriages 
War and displacement affect the formal marriage system of a society (see Schlecht et al., 2013). 
While the traditional ways in which people marry in Acholi continue to be valued, for many they 
cannot be practiced any more. Generally, marriage as a key mechanism for creating social 
cohesion is felt to be changing significantly (see also Dolan, 2005:290). Forced marriages, 
elopements, divorce and single parenthood living are considerably higher than before the war 
(see Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2006; Bailey, 2009:19; Rodrigez, 2006; Schlecht et al., 
2013). After the war, society was disrupted, with insecurity, displacement, extreme poverty, 
migration, modernisation, intermarriage, and education, among others, said to be responsible for 
this change. 
A once highly respected institution with its strict codes of social and sexual behavior is shifting 
to more dysfunctional and loose marriage-like situations. From being a rite of passage from 
childhood to adulthood, marriage appears to be undergoing a significant change and approaches 
to it shifting from a basic social cohesion unit to a commercialised, loose and unstable institution 
(see Dolan, 2005:292). It is also increasingly detaching from lineage control and becoming more 
of a single family and individualistic endeavour. This is the confusion and marriage position 
faced by former child abductees and other youth who matured in the camps.  
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Growing up with a new outlook to marriage and life, and unable to meet marriage 
expectations102, child mothers and other youth are taking advantage of the emerging marriage 
changes to ensure that they too can participate in this important institution. They target 
cohabitation and elopement marriages that are becoming ‗normal‘ and popular (see Schlecht et 
al., 2013). When such unions fail, the young women settle for single parenthood. Although 
traditional values continue to prohibit these loose marriage provisions, the weakening clan 
system, inability to pay bride price, higher numbers of marriageable age women, among other 
factors, are contributing to this popularity.  
7.4.1 Family Breakdown and Weakening of clan structure 
Habitually, a clan and its member families have played crucial roles in the life of an individual 
and in establishing new marriages (Girling, 1960:71). A young man depended upon his lineage 
heads and elders for consent to marry and settle the bride price. Elders of the girl‘s lineage were 
also heavily involved in decision making and negotiations surrounding marriage (ibid.). 
However, following the lengthy war and camp system, the high death rates, high levels of 
poverty, commercialisation of marriage and individualistic tendencies towards life, among 
others, have dismantled this assurance. The connectivity and dependency of families and 
individuals on the clans has been disrupted (see also Schlecht et al., 2013; Bailey, 2009). Many 
people lost lives through the fighting, camps and abduction which has reduced the number of 
people in families. Today, loss of parents characterises some of the families that make up clans. 
Therefore, with fewer people in the families that are supposed to constitute a clan within a 
village, they cannot be as effective as they were before the war broke out in the region (see 
Girling, 1960; Atkinson, 1994).  
Furthermore, the scarce wealth among clan families leaves them unable to coordinate and run 
economic and social clan priorities. As discussed in Chapter Four, prior to the war, many 
families and clans held wealth in the form of livestock alongside their agricultural produce. 
However, this economic guarantee was largely affected by the war, cattle rustling and raiding. 
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With displacement from their land and means of production, the clan elders lost social control, 
clan authority and power (Baines &Gauvin, 2014:288). Due to high poverty rates, clan elders 
and other clan members are becoming more preoccupied with taking care of their individual 
families and less concerned about what is going on in the clan families in general. This has left 
the clans‘ grip loosened and is becoming continually more difficult to effectively execute 
marriage issues for their children as before (Schlecht et al., 2013). With many parents 
increasingly becoming isolated from their children and elders rarely getting involved in marriage 
decisions, family or individual independence in marriage decisions is inevitable. It is now 
common for families or simply an individual young adult to make a marriage choice and settle 
with a man or woman without consulting his or her clan elders (see also Dolan, 2005:292). This 
was observable among the participants. Some of them had got away with elopement marriages. 
They had been in such marriages for years without their parents or clan elders forcing them to 
leave. Some women switched from one marriage to another without worrying about how the clan 
elders would respond. 
7.4.2 Unaffordable Bride Price 
In addition to the above mentioned changes and challenges facing the marriage institution, 
cohabitation and elopement marriages are becoming common because bride price is becoming a 
commercialised practice. Due to acute poverty, this tradition is shifting from being simply a 
token of appreciation to a girl‘s family to a source of financial gain, with her family hoping to 
earn as much money and materials from her marriage as possible (see also Bailey, 2009:23). 
Because of fear of losing out on the bride price, families often demand a man to pay it before a 
young woman gives birth or stays with him for a long time: ‗just a day after leaving home, the 
parents come demanding for bride price, arguing that allowing you [girl] to stay in your marriage 
long enough, they will not get that much out of you. This is pure greed for money driving many 
young women to preventable sufferings‘.103 
Bride price is, however, unaffordable for the young men where most of them are poor, 
uneducated, untrained and unemployable (Dolan, 2005:290; Schlecht et al., 2013; International 
Alert, 2013). Apart from absence of bride price portraying the man‘s ‗unmarried‘ woman as 
lacking virtue, failure to pay bride price lays the men open to accusations and stigma for not 
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living up to masculine ideals (see Schlecht et al., 2013). Seen as not honouring the woman and 
her family, her father or brothers may practically force her to desert this kind of ‗disrespectful‘ 
man. For example, two participants had been ordered back home by their parents because, a year 
after eloping, their partners had failed to make any instalment payment towards the women‘s 
otongo-keny. These women described their positions as ‗not married‘ because they were not sure 
if their partners would pay the highly respected bride price and take them to ‗their homes‘. This 
is not to suggest that before the war bride price was cheap and affordable by every young man. 
Girling (1960:70) writes that it was common for a young man to fail to raise the right amount of 
bride price for the desired girl. Such men were described as limoloye, ‗he was conquered by the 
bride wealth‘. However, today, with no cattle or any form of assets to generate income, it is 
easier for a young man to be a limoloye and left to engage in casual relationships and loose 
marriage-like situations.  
All this has consequences for the institution of marriage because, unable to afford the levied 
bride price, the young men resort to not taking girls and young women as their wives, but rather 
as passing flings. There is limited commitment to the union and, when the pressure for bride 
price mounts, some of them may find it easier to simply walk away from the women. Two other 
women in the sample had been simply abandoned by their partners. One of the men had moved 
in with another woman and the whereabouts of the other were unknown to the participant. When 
this happens, women are left in marriage limbo, taking care of the children, meeting all the 
domestic bills and waiting for the return of their men.  
It is hard to determine if men who approach this category of women for marriage feel they can 
get away without paying bride price. However, this is unlikely because men are aware that 
bearing a child with a woman they have not officially married increases their bride price yoke. 
When he decides to officially marry her, he will not only pay bride price but also the child‘s 
luk(the fine for illicit sexual intercourse). Further, should any calamity such as death befall the 
woman or the child, the man may still have to clear the bride price and/or kwoo (compensation 
for the loss of the child) (see Girling, 1960:70). So it should not be assumed that young men are 
unaware of the consequences of postponing or overlooking bride price, but considering the lowly 
men these women end up with—poor backgrounds, illiterate, no stable income, alcoholic, 
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abusive, etc.—it will be simplistic to conclude that men do not want to fulfil this marriage 
custom.  
7.4.3 High Male Death Rates 
The other factor contributing to high rates of loose marriages among the child mothers is the 
possibility that young females of marital age currently outnumber young men (see also Bailey, 
2009:20). Due to unavailable demographic information, this is based on an assumption that boys 
and young men were heavily recruited into the LRA and the government local defence units. 
Also, boys and young men were more likely to be killed in fighting, while protecting their 
families, or in the IDP camps. Thus, more male teenagers are likely have lost their lives 
compared to females. If these assumptions stand, such demographic changes are affecting the 
numbers of marriageable women, causing an excess supply of potential wives.  
In the marriage context, child mothers have to compete with ‗true‘ Acholi girls (virgins, with 
some level of education, good family background, etc.) who are considered to be more 
‗valuable‘, ‗morally upright‘ and ‗marriageable‘. When this competition is coupled with the yoke 
of otongo-keny on young men, the formerly abducted girls are left with limited ways of securing 
a solid marriage. While a ‗true‘ Acholi girl has an option of resisting a man until he officially 
marries her, or has a pool of young men to select from, child mothers do not have that 
preference. For them, the aim of getting married is to gain stability and survival, with a further 
objective of achieving a sense of identity and belonging as a ‗married‘ woman and mother. Being 
married for them is more about gaining social security than simply fulfilling cultural demands 
and having status. Particularly for former girl abductees, starting and maintaining a marriage is 
one way of redeeming their stigmatised identity. It is not clear whether, after moving in with a 
man, the woman may push her partner to pay the bride price. However, this is also unlikely. As 
will be discussed later in this chapter, formerly abducted girls find themselves in marriages 
where they are unable to negotiate their demands with their partners. They are also aware that if 
a man feels persuaded and pressured into paying bride price, he is likely to leave, replace her 
with another woman or get her a co-wife. With this fear and vulnerability, the women simply 
remain in loose marriages. 
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7.4.4 Could Informal Marriages be good for Child Mothers? 
Although it is a concern in the community that young people are increasingly engaging in loose 
marriages, some young women find the idea of first living with a man before the bride price is 
decided and paid acceptable. One of them had this to say: 
Today‘s marriage if you compare it with that of the past, there is a difference. Today‘s marriage 
is good because, your ‗husband‘ brings you to stay at their home for at least a year or more. 
During this time, you get to know each other very well; if he is bad, you will get to know and 
decide not to marry him. But when he marries you [paying bride price] when the marriage fails, 
it affects you a lot…104 
As the quotation exemplifies, a woman can live with a man for a year or longer in a loose 
marriage-like arrangement until they both are comfortable with each other and then decide to 
formalise their relationship. In such a case, there is less emphasis on ordinary courtship, since 
living with the man will determine if he is a potential marriage partner or not. In theory, this 
looks like a win-win situation where a woman has some bargaining power in terms of leaving the 
man if he does not respect and support her, or in cases of violence. However, in practice, as 
discussed later in this chapter, deserting such a marriage is still a complicated process and 
experience for women. In reality, informal marriage arrangements give men more bargaining 
power because they can easily walk out of the marriage, leaving the women to start all over 
again, with more children to take care of and the stigma of not sustaining a marriage.  
Although accepting contemporary cohabitation and elopement, women lose their cultural values 
about life and marriage (Whyte et al., 2013:10). Since they are unable to secure fixed customary 
marriages, they continue to engage in such unaccepted loose marriage-like situations. This is not 
because informal marriages are better for them; rather, with their limited life choices and 
circumstances, they are forced to go against their cultural values so as to engage in the marriage 
institution.  
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7.5 Marriage Patterns and Realities of Former Girl Abductees 
Findings show that time in abduction does not have an effect on women‘s desire to get married 
when they exit armed groups. Because they ‗may want to return to what they perceive as the 
stability of the pre-war arrangements‘ (Meintjes et al., 2001:6), they endeavour to realise their 
marriage dreams. Of the participants, 54% described themselves as ‗married women‘, 37% 
‗separated‘, 7% ‗single mothers‘ and 2% as ‗widows‘. The length of marriages ranged from 1 to 
31 years, averaging 5.6 years, including those who had separated from their partners at the time 
of our interviews. The majority (73.68%) had been married for a period ranging from 1–5 years.  
Considering that length of reintegration ranged from 6 months to 12 years, averaging 6.5 years, 
and most of them (74%) had reintegrated for a period ranging from 6–10years, the findings 
suggest that, after exiting the LRA, many of them stayed unmarried for some time (about 3–4 
years). This delay could be attributed to the high levels of stigma, fear, self-esteem issues and/or 
need to get reacquainted with ‗normal‘ life back home. The data does not support the argument 
that those who returned with children got married right away so as to find a means to provide for 
their children. The children were now the responsibility of the mothers‘ families (maternal 
grandparents) as the women tried to sort out their lives (see also Carlson &Mazurana, 2008:29).  
In African post-conflict situations, marriage is seen as a viable option to achieve a successful 
social reintegration. Being married provides honour and stability (see Coulter, 2009:219). 
Although many participants did not think of getting married when they first returned home, they 
felt marriage was the only way to re-gain their identity, social security and self-esteem. Even if 
they got married at different stages of their reintegration, their decisions and motivation to get 
‗their own homes‘ were similar. They saw marriage as providing them with an opportunity to re-
establish themselves in their community and boost their self-esteem.  
As with their other life events, the marriage narratives tell of different experiences for former girl 
abductees, with many describing their marriages as ‗‗good‘ or ‗normal‘—like for anyone else‘‘. 
Husbands treat them well, including being supportive and non-violent. This also means the 
individual husband not referring to the abduction experience during arguments, and respecting 
and defending her before the in-laws. A good marriage for a former girl abductee occurs when 
she lives in harmony with her in-laws, neighbours and other community members: ‗…when there 
are ceremonies in the community for example funerals or any other activity, Joyce [former 
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abductee] is very active and mixes freely with people. She is not like other former girl abductees 
who have weird behaviour…‘—a participant in a family discussion describing her daughter-in-
law.105 Living ‗in harmony‘ with people in the immediate setting and behaving as the society 
expects or demands shows that a former girl abductee has successfully reinserted into the 
community (see also Gulu Support the Children Organization, 2010:14). According to the Acholi 
culture, a good person knows his or her duties, understands and follows the Acholi morality and 
sociality (see Apoko, 1967: 49; Oloya 2010). From the community perspective, ability to 
participate in neighbourhood events, live peacefully, associate respectfully with in-laws and 
other people, and sustain a marriage determines whether a former girl abductee is making 
progress with her reintegration or not. Living otherwise (in isolation or withdrawn from other 
people) is interpreted as having unusual or anti-social behaviour and failed social reintegration. 
From the individual marriage narratives, it is clear that getting into and sustaining a marriage 
comes with a sense of pride, belonging, success and acceptance for former girl abductees. This, 
however, varies according to the nature of the marriage. The fixed, customarily married and 
cohabiting women draw more respect from their families and communities and have rights to 
family/clan resources, unlike the eloping women (Chapter Eight). If we are to compare the 
informal marriages, cohabiting is a safer marriage option for former girl abductees, because even 
if the husbands have not completed paying bride price, the reality that they are claiming full 
rights over their ‗wife‘/partner and children provides women with some stability and social 
security. However, whether the individual husband is willing or able to eventually complete 
bride price and formalise the union creates tensions, uncertainties and instabilities among the 
cohabiting women. One participant expressed it this way: 
…for a man to stay well with his wife and be sure that she loves him, he should fully 
marry her [completing payment of bride wealth] because if he does not, he will never see 
her true colours and complete love. This is because she will stay with the man while 
unsure about the marriage, and not knowing whether she will live at that man‘s home 
forever or not.106 
We have already seen that a woman is married into her husband‘s kaka (clan/patrilineage) and, 
before bride price is completed, she is considered an ‗outsider‘ by her in-laws, thus her loyalty to 
the husband and marriage can easily change (see Girling, 1960:72). Until the bride price is 
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cleared, even if she gives birth, she is still seen as a newly married woman who, according to 
Allen (1994:131), may be dangerous: ‗she may be a sorcerer/poisoner. She may be 
unpredictable, her loyalties are unclear, she is a threat to her husband‘s sisters living at home and 
to other wives and their children‘. Until bride price is completed, the ‗woman‘s loyalties will 
remain uncertain and have difficulties in establishing herself as an unthreatening insider in her 
new social context‘ (Finnistrom, 2008:192). Therefore, even if the former girl soldiers can be in 
‗good‘ cohabitation marriages, as long as their bride price is not fully paid, they are still 
considered outsiders in ‗their own homes‘. Equally, their husbands are also not fully respected 
by girls‘ parents and brothers. In relation to marriage as a determinant of successful 
reintegration, as with their peers in elopements, women in cohabitation unions have also not 
obtained a formal position in their new societal context as a married women and mother. Until 
their bride price is fully paid, their position in their marital families and communities remains 
unsecured and uncertain (see also Finnstron, 2008:193).  
7.5.1 Major Obstacles to ‗having a home‘ 
Stigmatisation 
Although factors like poverty, womanising husbands, pressure over bride price, and domestic 
violence, among others, hinder marriage attempts among young women in general, for the 
former girl soldiers, stigmatisation stands out as the single most influential reason for their 
marriage failures (see also Bailey, 2009:32). As already discussed, their stigma stems from their 
military background. Due to this background (stigma), families/clans encourage their sons to go 
for girls with no abduction past (see also Bailey, 2009). Like the case of Helenwhom we met 
earlier on (Table 6.1), many women in this study repeatedly expressed frustration with the 
treatment they receive from their in-laws: ‗my sisters-in-law say I was in the bush and that their 
brother is not fit to be with someone like me, and that he should leave me and bring somebody 
else… Being stigmatised in my marriage makes life really hard. It is so painful.‘107Many men 
who go ahead and marry former abductees are ridiculed into abandoning them, and those who 
stick by their women are often told never to boast of having a wife because they are harbouring a 
‗rebel‘ with a ‗bush/military mentality‘ who might turn on them anytime (see also Justice & 
Reconciliation Project, 2006). 
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This view of girl abductees originates from the fact that Acholi is a patriarchal society where 
violent behaviour is still attached to males. Women are accepted as nurturers and any experience 
of aggression is unnatural, bush-like, uncomfortable and unacceptable. If a ‗bush mentality‘ 
(dangerous, unintelligent, offensive, intolerant, terrible and uncivilised mindset or behaviour) is 
coupled with their ‗feared‘ military experience, they are seen as coming from a very ‗poor 
background‘, unwomanly and therefore heavily resented. 
With their military background, they are assumed to be unable to submit to their husbands as is 
culturally expected of all wives. The community members, especially older women, who 
participated in this study argued that, when it comes to marriage and general relationships, 
former girl abductees, have attitudes contrary to those of other ‗normal‘ (never-abducted) young 
women. Two of them had this to say:  
…in Acholi culture, a wife has to follow the husband‘s orders but not these people 
[former girl abductees]. They bring in their bush mentality which their husbands, with no 
abduction experiences cannot understand. The women want to be controlling and the 
husbands cannot take that pressure…leading to problems in their marriages…108 
…these women do not listen to advice. If you try to be harsh when talking to them, they 
become angry saying you want to control them.  They become so rude and hard to live 
with.109 
These claims and reasoning are common in African post-conflict situations. As already 
highlighted in Chapter Three, while soldiering in captivity, girls learned how to survive, and 
they, particularly those who stayed with the fighting forces for a long time, deviated seriously 
from the norm, become quarrelsome or use offensive language, among others (see also McKay, 
2005:25; McKay &Mazurana, 2004:37). Back in the communities, they are found or assumed to 
have behavioural problems and are accused of behaving contrary to their non-abducted peers. 
The society expects them to re-adopt the cultural status of a submissive woman/wife where they 
are not to question the man‘s (or any person‘s) authority (see also McKay &Mazurana, 2004:17). 
However, for some of them, being in the military environment for a long time left them with a 
changed way of thinking and responding to social issues. Although they are aware they have to 
be submissive, this remains difficult to achieve: ‗the abduction has greatly impacted my attitude. 
I have become a woman who does not allow a man or anyone to control me. I hate it when 
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someone tries to force me to do something I do not want. This is bad because according to 
Acholi culture, a woman should have a submissive nature.‘110Others are judged for how they 
behave and respond to other people: ‗people say I talk and I am rude. For example my mother in-
law says I don‘t talk but command. That everything I say, I say it in a commanding tone.  She 
also says when I want something done; I want it done so quickly. But if I am told to do 
something, I don‘t listen…She also says that, I like staring people straight in the eye when they 
are talking to me…these arethe reasons she gives for not liking me‘.111When confronted with 
severe stigmatisation and other challenges, others respond with extreme violence. In a family 
discussion, one participant described how one of her two formerly abducted daughters had 
shocked her husband and in-laws and as a result was forced to return to her parents‘ home:  
…their [girl abductees] marriages are failing because people still call them rebels and at 
times they cannot take these insults. For example, Filder has left her marital home 
because somebody provoked and called her a rebel. Filder picked a razor blade and began 
cutting that person‘s body. When the person started running and screaming, Filder picked 
a hoe and began chasing the person. We [Filder‘s family] were immediately called there 
[marital home] and she was handed to us. That is why she is home now.112 
Although they survived by being aggressive and violent, such reactions often interfere with their 
life back home (McKay &Mazurana, 2004:37), hindering their reintegration. Antisocial 
behaviour and violation of gender norms affect their ability to readjust to the expectations of the 
community. The time spent away from ‗normal‘ society is not only a determinant of the 
participants‘ behaviour and attitude towards marriage and other relationships, but also has had a 
long-lasting impact on their life in general. Many returned home with a different view of life that 
is contrary to an ordinary young woman: rougher, more assertive/aggressive, tougher, more 
individualistic, and with a higher sense of independence. This is apparent in those in towns, who 
are expressive, with a high sense of self-esteem. However, this achievement leaves them in a 
complicated and vulnerable position with no—or limited—ways of channelling this positive 
experience so that it does not come across as a ‗bush mentality‘ or ‗unwomanly‘.  
In other countries, such as Sierra Leone, former girl soldiers were encouraged by some 
reintegration agencies to marry their former commanders and captors (see Coulter, 2009:219), 
                                                             
110Interview, CM01, Amida Sub county, 8/10/2012. 
111 Interview, CM 31 
112Participant in FMD 01, Amida. 
180 
 
but this move was not seen as appropriate in Uganda. Reception centres instead advised girls 
otherwise: ‗have nothing to do with that bush husband‘, many were told. Even the child mothers 
were dissuaded from tracing the paternal roots for their children:   
...I did not attempt to do anything like that [finding the child‘s father and paternal 
relatives] because we were advised from World Vision that there was no need doing that 
since we suffered in the bush carrying and delivering them. They [children] are our 
consolations and blessings that God has given us and that we should even never let the 
relatives of their fathers know. Even about the mere fact that we were related to them and 
had come back home...113 
They were instead encouraged to find new partners and ‗forget their past‘. But because of 
stigma, among other problems, the new marriages with never-abducted men have also not been 
successful for many of them (see also Justice & Reconciliation Project, 2006).  
Some of the participants were adamant that the community is responsible for their marriage woes 
where their never-abducted men are pressurised into mistreating or abandoning them. Although 
this community driven stigmatisation affects the way the men relate with the women, limiting the 
stigma problem to community members is not a sufficient reason to explain their marriage 
struggles. In an attempt to explain why marriages with non-abducted men rarely result in 
sustainable unions, the Justice & Reconciliation Project (2006) notes that this is because ‗spouses 
who had never experienced abduction or life in the ―bush‖ are unable to empathize or relate with 
those who did.‘ The current findings support this argument. Instead of empathizing with their 
situation, their partners actually take advantage of the women‘s background and vulnerability:  
Since we [abductees] came back home, men are just fooling around with and using us. 
They pick you knowing about your abduction experience and go on to say they will stay 
with you but then later, they start calling you a rebel. For instance, when I returned home, 
a man asked to marry me. I even had a child with him but he shortly abandoned me and 
this has increased my problems because I have more children to support…114 
My bush experience has affected my social life. Had it not been my abduction past, I am 
sure I would be in my home [married]. I would be settled with a man in a family. But this 
does not happen because when I get married; people are always stigmatizing me. That 
man [former husband] was beating me a lot and calling me a rebel, which is why I left 
him.  The fact that I am a former abductee makes life difficult for me.115 
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Anyone would expect a man who opposes and ignores the ill-feelings of their own families 
towards marrying a formerly abducted girl to sympathise with the women‘s situation and stigma. 
However, in most cases, the partners are part of the problem or are the source of it: ‗…because of 
the stigmatisation I go through in this community, my life has not been good since I came back 
home. My husband who could help to eradicate the stigmatisation is also a party to it. This 
makes me very unhappy…‘116 
Apart from separation (discussed further below), secrecy is another strategy to deal with 
stigmatisation in marriage. Among the seven women in the sample that had relocated from their 
villages to towns and purposely kept their captivity experience a secret, two of them had never 
revealed their past to their husbands. One of them (aged 36) had been married for two years but 
left her partner because of his womanising behaviour: ‗people here in my marital home, there is 
no one who knows that I have been in the bush. I live a responsible life style just like everyone 
with no bush experience.‘117 Although secrecy helps the participants protect themselves from 
stigmatisation, it remains limited to the few who are able to relocate to completely new 
environments.   
Domestic Violence 
The possibility of young men in Acholi being fewer than marriageable young women 
exacerbates the former abductees‘ marriage problems. Most relationships men create with former 
girl soldiers and other child mothers are not serious and do not end in a respected customary 
marriage. But because the young women are desperate to ‗have a home‘, they end up moving in 
with some of these men. When the union fails to work out, the men abandon them, leaving the 
women in a more socially and economically complex position and situation. 
However, some men do stay with the women, but exercise their power by bestowing less respect, 
being violent and viewing the women as ‗mentally unstable‘ and/or ‗stupid‘. Apart from 
stigmatisation, another problem facing formerly abducted girls in their marriages is domestic 
violence. While this study discusses domestic violence from the perspective of formerly 
abducted girls, it points to problems of abuse of young women in the wider Acholi community 
(see Annan & Brier, 2009; Okello&Hovil, 2007). Beyond Acholi, evidence shows that domestic 
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violence is prevalent in many parts of Uganda, with more than two thirds of women who ever 
married having experienced some kind of gender based violence (physical, sexual and 
emotional) in the recent past. The problem is worse for women in rural than in urban areas 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2006, cited in Uganda Women‘s Network, 2012:3). Beyond 
Uganda, it has been identified that domestic violence is the most prevalent yet relatively hidden 
and ignored form of violence against women and girls (World Health Organization, 1996). 
Intimate partner violence (IPV) is the most common form of domestic violence against the 
participants: ‗the range of sexually, psychologically and physically coercive acts used against 
adult and adolescent women by current or former male intimate partners‘ (World Health 
Organization, 1997). IPV is a prevalent problem in the Ugandan marriage context (see 
Demographic and Health Survey, 2006; Koenig et al., 2003; Karamagi et al., 2006; Zablotska et 
al., 2007; Annan et al., 2008).  
Most of the participants repeatedly experience verbal abuse (threats, shouting or yelling) from 
their husbands. Among these, some experience physical threats or violence including pushing, 
slapping or holding them down: ‗my husband is very quarrelsome. He beats me. He verbally 
abuses me that I am from the bush, stupid and not mentally sound. That if I hadn‘t been 
abducted, I would have gone to school and may be would be a sensible woman...‘118The men 
usually violate them when they are under the influence of alcohol or if there is a disagreement in 
the family (see also Annan et al., 2008). Alcohol consumption before sex or at any other time not 
only emotionally distresses women, it is majorly responsible for the domestic violence in their 
marital homes. Studies have shown that the male partners‘ characters are predictors of their 
violent behaviour towards their spouses (Vlahov et al., 1998) and have found a strong connection 
between consumption of alcohol or drugs and violent behaviour (see van der Straten et al., 1998; 
Watts, 1998; Rao, 1997; Weinsheimer et al., 2005; Karamagi et al., 2006).   
In Acholi (and indeed other Ugandan ethnic groups), there is a belief that a woman should be 
punished (by beating) if she does not pay heed to her husband or father or brother(s)-in-law (see 
Uganda Women‘s Network, 2012:3; Speizer, 2010; Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 
2000-2001, 2006:411). Considering that in Acholi, customary law seems to overrule civil law, 
the women have to find ways to live with it. Among the participants, unlike those in towns, 
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women in remote villages seemed to endure the violence. Town participants were more likely to 
condemn and walk away from violent marriages (see also Rani et al.,n.d.). Their remote village 
counterparts were left trapped in their marriages because, as complete dependants of men, they 
hoped to gain material and social security, access to resources like land, and to search for 
fulfilment of their needs. As a consequence, engaging in marriage is for them more of a need 
than a desire. It is not their choice to endure the stigmatisation and domestic violence, but with 
no other alternative, they decide to stay in the marriages. 
While the impacts of physical abuse may be more visible than stigmatisation, psychological 
scarring, shouting, humiliation and constant threats of violence and injury are more subtle and 
dangerous forms of violence directed at this category of women in their marriages. Marital 
homes are often equated with or expected to be a sanctuary, a place where women seek love, 
safety and protection. However, for many of the participants, their marital homes (and biological 
families) are places that expose them to danger and breed severe forms of violence towards 
them: ‗elements of their [formerly abducted girls‘] new relationships [mirror] that of their forced 
―marriages‖ during abduction, such as the physical violence and inability to leave or escape these 
relationships‘ (Annan & Brier, 2010). Violence against them has become a cycle of abuse that 
has manifested itself in many forms throughout their lives (life in captivity and back home). 
Domestic violence leaves them in a situation where they are often made to feel helpless and 
psychologically destabilized.  
8.5.2 Separation as the only Response to Stigmatisation and Domestic Violence 
However important marriage is to the young women, they still resist the stigmatisation, violence 
and other problems they encounter. They do this by making selfless choices like deserting the 
unions. Particularly, of the women who were eloping, 37 per cent had deserted their marriage 
and one of them had separated from her second partner. The separated women either end up 
living with their parent(s) or renting in trading centres and town slums, while taking care of their 
children and other dependants (see also Baines &Gauvin, 2014:290). Of the 54 per cent that were 
‗having a home‘ (married), 7 per cent (n=4) were attempting marriage for the second time since 
they exited the LRA. Although some of the participants were still living with their partners, plans 
of abandoning ‗their homes‘ were revealed during the interviews. They were frustrated and had 
lost hope in their men and marriage: ‗it [marriage] is not really good because he abuses and 
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insults me saying I am insane given that I came back from the bush. He also likes fighting and 
beating me a lot… Life is very hard for me here and I plan to leave‘.119 Leaving the marriage 
often happens after a considerable period of time, but in other cases it occurred in less than a 
year: 
When I returned home, my parents had died and I struggled with life. I met a man and we 
started an informal marriage which lasted less than a year. I left him because I could not 
stand what people there [marital home] were saying about me and my children. I left that 
home and started renting here in town and taking care of my children. Since 2009 to date, 
I am still not married.120 
Even though the findings reveal high marriage separation rates among former girl abductees, this 
should be set in the wider post-conflict Acholi situation, and not only associated with an 
abduction past. When former girl soldiers‘ problematic marriages are compared to other young 
women within the Acholi society, the study concludes that this turbulence in the marriage 
institution is a legacy of a long war (see also Isis-WICCE, 2001:45). In an attempt to explain the 
high levels of ‗marriage‘ separation among former girl abductees and other young women (who 
mainly end up in loose marriage-like circumstances), the participants reported that, when they 
encounter problems in ‗their homes‘, they find abandoning them for newer unions or single 
parenthood living as the only solution. With no marriage counselling or any other related 
support, for many of these women, separation is inevitable.  
Finnistroom (2008:193) notes that ‗a formal marriage with bride wealth may assist in 
neutralizing such threatening potentials [cen] of former rebel women‘, but with the bride price 
fully paid, a woman‘s opportunities to abandon a sour marriage are limited. Here, the woman is 
often advised by her family to endure and maintain her marriage even if she is not happy. 
Because returning home means the parents or brothers will be subjected to bride price refunding, 
the woman is persuaded to stay in the marriage: ‗if you cannot bear the marriage challenges after 
giving birth and decide to separate with the man, you are again insulted for failing to sustain your 
marriage regardless of your pleas. Instead of returning the money they [father and/or brothers] 
could have received from their in-laws for you to be peaceful…‘121 Bride price keeping women 
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in violent marriages has been widely discussed (see Baryomunsi, 2004; Macdonald-Levy & 
MacMillan, 2005; Hague et al., 2011; Horne, et al., 2013). According to the terms agreed upon 
when the bride price is paid, there is a possibility of refund, particularly in the event of marriage 
break-up. Under the customary marriage law, if a woman can prove her dissatisfaction with her 
husband or marriage in general, she can be allowed to separate from the husband. The other 
condition is that her new husband pays the bride price that was paid to her family by the former 
husband. This shows how complicated it can be for a young woman to desert a fixed or 
cohabitation marriage. She either relies on her supportive family to refund the bride price or must 
find another man to service that debt—meaning leaving one marriage for another. Considering 
that most of these women are financially dependent on their husbands, lack any power to make 
demands upon the men, their families cannot (or are unwilling to) repay the bride price, and they 
cannot get a new husband able and willing to repay their debt; the women remain stuck in the 
‗bad‘ marriages. These are the women that are most at risk of being subjected to further abuse 
and exploitation in their marriages.  
Nonetheless, the difficulty of deserting a fixed or cohabitation marriage should not suggest that 
returning home when an elopement marriage fails is any easier. The fact that the woman has 
never taken the man to her family so that bride price is agreed upon and paid leaves her in a 
dilemma when the union fails: 
Staying with a man without sending something [bride price] back home, you feel 
ashamed because in the past, if you are formally married in a family and maybe you 
separate from your husband, you easily go back home [parental]. In this case, if your 
bride price was transferred to marry your brother‘s wife, you will go and stay at your 
brother‘s house. But if you are not married [eloping], you will fear to go back home when 
the union fails because you will be thinking, ‗If I separate with this man, where will I go 
and stay? Whose house will I enter to live in?‘122 
For some women, it is not bride price or the absence of it that hinders their mobility in this 
institution, but the burden of extra children. Even if the marriage/union is not working out as 
hoped, women are more concerned and worried about what will become of their children. Their 
children become the reason they endure ‗bad‘ marriages: ‗if it was not because of my children I 
would have left him, but I already have three children with him and I cannot leave them or go 
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away with them…‘123 With no economic independence, women have no power to take care of 
their children and themselves. The option of leaving the union and returning to their parental 
family with one or more children is also not an easy choice to make.  
Another category of the participants were stuck in these hopeless marriages because they simply 
did not have anyone or any family to escape to. These were total orphans with no alternative but 
to endure the ‗bad‘ marriage. For example, 20 year old Josephine had been eloping for two years 
and had one child at the time of study. She desperately wanted to leave her marriage but because 
she has nowhere or anyone to turn to, she was forced to go on with the marriage: ‗I am just 
staying here because there is nowhere else I can go. Only if there was somewhere I could go, I 
would not continue living like this, with people who despise me.‘124 These women are trapped in 
bad marriages because they have no one to turn to or simply because they cannot afford to live 
alone or move back in with parents where they will still be stigmatised and ridiculed for not 
getting ‗their own home‘.  
7.6 Marriage Remains a Significant Element of Long-Term Reintegration 
Regardless of the problems girl abductees encounter in their attempts to get married, this is an 
aspect of life they cannot afford to completely walk away from. To the formerly abducted girls, 
marriage is life. Fear of being viewed as ‗nothing‘, a malaya (‗prostitute‘) and/or Gekere‘ 
(‗second hand‘ or ‗second class women‘) causes them to stay in ‗bad‘ marriages or re-enter new 
ones. Abandoning a marriage means the cycle starts all over again for an individual woman—
waiting and searching for another man to honour and give her ‗a home‘. This testing process may 
take a long time: ‗…I angrily left my home and came back to my mother‘s home. I have been 
here now for three years... I have failed to get ‗my home‘ because people say that, ―if a man 
marries someone who has been in the bush, she might kill him one time‖ and this is why I am 
still living at our home [parental]‘.125 At the time of interviews, many of the participants that had 
abandoned their marriages had been searching for new husbands for a while (about 2–4 years).  
This continuous searching and longing for marriage is understandable. Considering that the 
participants‘ demographic data shows an average age of 26 years, many former abductees are 
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still young, with many chances of reattempting to have ‗a home‘. In addition, being unmarried 
beyond the age of 25 may prompt people to start perceiving them as ‗abnormal‘, cursed or 
carrying cen and in need of cultural healing. Until they get ‗potential‘ men to ‗give them homes‘, 
they have to withstand stigmatisation for having abandoned their marriage and returned to ‗their 
mothers‘ homes‘. They receive and are accorded very little respect because their marriage failure 
is simply concluded to be their total fault. They are viewed as undisciplined, irresponsible and 
unmarriageable: ‗we are constantly insulted in the community. They call us gekere. We are not 
free; the community members insult us. Since we are not married, the community sees us as total 
failures‘.126 
Because marriage is a cultural shared norm that they are expected to fulfil and failure at it 
promotes social isolation and stigma, it is no surprise that at the time of interviews, some of the 
participants had been married once or twice before they were even 25 years old. Although aware 
of the dangers that come with changing men, when they are stranded, unable to keep up with the 
social pressure and stigmatisation, they opt to go back and forth in these irregular marriages: ‗the 
man will come to you and convince you that, ‗with me, you will not have the same problem like 
the one you had in your previous marriage‘ and with the poverty you are facing, you decide to go 
for another marriage.‘127 
The relationship between an individual child mother and her parents impacts the former‘s 
decisions when she returns home after a marriage has failed. Inability to draw sympathy and 
support from their own families pushes them to desperate measures like going back to their same 
bad marriage: 
The problem is with our parents. For us who have delivered at an early age and come 
back home because the man is terrible, the parents talk to us in a bad way. This 
unpleasant treatment will annoy you all the time and when your former husband asks you 
to go back; you find you do not have any better alternative but to go back.128 
All these factors drive them to either keep with their violent and stigmatising husbands or enter 
another marriage and, if unlucky, the haste lands them in another bad union. The cycle starts all 
over again. Changing men does not provide any relief from their challenges but instead doubles 
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their magnitudes, for example producing a number of children with different men. This also 
increases their vulnerability, risk and exposure to HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted 
diseases. But, for them as individuals, considering the cultural importance of marriage, however 
frustrating and challenging they find these unions to be, with their social and economic standing, 
they cannot afford to give up on finding a stable ‗home‘. With no other means to survive, cope 
with stigmatisation, and regain their deserved positions as Acholis, the fight to secure a good 
marriage continues for this category of young women.  
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
Chapter Six discussed stigma promotion and how it hinders reintegration. The present chapter 
has extended this discussion by analysing participant marriage experiences and realities. Among 
other factors, stigmatisation, violence and patriarchal tendencies are the main challenges to their 
marriage attempts. However, because being married is central to social identity and status and 
the women depend on marriage for socio-economic survival, many stick in ‗bad‘ marriages or, 
alternatively, abandon them and attempt to remarry. In addition to stigmatisation and marriage 
problems, another reintegration challenge participants share is their lack of assets and 
capabilities to generate sufficient income. Findings suggest strongly that ability to earn an 
income positively impacts socio-economic reintegration and well-being of such vulnerable 
women. However, although many try to make their life situations bearable by engaging in one or 
more livelihood options, they still cannot sustain themselves and have to rely on other people to 
help them to meet their production and consumption needs.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
REINTEGRATION AND LIVELIHOODS 
This chapter which discusses economic reintegration is loosely based on the sustainable 
livelihoods framework (see Carney, 1998; Scoones, 1998). Livelihood comprises the capabilities, 
assets (including information, cultural knowledge, social networks and legal rights) as well as 
tools, land and other physical resources and activities required for a means of living (see 
Chambers & Conway, 1992). Basically, livelihood is the command an individual has over an 
income and/or bundles of resources that can be used or exchanged to satisfy his or her needs. A 
livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain 
or enhance its capabilities and assets, both now and in the future, while not undermining the 
natural resource base (ibid). 
 
Livelihood is another great reintegration priority and challenge for former child soldiers. Save 
for the Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY) by Annan et al. (2006, 2008), research exploring 
the impact of life in captivity on livelihoods following reinsertion into the communities is still 
scant. With livelihood strategies undergoing a significant change in Acholi, this chapter analyses 
their long term effect(s) on the formerly abducted girls. The findings support the hypothesis that 
war and life in captivity reduce child abductees‘ human capital in form of education and health. 
Back in the communities, this deficit affects their livelihood options and subsequent economic 
reintegration. Although most northern Ugandan youth face an acute economic dilemma (see 
Annan et al., 2008; International Alert, 2013), it is more challenging for formerly abducted 
young adults. With their economic reintegration characterised by extreme scarcity and 
deprivation, they are doing worse than their never-abducted peers (Annan et al., 2008:13; see 
also Verhey, 2002; Boothby, 2006; Françoise & Specht, 2003).  
8.1 Abduction and Lost Education Opportunity 
The prolonged conflict affected education provision in most areas of northern Uganda (see Bird 
et al., 2011; HRW, March & July 2003). Many adolescents (abducted or not) missed out on 
education and skill training (Women‘s Commission, 2001), leading to prevalent youth illiteracy 
and unemployment today (see International Alert, 2013; Annan, et al., 2011:13). Loss of 
education and the resultant literacy gap is worse for women than males (see Annan et al., 
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2008:18). For the participants, one of the most devastating outcomes of their recruitment appears 
to be the years of education and economic opportunity lost. The majority (75%) were attending 
primary school (grades 1–4) at the time of their abduction, cutting short their chance of attaining 
an education or skill training. As demonstrated inFigure 8.1, due to various problems and 
circumstances, many did not rejoin school when they returned home. 
 
Fig8.1: Reasons for not going back to/continuing with school upon return 
Interviews show that the level of education at time of recruitment, length of abduction, age at 
return and motherhood determine if a former female abductee can go back to mainstream 
education or join vocational studies (see also Annan et al., 2008:23). 
Among the participants who were attending school at the time of abduction or were yet to enrol, 
only 12 per cent (N=7) went back to school when they returned from captivity. These all had had 
at least four years of education prior to their abduction. This suggests that young returnees with a 
considerable level of education are more likely to rejoin mainstream education if supported. 
Participants who had at least four years of education felt they could fit into school when they 
first returned, unlike those who had to start from lower primary classes. Young women gave 
varying reasons why they dropped out of school (those who had rejoined) or did not bother going 
back at all. Although the majority blamed lack of money to support their education, many saw 
themselves as too old (mainly as a result of motherhood) or were unwilling to go back to primary 
school and sought to join vocational training programmes:  
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I did not go back to school when I returned home because my period for studying had 
already passed and it was not possible to start primary one. But I went for a tailoring 
course.129 
Going back to school, as an adult is very difficult because I returned home when I had 
already delivered three children. To add on that, if I decided to go back to school, I would 
be starting from primary one. Imagine that. It would be possible and appropriate if I had 
at least stopped around primary four when I was abducted.130 
Motherhood is a big determinant for female child abductees to either pursue education or not 
(see McKay &Mazurana, 2004; HRW, March & July 2003; Mazurana& Carlson, 2004). Exiting 
armed groups, child mothers are mostly unable, disallowed, or unwilling to attend school. In fact, 
the seven participants who went back to school had not returned with children and were in 
captivity for less than four years. Compared to their never abducted peers in northern Uganda, 
formerly abducted child mothers have attained significantly less schooling (roughly 1.3 fewer 
grades) and are considerably more likely to be illiterate (Annan et al., 2008:23). Exiting armed 
groups with children, child mothers see themselves as adults by virtue of having given birth. 
They view caring for their children as their main responsibility and place high priority on the 
education of their children, even when most of them have no means to achieve that: ‗I did not go 
back to school because I already had children. But then how could you go back and study when 
children are not in school? The only school related support I needed then and still need is for my 
children.‘131 Similarly, participants who were in captivity for a long time were in most cases also 
unable or unwilling to resume mainstream education due to emotional illnesses, shame and low 
self-esteem issues. They felt unable to concentrate on schoolwork: ‗I have not been able to return 
back to school. I feel like I am not as bright as I was before abduction. I believe I died and later 
resurrected after I was battered in captivity. I also stayed long in the bush and wonder if my dull 
feelings are a result of the blackout I experienced‘132 (see also HRW, March & July 2003). 
Research shows that abduction length impacts on the education loss and illiteracy gap among 
female returnees (see Annan et al., 2008:23).  
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8.2 Dependence on Peasant Farming 
With little or no education, knowledge or skills to enable them to acquire employment or 
financial capital to start up a small business, many formerly abducted girls are among the poorest 
of the poor in Acholi. With no other livelihood alternative, they depend on peasant farming that 
they were born, socialised and apprenticed into. However, among other challenges, two factors 
hinder their full participation in this livelihood: land accessibility and poor health.   
8.2.1 Women‘s Limited Access and Ownership Rights of Land 
Gender inequality in land accessibility and ownership across the developing world has been 
widely documented (for example, see Deere & Doss, 2008; Deere et al., 2009). Women‘s land 
accessibility and ownership in Uganda is consistently lower than that for men (see Associates for 
Development and Centre for Basic Research, 2006). The 1995 Constitution (Chapter IV, Article 
33, pp.20–58) promotes protection from deprivation of property for both women and men. The 
1998 Land Act (Chapter 227, section 27) also solidifies this policy and supports women‘s access 
to and use of land. However, limited access to and ownership of land (and other resources) 
remains a huge hindrance to women‘s economic development (see Uganda Bureau of Standards, 
2011). The presence or absence of land depends on cultural practices, gender and financial 
status. The land system practised, traditional norms and low economic status limit Acholi (and 
other Ugandan) women from inheriting; accessing and owning land (see Doss et al., 2012).  
As discussed in Chapter Four, land in Acholi society is held under customary tenure. Although 
the Ugandan 1998 Land Act provides land rights for women, it also states that, under customary 
law, women do not own land—they can only fight to access it, but not own it. There are three 
ways they can do this: through marriage, parents and renting (or even buying). For extremely 
poor women like the participants, marriage and parents are the only means (68 per cent reported 
access to cultivation land through these two channels). 
Accessing Land through Marriage 
Marriage ensures that a woman can access her husband‘s land for food production even in the 
event of the husband‘s death (see Adoko& Levine, 2004). The widow can still access the 
husband‘s land only in trust for the male children; in principle, she is the custodian of the land 
until the children become adults and the land transfers to their control. This, however, works in 
favour of the legally married women. Those who end up in informal marriages like most of the 
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participants may have no right to even access land. At the death of the husband, his family may 
remove the land from the care of the mother and her children (Human Rights Focus, 2013). 
Although war, education, religion and modernity are slowly changing social life organisation, 
Acholi is still a patriarchal society. Women‘s rights—or lack thereof—to access land are not so 
much rooted in the legal system but in the gender relations that continue to prevail in this region 
(Adoko& Levine, 2005). While the Ugandan constitution recognises women as property owners, 
patriarchal and cultural practices are still marginalising females in these aspects. Governmental 
efforts to mainstream gender in policy and planning are making some progress but areas in 
which gender inequalities are still salient include gender disparities in education, access and 
control over productive resources, and gender based violence. 
Accessing Land through Parents 
As long as a woman is living with both parents in the same household, she is able to access the 
family land. This access is based on the relationship shared between the family and a young 
woman. For example, some of the maternal orphans in the sample were not able to access family 
land. In such cases, accessibility can only be granted based on sympathy for the woman 
emanating from other family/clan members. Those who feel she has access by virtue of being a 
child to a particular man or family/clan will in fact side with her in demanding access and 
utilisation of land. However, this is also not a straightforward process. At times, clan members 
side with the step–mother, or they frustrate this means of access. For instance, in the case of a 
failed marriage, when a paternal orphan returns to her father‘s ancestral land, she is likely to face 
a challenge in sharing land with clan brothers and their wives:  
…when I came back from the bush, I found cases of land disputes rising. To make 
matters worse, they [family/clan members] look at us [abductees] as foreigners and they 
do not want us to even use the land for digging. My very own brothers and relatives are 
denying me land. Cases of land wrangle are a big issue in my family. When I want to 
grow food, I have to hire a garden from some other people…133 
Cases of orphans being marginalised by paternal relatives were common among the participants. 
This leaves such female returnees most vulnerable, with no one to stand up to such family and 
clan relatives.  
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Inability to access family land drives some of them to change men or remain in marriages where 
they are stigmatised and violated. Take the example of 20-year-old Josephine, whom we met in 
Chapter Seven. She attempted to abandon her ‗bad‘ marriage and return to her (deceased) 
father‘s land. She was, however, blocked by her clan relatives from cultivating it. Left with no 
choice, she returned to her marriage: ‗I cannot go back home, there is no land that I can cultivate 
there. I tried to go back home before and it was difficult and I had to return to my husband. If I 
go back again, my relatives will once again ask me what has chased me from my marriage, and 
why I am back to bother them‘.134 This tossing about between marriage and family/clan members 
hinders reintegration and chances to concentrate on agriculture livelihood. Historically, such land 
disputes in Acholi were settled by clan elders but, recently, various actors (religious leaders, 
politicians, local government officials, etc.) are involved in settling disputes. However, for 
female returnees, the notion of attaining external assistance to access agricultural land is still an 
alien concept (see McKibben& Bean, n.d). Poorly informed of their options, they are left to 
choose between land that may offer them a livelihood strategy in ‗bad‘ marriages or living a 
more economically challenging and stigmatising life as single parents.  
Renting and Purchasing Land 
With marriage and parents resulting in limitations on land accessibility for female returnees, 
some resort to purchasing or renting land in order to grow food. In recent years, because of 
increasing land disputes, the rate at which individuals are buying and owning land is rising. 
However, considering that female returnees are among the poorest in the region, purchasing land 
is simply unachievable for most of them. Only one participant (see case study 1, further below) 
had purchased a piece of land in her home district. Those who could not access land through 
marriage and parents were left with only one option, renting land to grow food. The practice of 
renting land as described in the 1998 Land Act is like ‗leasehold tenure‘, whereby one party 
grants to another the ‗right‘ to exclusive possession of land for a specified period, usually, but 
not exclusively, in exchange for the payment of rent. In the case of Acholi, rents range between 
5,000 and 50,000 Uganda Shilling (U$3 to 24) per farming season. This depends on the size of 
the plot of land and its location (accessibility, fertility, safety). However, considering their low 
cash inflows (discussed later in this chapter), renting a relatively good piece of land may also be 
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impossible for many young women. Others may rent only for a single season, and when the 
harvest is poor, they are unable to renew.  
Children Born in Captivity and Access to Land 
Women with children born in captivity (CBIC) face an even more complex land accessibility 
situation. Most of the children end up with their maternal grandparents/relatives, while others 
remain with their mothers, either in new relationships or as single parents. Unlike their mothers, 
their rights to access maternal grandparents‘ land are narrower. Since land accessibility is 
through inheritance (father to son), unless a CBIC switches lineage, from that of the mother to 
either that of the LRA father or step-father, they lack this right/claim. With their real fathers and 
paternal clans unknown, they remain at the mercy of their maternal relatives. One returnee‘s 
circumstances with her two CBIC (girl and boy) are informative:  
I do not have any land to dig... Ever since I returned from the LRA, I have never gone 
back to my home [father‘s land] in the village. I hear about land wrangles there and this 
makes me worry about my child because without land, he will suffer. There is no man 
that will take care of my child, even if he loves me. I think about taking the child back to 
our home but since my father died when I was still young, I have no idea how his land 
was demarcated. This is making life hard for me.135 
This concern for land accessibility was a common theme across all the interviews with formerly 
abducted child mothers. But as the quotation above tells, the worry and need for accessing this 
natural resource varies according to the CBIC‘s gender. Although a mother may have two 
children (boy and girl), the land concern issue is greater for a male child. There is an assumption 
that, unlike the male CBIC, girls can always access land through their husbands when they get 
married. Therefore, there is greater need for male CBIC to access land so as to be able to raise a 
family. However, regardless of this difference, mothers generally worry about their children‘s 
education and future well-being. Mothers are aware that when CBIC become young adults, they 
will be in a more difficult land/home situation than they currently face, even those in the care of 
their maternal relatives: 
My future plan is to have a place of my own, for my children to call home. Even if we are 
living at my aunt‘s home, in the future, as human beings, people will get tired of my 
children and would expect them to find their own places. I have to plan for them before 
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they become adults by finding a piece of land, construct a house on it. For agricultural 
land, if I find a Good Samaritan to allow me rent their land, we can grow some food...136 
For this category of female returnees, their successful reintegration is beyond their acceptance in 
family and community, ‗good‘ marriage or their access to land. It is about achieving a 
sustainable livelihood to ensure that their children have stability and are taken care of. When 
asked about their plans for the future, all mothers disclosed that their desire and priority is to 
ensure their children have access to education and land. The reality and worry about their 
children‘s inability to access such basic needs as land and a stable home leaves their 
reintegration and integration of their children problematic and far from successful. Mothers 
appealed for the children to be supported so that they can study and find stable land and home. 
This will stop the children‘s continuous stigmatisation, resentment and rejection:  
Our [with siblings] ancestral land that our dead father left is there but our paternal uncle 
disturbs us. He does not want us to cultivate the land. Now days we are looking for land 
from other people. For my case, I am suffering more with these children I came back with 
from the bush. My relatives do not want them on their land. We [abductees] need help 
with land where we can raise these children from. They need a home and stability.137 
 
8.2.2 ‗If only I was normal‘: Health Complications Impacting Peasant Farming 
Interviews show female fighters return from war with physical and health problems (see also 
Chrobok&Akutu, 2008; McKay &Mazurana, 2004:63–67). The participants reported physical 
and reproductive health problems resulting from rape and incidents of physical strain that 
occurred during captivity. They suffer from severe chest, back and abdominal pains, headache, 
stomach ulcers, bullet wounds and fragments, and general weaknesses (see also McKay 
&Mazurana, 2004:67). According to them, the root cause of their health complications is due to 
the heavy loads they carried, physical torture, starvation and bullet fragments that are still lodged 
in their bodies. Since they exited the LRA, many have not had proper diagnosis and treatment: 
‗...I was shot in the chest below my breast and a bullet got lodged there and it is still there up to 
now. I feel severe pain every day. I was scanned twice at Lacor and St Joseph Hospital but they 
did not find anything. But recently when I did another scan, a bullet was seen lodged in the bone 
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and cannot be removed‘.138 Although such health complications are common, many other injured 
females and males in northern Uganda still urgently need appropriate medical attention (see 
Annan et al., 2008; Isis-WICCE, 2006; Liebling-Kalifani& Baker, 2009; Liebling-Kalifani et al., 
2008), such problems remain particularly severe among returnees (see also Allen &Schomerus, 
2006).  
Apart from health complications being aggravated by domestic violence, leaving them physically 
weaker and psychologically tormented, changing gender roles are putting such women (with 
poor health conditions) in a more difficult position. Traditionally, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
households practise gendered division of labour: a man is expected to play a significant role in 
farming, including labour intensive tasks like field clearing, breaking the land, planting and 
harvesting. In addition to domestic tasks, a wife‘s roles have always been those of weeding, 
harvesting; transporting and preparation of food.  However this is changing whereby women are 
faced with the challenge of doing more than supporting their households through productive 
work (weeding, food preparation and processing). Food production requires considerable effort 
from husband, wife and other household members, but providing for a family is today steadily 
curving towards women (see also Ahikire et al., 2010). 
Camp life in particular is felt to have severely affected the ability of a traditional male family 
head to provide for his family. It has become worse in the post conflict phase, where transference 
of many responsibilities from men to women has seemingly become entrenched. Women 
assuming productive roles is said to have been rare before people went to camps: ‗those days 
before people came to camps, it was men who used to dig and women did the weeding. But 
nowadays, you find that it is women who take charge and dig and at the same time weed the 
garden while majority of men are just drunkards.‘139 Even though men can be seen working in 
gardens (as individuals, in small groups or with the ox-plough), this happens less than before the 
war broke out. In addition to their usual heavy and time consuming reproductive roles, women 
are expected invest more energy and hours in their productive roles (agriculture and other 
subsidiary occupations) to ensure safety and survival for their families (see also Okello&Hovil, 
2007).  
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In their report on northern Uganda, Ahikire and others found that in most of the households 
studied, a pattern of comparative male absence and women‘s strong presence emerged in the 
data. Women were living as single mothers, aged and widowed. For those in 
marriages/relationships, spouses contributed little or nothing. The majority of men, if not 
physically or psychologically disabled, were reportedly sufficiently demoralised that they spent 
most of their time in alcohol consumption (Ahikire et al., 2010:17). Possibly due to physical or 
psychological problems and unemployment, men (and some women) could be observed drinking 
as early as 10 am throughout the village trading centres, with young men frequenting drinking 
places and playing cards throughout most of their day. As single mothers, widows or those 
married to unmotivated men, women feel obliged to clear the land, break the ground and plant 
crops to keep their families fed:  
I find that the capacity of a woman to dig is not the same as that of a man. But now 
because of the pressure to feed the family, you will have to break the ground yourself and 
grow food. If you do not, there is nothing you can do to take care of your children 
because your husband will not do it. Women are doing all these things on conditions and 
if it was not because of scarcity, women would not do these heavy works.140 
Going back to the formerly abducted girls, these are the contexts they find themselves in (as 
orphans, single mothers or with demoralised spouses). They are expected to function and support 
their family livelihoods like other young women but, because of their poorer health, many are 
unable to undertake the back-breaking agricultural work (see also Allen &Schomerus, 2006:25). 
This inability further creates anxiety and emotional distress among these women: ‗… due to 
abduction experience, my working capacity has reduced. The moment I work hard, I get severe 
chest pains and I will be down for about 2 to 3 days while I have garden work to be done in those 
3 days, but I will be at home with pains, this annoys me.‘141 With no money to hire people to 
open up a garden, plant, weed and harvest for them, they are left at the mercy of their husbands 
or family members who, at times, do not sympathise with their poor health. Phrases like ‗he does 
not dig for me‘ or ‗he is not supportive with garden works‘ were often used to express the 
women‘s frustration with their husbands.  
A non-supportive husband in farming was another reason why some of the participants had 
abandoned or were thinking of abandoning their marriages. For example, at the age of 28, Stella 
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could not open a garden for herself due to her severe chest pains. Her pleas with her demoralised, 
unemployed, alcoholic and violent husband to do it for her had been futile. She was left to beg 
food from her ageing mother and neighbours or feed her children on wild greens and fruits, 
making her reintegration a desperate and a problematic process. Being married to such a husband 
comes with daily scorn from friends and family members but, because their own families are too 
poor to take care of the women and the children, they choose to stay with such a man. To save 
the situation, with their health complications, they have no choice but go out and find ways of 
feeding their families: ‗...at times, with my chest pains, I weed in people‘s gardens... if I do not 
do that kind of work, I will completely be unable to provide food for my children. Whenever the 
pain is too much, it becomes very hard for me to do even that soft farming...‘142 
8.3 Supplementary Livelihood Strategies 
The chapter has so far discussed how life in captivity leaves female returnees with reduced 
human resource, and many of them are incapable of fully engaging in subsistence agriculture. 
Such factors may explain the chronic scarcity of food and other basics that define their economic 
reintegration. However, like their non-abducted peers formerly abducted young women venture 
into other possible ways to earn money and support their families (see also Women‘s 
Commission, 2001, 2002; Save the Children, 2002). Although they still participate in peasant 
farming, many are increasingly supplementing this livelihood by engaging in informal economic 
activities like alcohol brewing, small trading/business and casual labour, among others. The 
range of these opportunities is much wider in towns than in remote villages, with village 
participants mainly exchanging their labour for money in agriculture-related activities.  
Formerly abducted girls adopt economic patterns followed by most of the poorest youth in the 
region (see Annan et al., 2008:11). They start by engaging in less profitable activities such as 
hawking natural items like firewood, wild fruits and vegetables, or doing manual work 
(agricultural or construction). When they have accumulated a little in savings, they upgrade to 
charcoal selling, brewing, agricultural reselling or petty business (a more profitable, stable and 
regular income activity). Getting to this level is regarded as a sign of arrival (a foot on the 
economic ladder), representing reward for hard work, shrewdness and ability to save money:  
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I started by hawking firewood, bamboo stalks and greens. Then my cousin brother gave 
me some little start-up capital and I opened up a small charcoal business. When I saved 
some money, I was advised to start a small eating joint. So I shifted to this trading centre 
[former camp] and I opened up this small restaurant business. I am renting this place 
highly and not making much profit. Before people went back to their villages, I would get 
considerably good money but not any money. Now, I get about 20,000/= on a good day 
and around 10,000/= on a bad day. I am planning on abandoning this business and start 
up a shop at Gandyang side [Kitgum town].143 
However, with no financial capital to start or expand their basic business ventures, engaging in 
serious business is still unachievable for many of the formerly abducted girls who continue 
trading in natural resources and other back-breaking activities to earn a living. 
8.3.1Tailoring has had Little Impact on Livelihoods 
Economic reintegration commonly involves vocational training, livelihood skills and catch-up 
education programmes to provide former child soldiers with livelihood options (Ozerdem, 2003). 
Returning to contexts of chronic poverty and limited employment opportunities, skills training 
opportunities have been assumed to positively impact economic reintegration (see Machel, 1996, 
1996a, 2001; Annan et al., 2006, 2008; Boothby et al., 2006). A total of 44 per cent of the 
participants benefited from vocational skill training programmes as part of transitional support. 
Although skills received varied, the focus in this chapter is on tailoring because it was (and 
continues to be) commonly offered to female returnees and their non-abducted peers. However, 
despite the goodwill of NGOs and community based organisations, tailoring and other skills have 
not been beneficial in progressing the participants‘ economic reintegration (see also Annan et al., 
2008).  
Upon completion of a tailoring course, some participants indeed relied on their tailoring skill to 
earn a living, working either as individuals or in groups. But, over time, tailoring has not been 
successful in securing an income and empowerment for many of them. Reasons ranging from 
no/broken sewing machines to little income from the activity were cited by women, leading them 
to cut short their participation in this activity. Prossy‘s story (Table 8.2)144 is an illustration of 
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how a hands-on skill like tailoring can provide a secure livelihood and contribute to long-term 
economic reintegration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8.2: Positive Impact of Tailoring on Reintegration – Prossy’s Story 
Prossy, now 28 years old was abducted at the age of 10 in 1994. After 11 years with the LRA, first as a ting-
ting and later as a corporal, commanding a unit of 11 soldiers, she escaped in 2005, pregnant with her first 
child. Along with her, she brought seven people of her unit. Like many of formerly abducted girls, she 
underwent a tailoring skill training course for 6 months. This was offered by KICWA. She did not get a 
sewing machine after the training and did not have money to hire one, either. Equipped with the skill, she 
struggled to find employment in Kitgum, but in vain. She later joined her young brother in Gulu, searching 
for opportunities and support for her and her son. In Gulu, she did odd jobs including being a domestic 
helper (maid) and hawking people‘s items for a commission. 
She later got a tailoring job at Living Hope centre. This is a Christian organisation (part of Watoto Church) 
that empowers vulnerable single mothers with a basic economic skill. Living Hope employs young women 
with a skill and experience and because of her tailoring training, Prossy obtained employment here in the 
tailoring department. She started by sewing clothes and making different kinds of dolls. She was paid 
according to the number of orders she completed in two weeks. Suppose she made 8 dolls in two weeks, she 
was paid 120,000 Uganda shilling ($49). Therefore, the more dolls she produced, the more money she 
earned in that period. She did tailoring for two years and because of her outstanding performance and 
competence she was promoted to a position of a trainer, still in the same department. With her new role, she 
trained new single mothers how to sew clothes and dolls. Although she worked harder at her new exhausting 
role while still earning 120,000 shillings in two weeks, this was a more satisfying position. After one year as 
a trainer, she was promoted to work in quality control department, sort of as a quality supervisor, a position 
she still maintained at time of the interview. She earned a monthly salary of almost 300,000 ($120).   
With no support from anyone else, the salary is her sole livelihood allowing her to care for her three 
children, the children of her dead siblings and other dependants. Because her clan members would not allow 
her to construct a house on her father‘s land, she was forced to buy a piece of land in Pader (home district). 
But because Pader is distant and remote, she planned to purchase another piece of land near Gulu town and 
construct a family house on it. She also has plans to go back to school through the adult literacy system: ―...I 
want to study however old I will be. My heart really wants to study and if I study, it is not to get big jobs or 
compete for better jobs, I just want to increase my knowledge…‖ Prossy revealed.  
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Unfortunately, such relative successful stories are not common in Acholi villages and towns. The 
participants had anticipated that learning tailoring would help them accomplish their dream of a 
better life for themselves (see also Caulter, 2009), but this has not been possible for most. The 
other nine women in the sample (in Kitgum trading centres) earned very little and irregular 
incomes from their tailoring practice and did not consider it as a reliable source of income (see 
also Annan et al., 2008:22). Such discouraging findings show that tailoring skill in Uganda has 
had little impact on former girl soldiers‘ livelihoods.  
Skills like tailoring were offered based on gendered ideas of what the women should do rather 
than on an assessment of their capacity or potential for generating meaningful income(see also 
Utas, 2005; MacKenzie, 2009a:212; Annan et al., 2008:22). This resulted in an overabundance 
of women (abducted and non-abducted) trained in tailoring, diluting the worth of their skill. 
Without training in skills that have marketable value in communities, the participants have been 
forced to find alternatives for survival. 
8.3.2 Brewing as a Source of Income 
Among all the supplementary occupations the young women in the sample participated in, more 
than half of them were involved in brewing and distilling. This was not surprising, considering 
that brewing is the primary economic activity among the lowest income earning females in 
northern Uganda (see Annan et al., 2008:13). Although Acholi women brewed in the past (see 
Girling, 1960; Atkinson, 1994:60), it was usually a subsidiary rather than the main or sole 
activity which is widely encountered today. Young women in their early and mid-twenties are 
increasingly brewing and distilling for survival. This not only demonstrates alcohol‘s widespread 
use in the region, but the increasing dependency on cash in rural areas. It also shows women‘s 
desperation to earn a living for themselves or as contributors to family incomes.   
As Evaline‘s story demonstrates (Table 8.2),145  brewing is popular in Acholi because it is 
reasonably profitable, does not require a lot of skill and financial capital and can be carried out at 
home, alongside domestic tasks and child care (see also Annan et al., 2008:13). Only a small 
amount of money is needed to purchase yeast and buy or/and rent distilling equipment. The 
activity can be done on an individual account and no licence is needed to produce or sell/supply 
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alcohol. However, this does not mean that everywoman can participate in this economic activity. 
Those who are completely unable to secure any money to access inputs and equipment are 
limited in their participation (Annan et al., 2008:13). The participants that had brewing as their 
main source of income were economically better off than those who desired, but were unable, to 
participate in brewing. Although brewing makes a relatively positive contribution to young 
women‘s incomes, it is still difficult to save enough money from it. Evaline shared her 
experience:  
The business [brewing] can best be described by the losses that I usually incur. It is very 
rare that it has paid me well. A good return ranges slightly above 10,000 or 15,000 
Uganda shillings. And it is part of this money that I save in the Village Savings and Loan 
Associations while the rest is used in sustaining the business running and providing food 
for the family as well. The challenge is money earned through the sale of alcohol can 
never be saved into meaningful accumulation.146  
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Dependence on Brewing Affects Peasant farming Activities… 
In the past, women spent most of their time fulfilling their domestic and farming roles (see 
Girling, 1960:190–91). The tradition of farming as an obligation for households and individuals 
has been weakened. Unlike in the past, where housewives maintained three or more cultivation 
fields (Girling, 1960:190), today it is done on a much smaller scale (monoculture gardens of less 
than an acre close to their homes). Although the diminishing communal work groups/teams and 
lack of means to hire young men or an ox-plough to cultivate the fields constrains agricultural 
Table 8.3: Brewing as the quickest way to generate cash—Evaline’s Story 
Twenty four year old Evaline was eleven years old when she was abducted in 1998. After 12 years in captivity, 
she returned to her village in 2010 with three children (a boy and two girls). She missed out on the skill training 
offered by the humanitarian agencies. When she returned to her village in Lamwo district, she first relied on her 
amnesty money to support herself and the children. She invested the balance in a restaurant business. Set up in a 
village trading centre (former camp), she earned about Ugandan Shillings 50,000 a month. The business was the 
breadwinner for her family. It footed all household bills and other related costs. Because of these high 
expenditures, the business did not survive for long. After two months, Evaline had no money left and she closed 
the restaurant. She then relied on her mother‘s brewing business to survive until she got married.  
Her husband is illiterate and unemployed. He does odd jobs to earn money.  For two years, his family has been 
involved in clan land wrangles and their household is not able to grow food. They buy most of their food or 
exchange their labour for food. Evaline experiences severe chest pains and chronic headaches and cannot do 
much digging in exchange for food. She only maintains a small garden behind her house where she grows a few 
leafy vegetables to supplement their diet.  She also depends on brewing to generate money to contribute to the 
family budget. The money she collects from brewing is spent on buying soap, salt, food and other basic needs. 
She mainly brews Waragi (local gin) and Kwete. Depending on the availability of brewing requirements, 
Evaline brews about 10 Litres of waragi a month and earns around 10,000 Shillings profits from it. It is much 
harder and expensive to brew enough Kwete, ‗the biggest challenge is getting the different components I need. 
For instance maize flour is scarce and slightly expensive on the market. I brew twice a month. However the 
number of times sometimes depends on availability of the components including the drums for fermenting and 
other equipment for brewing which I have to hire from others. For instance it is on hold right now.‘  
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productivity (Annan et al., 2008:12), there is also increasing ambivalence towards agriculture in 
general. The participants allocated less time to agriculture and instead spent more time and 
efforts on domestic chores, brewing or/and doing other subsidiary occupations. Domestic chores 
occupy women‘s lives more than any other activity (Annan et al., 2008:9; Artkinson, 1994) and 
this is severe for child mothers (abductees and non). Two of the participants in FGDs, both older 
women, had this to say: 
What I am seeing oppressing these young women in our households is workload. We 
older women here [group discussion] know this. We tend to leave household works to 
them yet they have their kids and problems to sort. But because we know that such a 
young woman has nowhere else to go, she will do all the work you give her. This is 
making life difficult for many of them because they cannot imagine any other way out to 
take care of themselves and the children.147 
The younger women in families are seen as still healthy and able to do a lot of work and 
so issues of feeding the family and other things like house chores, it is the young women 
who do them.148 
For a society that is strongly differentiated in gender roles, such young women are spending their 
youthful life doing domestic work and rearing children.  
The participants claimed that the non-existent incomes from their agricultural activities were 
forcing them to abandon/neglect their primary livelihood. However, the fact that many of them 
prefer residing in towns to remote villages indicates reduced interest in pursuing the hard life of 
farming. Many would rather venture into the alternative ways of earning a living that the towns 
offer. This reluctant attitude among the youth to participate in agriculture is noticeable 
throughout most trading centres (some were originally camps) where many have sought to stay, 
hoping to secure a source of income. Although most people in Acholi are still subsistence 
agriculturalists, large numbers of youth are moving to towns and trading centres to do business 
or for employment. This is understandable, because life in rural areas is increasingly becoming 
dependent on cash, and youths are therefore looking for strategies that bring in more money than 
agriculture.  
                                                             
147Participant, FGD01. 
148Participant, FGD02. 
206 
 
…And Reinforces Social Stigma 
Brewing exposes female returnees (and other young women) to further social stigma and abuse 
in the community. Often, their brew is consumed on credit and when they demand to be paid, 
they are abused and stigmatised on the grounds of their early motherhood and abduction. Further 
action may create relationship strains between them and other community members. Some 
participants, particularly those who were not married, were often insulted and accused by older 
women of trying to snatch their husbands under the pretext of demanding brew money. In 
Acholi, and indeed in other parts of Uganda, producing and selling alcohol is associated with 
‗prostitution‘; for instance, many women selling alcohol in central and western Ugandan villages 
commonly have failed marriages or are single mothers. They are frequently stigmatised and 
assumed to be sleeping with some of their customers. They are seen as potential carriers of the 
HIV virus and/or other sexually transmitted diseases.  
The trend and attitude in Acholi is slightly different: many of the brewers and distillers are 
respected mego (‗mothers/older women‘). However, young women joining and hoping to earn a 
living through this economic activity are not accorded the same respect. They are viewed as 
Malaya (‗prostitutes‘), with suspicion of being promiscuous and willing to have sex with the 
male customers. The fact that alcohol is produced and sold near/in their homes exposes them to 
further sexual harassment. Turning down sexual advances from their male customers may 
instigate stigmatisation. Formerly abducted girls not only have to put up with the stigma of 
having been part of the LRA, but have a ‗young female alcohol seller‘ stigma exacerbating their 
reintegration problems.   
Regardless of these problems and risks associated with brewing, the activity remains popular 
among low income earning young women. Since they brew to generate cash to meet their basic 
needs, if they were to access larger amounts of capital, it is likely that they would forego the 
activity for more cash-intensive, less stigmatising and more profitable economic activities. 
However, when girls and young women cannot get remunerative employment, are unable to 
produce enough from cultivation, and lack security to access loans, brewing and distilling 
remains the easiest and most accessible option for earning a living. The cycle continues in the 
younger generation; where girls are unable to continue with school and therefore cannot secure 
employment, brewing seems to await them.  
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8.4 Linking Ability to Earn Income to Reintegration 
Formerly abducted girls‘ participation in supplementary livelihood activities alongside 
household chores and cultivation can be interpreted as a positive sign—adopting and 
understanding the economic dynamics of their communities. With life increasingly becoming 
dependent on cash and with changing gender roles, they have to work hard to keep up with the 
economic dynamics of their society. They are shrewd, determined fighters who scramble to feed 
their families each day by engaging in any ‗affordable‘ economic activities, however risky and 
stigmatising they may be. Such ability and courage to rise above their past and be resourceful for 
their families should be recognised and appreciated. 
Their monthly incomes ranged from 10,000 to 300,000 ($4-120), with the majority earning less 
than 100,000 ($40). Most of them earned far less than 1,250 Uganda shillings (US$0.75) a day. 
Such findings show the level of serious shortage of income that defines the participants‘ 
economic reintegration. These income patterns are commonly found among the poorest young 
women in northern Uganda (see Ahikire et al., 2010:34; Annan et al., 2008). Using the 
researcher‘s judgment, the study categorises the participants into three economic cohorts based 
on their incomes, any investments (gardens, domestic animals or land), and ability to hire labour 
or rent land. The categories are ‗very-needy‘ (A), ‗poor‘ (B), and ‗above-poor‘ (C). Save for 
Prossy, who, based on her remunerative employment, falls in category C, the rest fall under the 
two poorest economic groups of A and B. These are people experiencing failed economic 
reintegration, unable to regularly generate reasonable income and who therefore depend on their 
families and husbands for economic survival.   
Participants in categories B and C who are able to provide/contribute to the family income are 
more likely to acquire a position and respect in their marriage, family hierarchy and community. 
Earning some money entitles them to appreciation and favour in the household and grants them a 
place in the decision-making process. Phrases like ‗we [husband and wife] share everything,‘ 
‗we plan together‘, ‗we solve problems to together‘ were often used in interviews to illustrate 
their approved position in the family hierarchy. With this improvement and sense of economic 
empowerment, women‘s life situations in households change for the better (see also Angeleles, 
2012:8). They increasingly participate in decisions concerning children‘s welfare, family 
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welfare; income, expenses, business and farming, among others (see also Ahikire et al., 
2010:21).  
With some level of economic empowerment, families also start sympathising and protecting 
formerly abducted girls from stigmatisation. Women whose families count on their finances have 
their stigma overlooked and receive admiration for upholding their families in such difficult 
economic times. They are frequently used as a point of reference for non-abducted peers who are 
blamed for not contributing much to their families. For example, a woman like Prossy, with a 
stable job, is viewed differently by neighbours and community members. Her financial status 
lessens the stigma and suspicious attitudes often directed towards returnees.  
Another extremely important benefit is that this economic achievement helps formerly abducted 
girls to take charge of their life situations. Their stories show that financially supporting or 
contributing to their families uplifts their status, pride, confidence and self-esteem. This 
empowerment puts them in a position where they are able to even compare their social and 
economic situations with their non-abductees peers:  
You find that, those who have been at home here; they didn‘t run anywhere, they have 
their land but their children are not in school. With all that happened to me, I am 
struggling to take care of my family, I am living better than them.149 
The way I (Prossy) see my life situation, there are some people who studied but do not 
have what to do, no jobs, nothing. Sometimes seeing such people, I feel sorry and 
sympathetic for them and feel like giving them a helping hand, but then no much 
capacity. Such people were not abducted but do not have anything in their lives; it is their 
physical body that is staying at home. But then for me, I go to work every day and get 
money. And that is why I find my life situation better off than for those who were not 
abducted. They are the one who studied and supposed to help/support you [former 
abductee] but instead it is you to help them... 150 
Some studies, such as that of Ahikire and others, argue that because almost all women were in 
IDP camps during the war, the observable urban/rural differences between them have since 
blurred (Ahikire et al., 2010:26). However current findings do not entirely support this analysis. 
Based on the present sample and experience of working in both settings (towns and villages), 
there is an apparent difference between these two categories of women. Women in remote 
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villages do not participate in as many cash generating activities as those in towns or trading 
centres; they have pretty much resumed the pre-conflict gender roles.  
More confidence and a degree of independence gives women who earn some income control 
over their life situations: for example, Prossy left her three year stigmatising marriage because 
she, her children and other dependents could survive on her salary. She did not need to rely on 
the livelihood provided in her ‗bad‘ marriage and financial support from her womanising and 
stigmatising husband. Through earning an income and thus feeling physically and emotionally 
empowered, formerly abducted girls find it necessary and possible to negotiate their position and 
resist intimate partner/cohabiters violence (see also Angelele, 2012:8). Studies have shown that 
women with greater autonomy and control over resources and reproduction are more protected 
from violence (see Jejeebhoy& Cook, 1997; Jejeebhoy, 1998; Levinson, 1989). Therefore, for 
the formerly abducted girls in remote villages that depend on marriages and husbands for 
survival, taking a decision to walk away from a ‗bad‘ marriage remains unlikely for many of 
them.  
8.5 No Stable Livelihood, No Successful Reintegration 
As we saw in Chapter Three, the literature suggests that successful reintegration is the 
continuation of livelihoods and social relationships; either to the life led before recruitment or 
life comparable to never abducted peers. The study participants defined successful reintegration 
in line with cordial relationship with community members and ability to financially sustain 
themselves. Anybody with a negative relationship or is totally dependent on family or husband to 
meet their basic needs, their reintegration should be looked at as having failed. One of them 
highlighted some of the factors determining successful reintegration in this vein,   
For me a good and successful reintegration is being able to live in harmony with other 
people which come from doing onto others what you want done onto you. When there is 
no stigma I am facing that makes it difficult for community members to identify me as a 
former abductee. The other factor is my participation into community projects such as 
farming activities and businesses without any discrimination based on my past 
experiences.  Basically, I will say I have successfully reintegrated when the stigma stops 
and I am no longer begging people for food, soap, clothes… 151 
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With many of the participants still facing serious stigmatisation in their communities, their social 
reintegration cannot be described as successful. Also, if successful reintegration is being like 
everyone else, then the economic situation of almost all the women under study cannot be 
considered a success. They are caught in the back-breaking village and trading centre poverty 
that grips many of their poorest non-abducted peers (see Annan et al., 2009). Although many of 
them have been reintegrating for a number of years now, life situations have not manifested into 
what would be described as a progressive economic reintegration. Absolute/extreme poverty is 
still the defining feature of their day-to-day lives where they are as desperate for basic needs as 
was the case in the camps.   
Successful economic reintegration requires individuals to be literate or semi-literate, healthy and 
able to work. The formerly abducted girls have reduced livelihood resources in terms of: human 
(no education, knowledge and skills; poor health; suffer psychologically); social (low social 
status; self-esteem issues; stigma; relationship/marriage problems; marginalisation; no strong 
networks and connections); natural (limited access and ownership of land); and lack of financial 
capital (no security). The overall lack of financial capital is a hindrance to effective livelihood 
strategies, leaving the majority clinging on to peasant farming even when they are unable to 
survive on it. Even those who earn a few shillings a day or month are unable to save it because 
they need more than that income just to stay alive.  
Stigmatisation further limits their ability to explore their social capital (community networking 
trust, cohesion and inclusion) where they would obtain information and other resources, find 
social support and have any possible chance to influence community decision making. Stigma 
significantly hinders their socialisation and networking, which would be helpful in achieving a 
sustainable livelihood and reintegration.  
Their reduced resources and strategies leave them with extremely condensed chances of 
achieving a sustainable livelihood (reduced poverty, increased incomes, reduced vulnerability, 
resilience, etc.). With their subsidiary livelihood activities unsustainable and pushing them 
further to the margins, they lack food reserves or savings to rely on in a time of need. The 
absence of such a safety net results in their increased vulnerability to future disasters and risks. 
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8.6 Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has attempted to show the participants‘ lack of assets and capabilities to generate 
sufficient income. With their livelihood realities, we can see why many young women remain in 
‗bad‘ marriages to survive. Although they try to make their life situations bearable by engaging 
in one or more supplementary livelihood options, they are unable to save enough and invest in 
serious business activities to generate more income. With extreme poverty in a patriarchal 
society, the participants lack the ability (by themselves) to get out of this scarcity trap. Unless 
economic initiatives for female youth in northern Uganda are designed and effectively 
implemented to target formerly abducted girls, many of them will continue to survive by brewing 
and doing domestic or manual work to survive. Such economic activities affect their already 
stigmatised position and expose them to exploitation by those who hire them (see also Annan et 
al., 2006, 2008). Also, with their poor health, participating in such least-income-earning and 
back-breaking activities may not be possible in the long run.  
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
With information collected from 57 formerly abducted women, this thesis has discussed the 
central themes in their social and economic lives. It traced their movements from the time they 
were abducted; lives and experiences of soldiering in captivity; and their lives at the time of 
interviews. The findings demonstrate that their experiences as associates of an armed group have 
become central to their identity, and it is through this lens that they view and experience the 
‗civilian‘ world.  
The rich information shared during fieldwork provides contemporary knowledge on the situation 
of formerly abducted girls in Acholi, knowledge which is contextual and circumstantial but not 
unique. The findings give a critical insight into the degree of complexity and diversity of issues 
that these young women experienced and continue to experience in their villages as they try to 
rebuild their lives. Although these challenges are shared by their non-abducted peers, they 
remain severe for formerly abducted girls. To ensure the participants‘ voices were included and 
recognised, the findings have been presented with quotations from interviews while also 
including the author‘s experience, perspectives, reflections and knowledge gained through 
interacting with them and perusing the literature.  
Considering the small size of the sample, the study makes no claim to the generalisability of the 
stories analysed, although comparisons are made with related findings elsewhere.  
9.1 Recapitulation 
This thesis presents findings of research into, the social and economic life of formerly abducted 
girls. Interviews have revealed that the major themes include: physical and mental scars of 
abduction and life in captivity, stigmatisation, marriage complexities and economic hardship. To 
explore the significance of these central themes, subsequent sub-questions were posed. The first 
was: What are the participants‘ abduction experiences? During in-depth interviews, the 
participants were asked to look back at the events of their recruitment and lives in captivity. All 
of them were forcefully recruited, with the majority still adolescents and teenagers at the time. 
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The data explain the process of becoming a soldier with the LRA, including surviving the day of 
abduction, journey to Sudan, initiation/purification, military training and, finally, deployment for 
rebel activities. This process was intense and the participants were subjected to physical and 
psychological torture, oppression and brutality which forced them to rethink, review and forget 
their pre-abduction lives and relationships. They were instead forced to adopt and believe in a 
new reality, where violence was not only acceptable but the order of the day. To survive the day 
of abduction and then life in captivity, to fit in and work with the armed group, they had to adopt 
the reality and stigmatising identity of ‗rebel‘ without questioning or reflecting on what the 
consequences would be. Interviews also show how forced marriage in the armed group was 
organised. Marriage in the LRA was an important aspect of the women‘s military experience 
and, as discussed in this thesis, that part of their background continues to negatively impact their 
day-to-day lives.  
The majority (65%) of the women in our sample continue to emphasise the negative elements of 
life in captivity. They claim that ‗bush‘ life was never good and there was nothing they enjoyed 
or learnt while with the armed group. On the other hand, a smaller number (35%) perceived 
some abduction experiences as positive. They identified personal attributes or lessons learned 
from their military experiences that they owe to their soldiering in captivity. These life 
experiences added some value to their capacity to live in a ‗normal‘ world, taught them the art of 
perseverance in the face of difficulties and how to overcome these.  Having developed an 
independent, hardworking, courageous, resolute, and self-reliant attitude towards life and 
survival in captivity, the women find it difficult to subsequently renounce such feelings of 
independence and power following their return to civilian life.  For example, women who stayed 
longest in captivity and were exposed to suffering, killing and mortal threats for the duration of 
their stay, have been left feeling unnaturally ‗strong hearted‘ or courageous. They are not easily 
moved when something extremely bad happens. One of them had this to say: 
…in times of grief, I see them [non abductees] mourn for the dead in ways that I can‘t. I 
am strong hearted which I think I owe to my military experiences where I saw several 
dead people that I am no longer moved that much by the death of other people. In terms 
of fear of darkness, I can move any time of the night unlike many young women in this 
village who cannot.152 
                                                             
152 Interview, CM47, Lokung sub county, Lamwo district, 15/12/2012. 
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While to an ordinary person, life in captivity may be seen as entirely negative or bizarre, 
returnees have been changed by their experience, in ways which they feel and take as positive. 
Their stories portray a sense that being former abductees cannot be something that they relegate 
to the past, as it is part of their present-day identities and day-to-day lives. 
The second sub-question investigated was: How did the participants relate to their families and 
communities when they first returned home? And is this relationship improving or deteriorating 
over time? A lengthy war like that of northern Uganda leaves families and communities 
disrupted. When abducted persons returned home, many found themselves in different family 
structures headed by parents, grandparents, relatives or siblings. Similar to other studies, the 
findings challenge what is commonly presented in the reintegration literature, that most formerly 
abducted girls are rejected by their families. Many of our participants were initially accepted 
back by the remaining family members and went on to live in a cordial relationship with 
everyone. However, during the subsequent months or years, this relationship changed. This 
applies to their relationship to the wider community as well.  
Although it has been years since most of the women in our sample returned to their villages, they 
still face challenges in relating to other villagers. The findings illustrate complex situations such 
individuals find themselves in. They recognised and acknowledged their families and 
communities as important resources for reinsertion and long-term reintegration. They however 
also detailed their hindrances/barriers in terms of stigmatisation (both support and negative 
attitudes happen concurrently). We have seen that stigmatisation (tension, suspicion and negative 
attitudes) in Acholi—as identified by previous studies on initial reintegration—is still prevalent 
and hampering long-term reintegration. In their villages, formerly abducted individuals live with 
their physical deformities and the shame of having been part of the enemy for years, and are seen 
as transgressing and deviating from cultural norms. Although interviews indicate stigmatisation 
was more prevalent while people resided in IDP camps, it is still quite persistent in villages. 
Stigma promotion is used to set the abductees apart from the normal social strata: stigmatisation 
remains the greatest problem in their reintegration progress, hindering their relationships and 
marriage prospects. 
Although some participants acknowledged that stigmatisation has reduced ever since they left the 
camps, the improvement in treatment appears to occur through their efforts to fit into the 
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villages. Through the ways they relate with others, they are proving to the villagers that they are 
good people who need to be respected and appreciated like their non-abducted peers. It is still, 
however, difficult to break free of stigmatisation—forcing many of them to live disconnected 
lives and find comfort in isolation. Their physical world is largely confined to the settings where 
they reside and work. Faced with resentment, formerly abducted individuals can only cope with 
stigmatisation by maintaining silence as they try to live a ‗normal‘ life, ‗behaving well‘ and 
being respectful of others. They live with stigma promotion as part of their daily lives. Another 
category lives in isolation, avoiding or making no effort to interact with other people. At times 
when stigmatisation becomes unbearable, some are forced to relocate to completely new 
environments to start over. However, as discussed in this thesis, isolation, silence, secrecy and 
relocation coping mechanisms are not protective enough.  
Apart from negatively impacting their behaviour, stigmatisation is a source of emotional distress 
and low self-esteem for the formerly abducted. It not only inflames a sense of paranoia as they 
feel people in the family and social surroundings are constantly scrutinising them, it reminds 
them of their lives with the LRA, where they were at all times monitored and their actions 
closely watched and questioned by the commanders. There is an urgent need for the villages to 
shift/change their attitudes/perceptions of formerly abducted individuals and support them to 
achieve successful reintegration.  
Since stigmatisation is a persistent challenge, it needs persistent external responses. There is 
urgent need to address the structural causes of these people‘s stigmatization, marginalization, 
discrimination and vulnerability (e.g legislation on this minority group rights, anti-stigmatization 
and anti-discrimination campaigns). If not adequately addressed, individual rights will continue 
to be violated through prevalent stigma promotion. Eventually, formerly abducted people will 
have to contend with negative stereotypes and prejudices based on resentment, including: stain 
(‗they killed and are polluted‘); fear (‗they are dangerous and uncontrollable‘); and jealousy 
(‗they are benefiting from their abduction experiences‘). This will continue to be extended to 
their marriage prospects and attempts to form important networks that can benefit them as they 
seek to survive in post-conflict Acholi. There will be no successful reintegration for this category 
of youth if a barrier/wall is maintained between them and other people. Stigmatisation is steadily 
pushing them further to the margins of society. 
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Regardless of their different reintegration levels and achievements, all the women in our sample 
wish to be seen as living in the same way as their non-abductee peers, are consistently behaving 
as respectable, law abiding Acholi and Ugandans. They aspire to earn a decent living by 
generating money, being married and taking care of their families. Asked about their life goals, 
none of them identified a personal goal that could be interpreted as socially unacceptable. 
Generally, their identification with the societal norms is no different from that of other young 
women in Acholi. All they desire is acceptance, support and a chance to try to achieve their 
successful reintegration. 
The last sub-question asked was: How have the study participants reintegrated in economic 
terms? Evidence shows that recruitment into armed groups leads to human resource deficit. 
According to the interviews, no or low education and skills limit the participants‘ choices of 
livelihood strategies. Due to difficulty in accessing land or/and poor health, their participation in 
crop production is limited. These challenges, coupled with poverty, force them to venture into 
other supplementary livelihood strategies to ensure they and their families are provided for.  
While many of the women in our sample have not achieved desired economic reintegration 
outcomes, including increased incomes, over time they adapt to the local economic dynamics 
and become active agents of their own economic well-being. Regardless of limitations, they 
become functional, able and caring young adults towards their families and villages, impacting 
their surroundings through these livelihood contributions. While their specific vulnerabilities 
must be recognised, so too must their agency, determination and resilience. Their economic 
reintegration experiences demonstrate their strength and courage as they guarantee their survival 
to their families. 
In the long run, as demonstrated by Prossy‘s experience (Table 8.1), the more empowered and 
financially independent these women become, the fewer economic problems and stigmatisation 
they will face. The key to reducing stigma promotion remains in enhancing their ability to earn a 
stable income. However, this remains difficult considering that this category of youth is the least 
educated, has health complications, and resides in the remotest areas of northern Uganda. Given 
their inability to take on back-breaking economic activities, there is an urgent need to 
economically empower them. Also, considering that tailoring and other economic reintegration 
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programmes have not benefited most of them directly, more meaningful and realistic economic 
programmes targeting these young women in northern Uganda are sorely needed.  
Although, in terms of experiences, the 57 women interviewed have much in common, this should 
not give an impression that they are a homogeneous group. Their heterogeneity is the first 
characteristic that policy makers, development actors and researchers should take into account. 
Close diagnoses of the life situations of former girl abductees should allow accurate 
understanding of their reintegration progress and ongoing challenges. To reach out to this 
category of youth, there is a need to first understand and acknowledge their age, experience, 
perspectives, challenges, worries, aspirations, motivations, skills, and hopes for the future. They 
are not only a bunch of victims that need saving. They are active agents whose voices matter and 
need to be heard. They are ready to work, both individually and as a group. Although they are 
too poor to overcome their problems on their own, they are still hard working, and determined to 
‗make something‘ of themselves and their children. They are realistic about their circumstances 
and how they might be improved it. Therefore, to know what initiatives could work for them, 
their voices and experiences (and those of other young women) should be given priority when 
designing programmes to reduce their poverty and vulnerability.  
9.2 The Struggle Continues 
Although at the time of our interviews, many had been home for 6–10 years, they had not been 
able to achieve successful reintegration. With peace returning to northern Uganda, there is a 
feeling that everyone is going through a tough time as the region is trying to recover from the 
effects of a long war. While formerly abducted girls are not expected to complain but to rise to 
the challenges of day-to-day living along with the rest of the population, which they in fact do, 
they are still highly vulnerable and often marginalized. Because the majority were not rejected 
by their families and communities when they first returned home, are not involved in violence, 
they are assumed to have ‗successfully‘ reintegrated. At the time of this study, many had indeed 
attempted to participate in community reintegration initiatives like marriage and income 
generating activities. They were taking care of their children either by themselves or with the 
help of other people like their families and partners. However, they still faced stigmatisation and 
unfairness, and inability to fully engage in farming or earn money through stable means. They 
continue to struggle to find a place back inside their families and villages, a difficult task that 
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cannot be done in a short time and without help. With lack of recognizable external help say 
from their government, this minority group in post conflict northern Uganda is facing long term 
reintegration challenges by themselves, with minimum assistance from their families and 
villages. 
Although they have made slow progress with their reintegration, most women in the current 
sample still have hopes for a better future. Women with no hopes and aspirations are those who 
are, or perceive themselves to be, the very worst off. Stuck in their abduction past, they do not 
think of the future or do not think they have one—‗only God knows my fate/my future‘ was a 
common comment for some of them. Without earning any regular income, they depend entirely 
on others to survive. These women feel paralysed, with no sense of a future. Most of our 
participants, however, have plans and hopes, and thus a sense of a better future. Those who earn 
an income, however small, feel they can improve their situation. Although still faced with 
obstacles to their complete reintegration, they are positive towards life. Throughout the world, it 
is argued that the central drive for women‘s struggle to earn a living is to attain a better life for 
their children (Engle, 1986). Similarly, the participants‘ driving force and motivation to provide 
for their children are strong. Although they feel they lost valuable time and energy in captivity, 
they continue to work hard to ensure their children are provided for and can live a better life. 
Through educating and empowering their children, the mothers look forward to better life 
situations. However, given their limited resources, without external assistance to educate the 
children, this assumed ‗better‘ future will be difficult to achieve.  
The post-war period is often assumed to be a time of opportunity and progress for women (and 
other previously marginalised groups). During and after a conflict, women take up new roles and 
positions of power at the household and community levels. Because of this, the post war period 
is regarded as a time to re-negotiate and reconfigure women‘s status and positions (Handrahan, 
2004; Barth, 2002). However, the findings and literature show that ex-female combatants often 
return to their traditional roles and ways of living (particularly in villages). If they act otherwise, 
for example in exercising the power earned through their militarisation experience, they face 
challenges in relating with other people. Thus, to fit in to the host families and villages, they 
have to renounce these experiences. They have to do this because they are aware that their 
military experience is not accepted and appreciated by people in their new/old surroundings.  
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Formerly abducted girls resuming their traditional roles and ways of life are encouraged and 
aided by reintegration and other post-conflict development programmes. This is further 
reinforced by their families. For example, the line ‗forget your abduction past and start living 
like a normal person‘, was a common way family and villagers advised such young women. If 
they resisted and took evident pride in their experience, they risked being branded ‗unnatural‘, 
‗unwomanly‘, ‗unmarriageable‘ etc. However, this does not mean that there is no friction 
between the reintegrating individuals and their host villages. As host villagers demand that the 
women  become ‗normal‘ and ‗like us‘, the women resist (e.g. standing up to their stigmatisers or 
reporting them to the authorities, marrying their bush husbands, abandoning ‗bad‘ marriages, 
maintaining silence and isolation, among others). But on a personal level, this is an unequal 
battle; the women have to struggle within this hostile system so as to make ends meet or else 
they lose the battle for survival.  
9.3 Missing theme 
Although the academic literature and media coverage led this author to expect widespread 
feelings of resentment or/and calls for judicial recompense during interviews with the women, 
she encountered little in the way of such sentiment. The aim of participants at the time of our 
interviews was to be allowed to fit in socially and to be able to sustain themselves and their 
families. The women were silent on feelings of revenge either toward the men who had 
abducted, raped and tortured them, or the people who had stigmatised them in the villages. Most 
did not demand justice or for their abusers and stigmatisers to be punished (even when they knew 
the whereabouts of their bush husbands). They did not ask for, or expect any form of 
compensation for their suffering and loss. This silence can be attributed to a number of reasons, 
including: 
 They simply want to forget the past and focus on what is more important to them now 
(acceptance, marriage, livelihood etc.); 
 Seeking revenge or calling for justice and compensation will bring them (and their 
children) back into the limelight, which will ignite more public stigmatisation, 
resentment and jealousy; 
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 Seeking revenge may have greater and  longer-lasting repercussions for  the children 
than their mothers; and 
 Considering their illiterate status, particularly in the villages, the women do not know 
how their human rights have been and continue to be violated.   
9.4 Areas for Further Research 
The sample size in this study was ideal for gaining an insight into the complex war, life in 
captivity and reintegration experiences of research participants.  There is scope to expand the 
exploration of the core themes covered in Chapters 4-7 of this thesis to other groups of formerly 
abducted individuals, including young men; women who occupied high ranks in the LRA; 
women who were actually empowered by their experiences in captivity; and individuals who 
relocated to larger towns. Research among these groups should provide equally diverse and rich 
understandings of their lived realities to complement those revealed by the present study. For 
example, during the course of this female-focused study, it was realised that there are no 
comprehensive studies of formerly abducted boys‘ marriage and livelihood experiences, to 
compare with the everyday realities of the young women studied.  
The question of why the villagers continue to stigmatise formerly abducted individuals when it is 
common knowledge that they were forcefully recruited is a very interesting one that could be 
expanded even more. There is a need to explore and profile the stigmatisers. From the 
interviews, it was not clear who stigmatises former abductees the most; could it be older women, 
young women (peers), young men, older men or children, and why? The findings also highlight 
the dilemma some women face, where they would want to move to a place where they are 
anonymous to avoid stigmatisation, but because of tight social ties which they depend on to 
survive, are unable to do so. This is an interesting issue which merits further research, probably 
with emphasis on  differences between women and men—is it easier, for example, for men to 
move somewhere where they will be anonymous? And, finally, linking stigmatisation and 
marriage, the findings show that former abductees do not marry each other. If they did, this 
would probably diminish some of the stigma in the marriage and perhaps allow them to be more 
open about their experiences. The question of why they do not marry each other can be explored 
further. Lastly, in terms of sensitisation efforts and sympathising with former abductees, never 
abducted young women and men are a category to target if stigmatisation is to be addressed in 
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Acholi. First, the focus should be on exploring whether and how young men and women offer 
practical support to former abductees, thereby contributing to their rehabilitation and healing. 
Such support can then be promoted with the aim of challenging and reducing stigmatisation. 
There is also a need for longitudinal studies using insights from development, sociology, 
economics and anthropology to further demonstrate how returnee experiences evolve over time, 
say over a 15 to 20 year period. For example, by tracing the personal journeys of the women over 
time, changes in their reintegration outcomes can be explored at depth. It may be that, despite a 
longer period of reintegration, their social and economic situations remain the same. However, 
based on current findings, this is unlikely. Considering their situation when they first returned 
home, there is a tremendous shift, particularly with respect to their economic reintegration 
experiences. This suggests that some, after many more years reintegrating, will demonstrate 
considerable progress in their social and economic fortunes. But, even though there will be 
different and varying perspectives on long-term reintegration, even among this group, 
respondents will still be in a position to provide more information on the dynamics and outcomes 
of successful reintegration. Such information will be particularly useful to inform sustainable 
livelihood planning for women who, having participated directly in armed conflict, had also 
successfully exited armed groups waging war, and were seeking to rebuild their lives. 
Finally, the majority of participants (n=40) were mothers of a total of 59 surviving children born 
in captivity. The issue of these children, both in Acholi and elsewhere in northern Uganda, needs 
urgent research attention. Very little is known about how these children‘s integration is 
unfolding. Considering that many of them are approaching adolescence, a detailed diagnosis of 
their unique and complex needs remains crucial. Bearing in mind that most LRA fighters 
were/are Acholi, there is a need to understand how children born to abducted girls from other 
groups are treated. For example, does stigmatisation manifest itself differently among these other 
communities? Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Five, mothers often gave their children 
stigmatising names: how has this impacted on the children‘s integration? Also, a deeper analysis 
of mother-child relationships is needed, as research into how this relationship impacts the long-
term reintegration of mothers is still very scant. We also need, finally, to understand how the 
natures of such filial relationships vary with the specific circumstances of conception: forced 
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marriages (where the mother knows the father); gang rapes in armed groups; rape in IDP camps; 
and ‗everyday‘ rape in the community.   
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Appendix A: Uganda Timeline since 1962 
  
1962 October 9 Uganda ends Britain rule and gains independence with the Buganda king, 
Edward Mutesa II, as president,  
 
1966 Obote under Uganda People‘s Congress (UPC) becomes President of 
Uganda. A new constitution gave him and abolishes all tribal kingdoms. 
This ended Buganda‘s autonomy 
1971 January 25 Obote is deposed in a coup led by Idi Amin, Army chief 
1972-73 Uganda engages in border clashes with Tanzania 
1978-9 Amin is toppled by a coalition of Uganda National Liberation Front, 
Tanzania forces and Ugandans in exile.   
1980 Obote is re-elected for president (Obote II) 
1981 Feb 
 
Yoweri Museveni launches a guerrilla war under National Resistance 
Army (NRA). This five-year bush war took place in central Uganda 
(―Luwero triangle‖).          
1985 Obote is toppled and replace by General Tito Okello 
1986 Okello is deposed by Museveni‘s National Resistance Army (NRA). The 
former is declared president on 29 January 1986. Many Acholi and Langi 
soldiers fled to northern Uganda and Sudan 
1986-1987 Formation of the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army-UPDA (the remnants 
of Uganda‘s National Liberation Army-UNLA) 
1987- 1988 Alice Auma ―Lakwena‖ launches an insurgency,Holy Spirit Movement. 
She is defeated and she flees to Kenya 
1988-1989 SeverinoLikoya (father of Alice Auma) engages in conflict 
Late 1988 Joseph Kony, takes over the fight in northern Uganda 
1988-1994 
1993/4 
Formation and operations ofLord‗s Resistance Army, under Joseph Kony 
Khartoum begins to provide directsupport to the LRA. Inreturn, the LRA 
supports Sudan‘s war against theSudan People‘s LiberationArmy in 
southern Sudan. 
1994 March The LRA steps up ambushes and abductions in the north 
1994 First attempts of Peace talks between the government and LRA (known as 
―Bigombe talks‖) 
1995- LRA fighters are reported to have set up bases in neighbouring states: the 
Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
southern Sudan. 
1995 April relations between Uganda and Sudan break off each accusing the other of 
backing hostile rebel groups 
1995 New constitution legalizing political parties but maintains the ban on 
political activity for more five years. 
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1996 Acholi residents flee villages due to LRA‘s violence. Forced displacement 
starts 
 
1996 Oct 10 The LRA abducts139 girls from a Aboke girls‘ (run by Catholic Italian 
nuns) 
1999 May 14 
 
 
2001 
President Museveni offered amnesty to rebel leader Joseph Kony, head of 
the Sudanese backed Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Members of the LRA 
were included in the offer. 
The U.S. government places the LRA on a list of terrorist organizations. 
April 2002 Uganda and Sudan relations are restored. Khartoum gives Ugandan army 
the right to pursue LRA into Sudanese territory. 
2002-2004 
 
2003 
UPDF launches ―Operation Iron Fist 1&2‖ aimed at wiping out the LRA 
for good. 
Pres. Museveni requests that the International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
investigate crimes against humanity in northern Uganda. 
2005 October 
2005 
ICC issues arrest for Joseph Kony and his other four LRA commanders. 
The LRA shifts its base of operations to northeastern Congo, underscoring 
the regional dimensions of the conflict. 
2006 July 14 The government and the LRA launch peace negotiations in Juba, southern 
Sudan. 
2006 August 
 
2007-2015 
LRA declares ceasefire for proposed peace talks, held throughout 2006 and 
2007 
Museveni initiates the Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP) to 
promote reconstruction and development efforts in northern Uganda  
2008 February 23 Government and LRA sign permanent ceasefire in Sudan. However, in 
November Kony fails to show up to sign a peace agreement. 
2008 December ―Operation Lightning Thunder‖ a joint military offensive against LRA in 
DRC is launched by Uganda, DRC and Sudan.  
 
December 19, 
2011 
A unit of US special forces arrives in the east of the Central African 
Republic to help fight the LRA 
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Appendix B: Location where individual and groups interviews were carried out 
District  Sub-county Participants Number 
Gulu Gulu Municipality  Formerly abducted women     
 
4 
Formerly abducted young men 
 
3 
NGO Officer                  
 
1 
Reception centre officer     
 
1 
Kitgum Kitgum Town Council Formerly abducted women    
 
15 
FGDs     
 
4 (44 participants) 
Local women‘s leader              
 
2 
Reception centre officer                                2 
LabongAmida 
 
Formerly abducted women     10 
FMDs                                        4 (17 participants) 
Local council leader                  1 
Omiya Anyima Formerly abducted women       16 
FMD                                            1 (11 participants) 
Lamwo Lokung Formerly abducted women          12 
FGDs                                            2 (19 participants) 
Pader Pader Town Council FGD                                              1 (11 participants) 
Reception centre officer                                1 
Total   170 Participants 
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Appendix C: Demographic Information for all the women153 
 CM Age at abduction  Length of abduction  
Forcibly 
Married? Bore child/ren 
 Age at time of 
interviews  Married? 
How 
long? 
CM01 16 6 years yes 2 29 
CM02 9 4 years  yes 0 19 
CM03 12 4 years  yes 2 20 
CM04 12 4 years  yes 1 24 
CM05 9 7 years  yes 1 23 
CM06 11 10 years  yes 2 20 
CM07 15 don‘t know yes 1 28 
CM08 12 6 years yes 0 22 
CM09 10 7 years  yes 2 (1 died) 32 
CM10 10 5 years  no 0 22 
CM11 12 don‘t know no 0 23 
CM12 13 9 years  yes 1 21 
CM13 13 9 years  yes 1 28 
CM14 19 3 Months  no 0 30 
CM15 11 don‘t know yes 2 36 
CM16 11 6 years yes 1 27 
CM17 13 9 years  yes 1 23 
CM18 13 8 years  yes 1 23 
CM19 14 3 months  yes 0 25 
CM20 6 3 years yes 0 20 
CM21 13 3 years yes 1 24 
CM22 14 don‘t know yes 3 (1 died)  40 
CM23 13 3 years yes 1 25 
CM24 11 5 years  yes 1 29 
CM25 14 7 years  yes 1 26 
CM26 30 3 Months  no 0 45 
CM27 15 1 year  yes 0 21 
CM28 13 6 years yes l 26 
CM29 17 4 years  yes 2 29 
CM30 13 1 year  yes 0 23 
CM31 15 2 years yes 2 23 
CM32 11 8 years  yes 1 (died) 23 
CM33 14 7 years  yes 2 30 
CM34 19 3 years yes 1 33 
CM35 11 8 years  yes 2 26 
CM36 8 7 years  yes 2 25 
CM37 14 8 years  yes 2 32 
CM38 13 6 years yes 1 25 
CM39 15 2 years yes 1 29 
                                                             
153 CM is for Child mother  
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CM40 9 9 years  yes 2 28 
CM41 17 6 years yes 1 27 
CM42 13 4 years  no 0 25 
CM43 11 12 year no   3 23 
CM44 14 2 years yes 
1 (left in the 
bush) 22 
CM45 30 9 years  yes 2 Miscarriages Don‘t know 
CM46 30 2 years no  
 
43 
CM47 13 8 years  yes 1 25 
CM48 10 don‘t know yes 1 26 
CM49 12 don‘t know yes  0 19 
CM50 14 9 years  yes 2 38 
CM51 9 don‘t know 
yes (married 
twice) 2 19 
CM52 12 don‘t know yes 0 36 
CM53 13 9 years  yes 1 23 
CM54 20 4 years  yes 1 (died) 32 
CM55 10 11 years  yes 1 28 
CM56 14 7 years  yes 3 30 
CM57 14 10 years  No 5 (1 died) 36  
 
 
 
 
  
